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Thesis	Abstract			Incentive-based	 measures	 are	 increasingly	 being	 employed	 as	 a	 strong	 motive	 to	encourage	 conservation	 yet	 the	 evidence	 that	 they	 are	 generating	 sustainable	resource-use,	 improving	 rural	 livelihoods	 or	 aiding	 biodiversity	 protection	 remains	inconclusive.	 To	 provide	 empirical	 evidence	 to	 this	 discourse,	 in	 this	 study	 the	McDermott	et	al	 (2013)	equity	 framework	 is	used	 to	explore	how	different	benefit-sharing	arrangements	have	shaped	twenty-five	years	of	Integrated	Conservation	and	Development	projects	(ICDP)	neighbouring	the	Mt.	Elgon	National	Park,	Uganda.		Applying	 a	 self-reported,	 post-hoc,	 quasi-experimental	 design,	 a	 time-series	 of	participatory	 mapping	 activities	 revealed	 that	 despite	 the	 willingness	 of	 targeted	groups	 to	 adopt	 ‘green’	 technologies	 (distributional	 equity),	 maintaining	 and	 up-scaling	 these	 activities	 remained	 limited	 at	 the	 landscape	 level.	 Social	 network	analysis	uncovered	that	limited	knowledge,	restricted	access	(contextual	equity)	and	the	 lack	 of	 inclusion	 in	 decision-making	 (procedural	 equity)	 impeded	 this	development.	Tracking	the	Mt.	Elgon	Regional	Eco-System	Conservation	Programme	(MERECP)	as	a	specific	case	study,	the	analyses	then	showed	that	wealthier	members	of	 society	 and	 the	 political	 elite	 were	 the	 principle	 beneficiaries	 of	 conservation	inputs.	 In	 the	 cases	 where	 these	 institutionalised	 hierarchies	 were	 purposely	sidestepped	(a	measure	to	ensure	marginalised	stakeholders	gained	funds),	cases	of	conflict	and	resentment	arose.		Overall,	 communities	 that	 had	 loose,	 expansive	 conservation	networks	 adopted	 the	greatest	 number	 of	 simple	 technologies.	 Nevertheless,	 those	 that	 have	 built	 a	 high	level	of	trust	both	amongst	one	another	and	with	supporting	organisations	resulted	in	the	most	 socially	 equitable	 and	 biologically	 efficient	 outcomes.	 Portraying	 a	 future	rich	 in	 sustainable	 land-use	 practises,	 communities	 do	 aspire	 to	 protecting	 their	natural	resources.	Whilst	this	may	be	a	time-consuming,	expensive	process,	building	sound	 adaptive	 ‘co-management’	 relationships	 that	 respect	 cultural	 norms,	 provide	suitable	 alternatives	 and	 maximises	 local	 knowledge	 is	 the	 key	 to	 implementing	incentive-based	conservation	measures	across	Mt.	Elgon.		
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Introduction		Covering	more	than	15%	of	the	earths	terrestrial	surface	(Franks	and	Schreckenberg,	2016),	 Protected	 Areas	 (PAs)	 remain	 one	 of	 the	 most	 effective	 measures	 in	conserving	 different	 species	 and	 habitats	 across	 the	 globe	 (Gray	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 Yet	when	 discussing	 their	 social	 impacts	we	 are	 addressing	 a	 global	 inequity	 problem.	Typically	 degraded	 by	 wealthier	 individuals,	 too	 often	 restricted	 access	disproportionally	 affects	 the	 most	 vulnerable.	 Characterised	 by	 rapidly	 growing	populations	 living	 in	 extreme	 poverty,	 people-free	 parks	 can	 cause	 severe	 socio-economic	hardship	(Spiteri	and	Nepalz,	2006)	and	numerous	cultural	losses	(Martin,	Gross-Camp	and	Akol,	2015)	that	current	management	approaches	are	struggling	to	adequately	distribute	the	costs	and	benefits	of	(Franks	and	Schreckenberg,	2016).			Aspiring	to	ease	these	opposing	environmental	and	development	pathways,	since	the	1992	Convention	of	Biological	Diversity	(CBD)	policy	thinking	has	shifted	away	from	the	reactive	and	ad	hoc	approach	of	protecting	individual	species	to	a	more	proactive	and	holistic	one.	By	integrating	the	management	of	land,	water	and	living	resources	to	encourage	 sustainable	 resource	 use	 (MEA,	 2005),	 the	 conference	 devised	 the	‘ecosystem	approach.’	This	was	the	first	attempt	to	put	human	needs	at	the	centre	of	biodiversity	 management	 (Raffaelli	 and	 Frid,	 2010)1.	 On	 the	 grounds	 of	 achieving	democratic	 accountability	 and	 reducing	 dependency	 on	 protected	 resources,	 these	have	 now	 been	 promoted	 under	 the	 umbrella	 of	 decentralisation	 approaches	 that	included	 building	 adaptive	 co-management	 relationships	 under	 community-based	conservation	 and	 promoting	Alternatively	 Livelihood	 Projects	 (ALPs)	 (Wright	 et	 al.	2015).		At	the	2007	G8	Postdam	summit,	a	strong	emphasis	was	then	placed	on	the	need	for	environmental	valuation	to	drive	the	ecosystem	approach	(Pokorny,	Johnson,	Medina	and	Hoch,	2012).	Stemming	from	Coasean	economics	(Pascual,	Muradian,	Rodríguez	and	Duraiappah,	2010),	by	 integrating	global	value	chains	and	 the	payment	of	non-market	 forest	 services,	 it	 is	 hoped	 that	 the	 numerous	 environmental	 and	 cultural																																									 																					1	Principle 1,4 and 5 of the Rio Declaration "Human beings are at the centre of concerns for 
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services	 offered	 by	 nature	 will	 be	 valued	 (Wilson	 and	 Guéneau,	 2004).	 Essentially	improving	economic	efficiency	and	providing	real	financial	incentives	for	local	actors	to	 conserve	 them	 (Engel,	 Pagiola	 and	Wunder,	 2008).	 Directing	 such	 efforts	 in	 the	global	 south,	 the	 application	 of	 market-based	 incentive	 mechanisms,	 including	Payment	 for	 Ecosystem	 Services	 (PES)	 and	 the	 United	 Nations	 Reduced	 Emissions	from	 Deforestation	 and	 Degradation	 (REDD+)	 policy,	 have	 been	 growing	 (Gómez-Baggethun	and	Muradian,	2015;	Hejnowicz,	Raffaelli,	Rudd	and	White,	2014).	The	aim	of	 which	 has	 been	 to	 alleviate	 poverty	 whilst	 encouraging	 the	 growth	 of	 green	economies:	what	has	been	termed	a	triple-win	for	ecosystem	conservation,	financial	investors	and	the	rural	poor	alike	(McAfee	and	Shapiro,	2010).	Further	justifications	have,	however,	included	their	ability	to	reduce	information	asymmetries	and	provide	policy	makers	with	price	signals	(Gomez-Baggethun	and	Ruiz-Perez,	2011).		Reflecting	mainly	on	the	existing	PES	and	Integrated	Conservation	and	Development	Projects	 (ICDP),	 sceptics	 are	 not	 only	 questioning	 the	 practicalities	 of	 such	interventions	but	the	legitimacy	of	introducing	neoliberal-policies	in	the	marginalised	global	 south	 (McAfee	 and	 Shapiro,	 2010;	 Bremer,	 Farley	 and	 Lopez-Carr,	 2014;	Corbera,	 Brown	 and	 Adger,	 2007;	 Krause,	 Collen	 and	 Nicholas,	 2013;	 Gómez-Baggethun,	 de	 Groot,	 Lomas	 and	Montes,	 2010).	 Having	 the	 potential	 to	 reproduce	existing	 power	 asymmetries	 found	 in	 markets,	 they	 also	 have	 the	 ability	 to	undermine	 the	 rights	 of	 poor	 communities	 whilst	 crowding	 out	 their	 intrinsic	motivations	to	conserve	nature	(Kosoy	and	Corbera,	2010;	Muradian	et	al.,	2013).		
Problem	Statement		
The	Role	of	Benefit-Sharing	in	Public	Participation			As	 highlighted	 by	 Muradian	 et	 al.	 (2013),	 in	 practise	 very	 few	 interventions	 are	founded	on	pure	markets.	These	schemes	are	policy	interventions	trying	to	motivate	widespread	 behavioural	 changes	 which	 in	 turn	 largely	 depend	 on	 whether	individuals	have	the	‘eligibility,	ability	and	willingness’	to	do	so	(Pagiola,	Arcenas	and	Platais,	2005;	Pascual	et	al.,	2010).	From	a	stakeholders	perspective	one	would	only	engage	in	conservation	if	a)	the	benefits	outweighed	the	opportunity	and	transaction	costs	and	b)	if	these	benefits	were	perceived	to	be	legitimate	and	distributed	in	a	fair	manner	(Dunlop	and	Corbera,	2016;	Pascual	et	al.,	2010).		
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Consequently,	one	of	the	most	crucial	questions	that	needs	addressing	is	how	can	the	benefits,	be	it	in	the	REDD+	context	or	not,	be	distributed	in	an	‘efficient,	effective	and	equitable’	manner	 (Angelsen,	Brockhaus,	 Sunderlin	 and	Verchot,	 2012;	Wong	et	 al.,	2016)?	To	date,	there	is	no	one-size-fits-all	mechanism	for	the	channelling	of	finances	(Hoang	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Madeira	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 Instead	 individual	 projects	 have	 been	structured	 according	 to	 the	 host	 country	 and	 site-level	 circumstances	 (a	 nested	approach)	with	different	beneficiaries	and	costs	associated	with	the	sharing	process.		Who,	 why	 and	 what	 you	 receive	 depends	 on	 the	 different	 agreements	 reached	between	the	context	specific	stakeholders	(Hoang	et	al.	2012;	Lindhjem	et	al.	2011;	Mwayafu,	Kimbowa	&	Graham	2012;	Peskett	2011).	This	is	known	as	benefit-sharing	and	there	are	two	dimensions	that	underpin	it	(Fig	1).	The	first	is	the	transparent	and	efficient	distribution	of	from	national	level	to	the	community	(vertical).	These	can	be	considered	 incentives	 that	 drive	 good	 governance	 and	 external	 support	 i.e	 actors	from	 different	 government	 agencies	 or	 intermediary	 organisations.	 Linked	 to	environmental	performance,	instruments	such	as	‘Ecological	Fiscal	Transfers’	can	be	used	 for	 intergovernmental	 flow	 of	 benefits,	 particularly	 towards	 lower	 level	administrators	 (Wong	 et	 al.	 In	 Prep).	 The	 second	 is	 the	 distribution	 of	 funds	 that	provide	 customised	 and	 legitimate	 financial	 incentives	 to	 alter	 land-use	 change	 in	favour	 of	 sequestration	 and	 storage	 (horizontal).	 Such	 incentives	 can	 be	 direct	payment	 to	 communities	whilst	 others	 can	 be	 in-kind	 benefits	 such	 as	 technology,	education	and	healthcare	services	(Mwayafu,	Kimbowa	and	Graham,	2012).										
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Dimensions	of	Fairness,	Equity	and	Justice		Given	that	stakeholders	users	are	not	homogenous,	the	design	and	implementation	of	a	 benefit-sharing	 scheme	will	 affect	 stakeholders	 differently	 and	 change	 over	 time;	not	least	because	their	perceptions	of	what	fairness	will	vary	(Kaye-zwiebel	and	King,	2014;	Krause,	Collen	and	Nicholas,	2013).	
Distributional	Equity		Traditionally,	 economic	 fairness	 may	 be	 seen	 as	 the	 equal	 division	 of	 benefits	amongst	 all	 possible	 individuals	 (egalitarian)	 but	 since	 it	 is	 subjective,	 numerous	fairness	 criteria	 can	 be	 applied	 (Pascual	 et	 al.	 2010).	 Deciding	 why	 certain	stakeholders	 should	 benefit,	 such	 as	 whether	 they	 should	 be	 compensated	 for	restrictions	 to	 community	 rights/resource	 access,	 awarded	 for	 environmental	stewardship	(merit-based),	or	prioritised	due	to	their	authority,	status	or	control,	are	some	 such	 rule-based	 principles	 to	 consider	 (Le	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 Then	 targeting	 who	should	 benefit,	 i.e.	 upstream	 or	 downstream	 users,	 individual	 households,	
Figure	1.		Bene%it-sharing	distribution	pathways	and	their	potential	recipients.	Adopted	from	Ellis-Jones	in	Lindhjem	et	al.	(2011)	and	Pascual	et	al.	(2010)	
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Community	 Based	 Organisations	 (CBO’s)	 and	 whether	 these	 divisions	 should	 be	based	on	factors	such	as	gender,	wealth	and	age	all	have	important	ramifications	on	equity	 and	 consequently	 ecological	 outcomes.	 The	 type	 of	 benefit	 is	 equally	 as	important.	 A	 study	 by	 Fisher	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 showed	 that	 deforestation	 avoidance	payments	 to	 communities	 could	 increase	 the	value	of	 firewood	whilst	providing	no	liable	 fuel	alternative	making	 it	 an	 inefficient	 incentive.	 In	other	words	 the	 fairness	criteria	 adopted	 by	 any	 scheme	 will	 impact	 distributional	 equity,	 that	 being	 the	dispersal	of	burdens,	benefits,	risks	and	responsibilities	(Pascual	et	al.,	2014),	and	in	changing	these	dynamics	this	now	becomes	a	question	of	 justice	(Sikor,	2013).	 It	 is,	however,	 the	 ideologies	 of	 social	 justice,	 those	 of	 needs,	 rights,	merits	 and	 interest	that	underpin	fairness	criteria	(Gregorio	et	al.,	2013).		
Procedural	Equity			With	 that	 in	 mind,	 perceptions	 of	 fairness	 are	 not	 only	 guided	 by	 distributional	equity,	 but	 through	 the	 political	 process	 in	 which	 they	 have	 been	 implemented	(McDermott,	 Mahanty	 and	 Schreckenberg,	 2013).	 Known	 as	 procedural	 equity,	 the	level	 of	 participation,	 like	 being	 able	 to	 freely	 voice	 one’s	 personal	 opinions	 and	question	 the	 decision-making	 process	 (Luintel,	 2016),	 is	 a	 critical	 component	 of	stakeholders	 acceptance	 of	 the	 distributional	 outcomes	 (Scholsberg,	 2009).	 For	example,	when	irrigation	communities	in	Australia	were	faced	with	the	possibility	of	losing	water	resource	allocations	to	deal	with	sustainability	issues,	their	inclusion	in	the	democratic	decision-making	process	overrode	economic	 considerations	 in	what	they	 believed	 were	 significant	 judgements	 of	 fairness	 in	 their	 reallocation	 (Syme,	Nancarrow	 and	 Mccreddin,	 1999).	 Individuals	 are	 therefore	 not	 motivated	 by	economics	 alone	 (Sommerville	 et	 al.	 2010),	 achieving	 improvements	 in	 procedural	equity	 helps	 create	 legitimacy	 and	 is	 prerequisite	 for	 addressing	 effective	distributional	outcomes	in	practice	(Gregorio	et	al.,	2013;	Wong	et	al.,	2016).	
Contextual	Equity	
Termed	 equity	 in	 access	 by	 Brown	 and	 Corbera	 (2003)	 or	 contextual	 equity	 by	McDermott	 et	 al	 (2012),	 context-specific	 capabilities	 and	 power	 dynamics	 bring	together	 dimensions	 of	 procedural	 and	 distribution	 equity	 (Kosoy,	 Corbera	 and	Brown,	2008;	Muradian	et	al.,	2013).	More	specifically,	Ribot	and	Peluso	(2009)	argue	
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that	 one’s	 ability	 to	 access	 benefits	 principally	 depend	 on	 the	 existing	 social	relationships	and	 institutional	 arrangements,	 then	 to	a	 lesser	extent	 capital,	 labour,	market	 technology	 and	 information.	 Here,	 power	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	relationships	between	different	people,	 including	 the	knowledge	and	authority	 they	choose	 to	 share.	 Unequal	 power	 in	 a	 socio-ecological	 setting	 will	 (re)	 produce	inequity	yet	in	practice	changing	it	is	exceptionally	difficult	as	you	risk	the	potential	of	 redistributing	 power	 to	 those	 who	 undermine	 conservation,	 mismanage	 finance	and	reduce	stakeholder	participation.		
Vertical	benefit-sharing	agreements	in	conservation	often	target	state	owned	forests,	many	of	which	who	fail	to	recognise	customary	rights	of	their	resource	users	(Sikor,	2013).	 Such	 is	 the	 case	 with	 the	 Batwa	 indigenous	 communities	 in	 Uganda	 who	continue	 to	be	 inadequately	compensated	 for	 their	historical	economic	and	cultural	marginalisation	 (Martin,	 Gross-Camp	 and	 Akol,	 2015).	 In	 the	 creation	 of	 protected	areas,	biological	corridors,	forest	reserves	and	sustainable	forest	management	zones,	governments	may	not	only	prohibit	community	use	or	completely	evict	peoples	from	such	 area,	 they	 may	 justify	 finance	 going	 into	 their	 management,	 essentially	increasing	state	control	(Lyster,	2011).	As	shown	in	a	review	across	Nepal	(Adhikari,	Kingi	 and	 Ganesh,	 2014),	 decentralising	 natural	 resource	management	without	 the	capabilities,	 downward	 accountability	 and/	 or	 sufficient	 powers	 could	 threaten	equity	targets	(Ribot,	2003).	With	regards	to	financial	outcomes,	Pascual	et	al.	(2014)	warn	 nepotism,	 corruption,	 fraud,	 and	 elite	 capture	 are	 very	 realistic	 outcomes	 in	settings	that	lack	real	transparency	amongst	their	stakeholders.		
Attempting	 to	overcome	some	of	 the	key	equity	and	rights	challenges,	 international	policy	makers	have	designed	a	number	of	environmental	and	social	safeguards	 that	could	 help	 guide	 the	 implementation	 of	 incentive-based	 projects	 on	 the	 ground	(Fontana	 and	 Grugel,	 2016;	 Mahanty	 and	 McDermott,	 2013).	 They	 call	 for	 full,	transparent,	 non-discriminatory,	 respectful	 and	 effective	 stakeholder	 participation,	especially	with	the	most	marginalised	stakeholders	that	are	lacking	clear	legal	rights	and	identities	over	their	traditional	land.	This	means	formally	recognising	the	rights	of	 indigenous	 and	 other	 affected	 peoples	 by	 ensuring	 Free,	 Prior,	 Informed,	 and	Consent	(FPIC)	from	the	on-set	of	the	intervention	(Mahanty	and	McDermott,	2013).		
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Research	Need	and	Theoretical	Approach			Overall,	 the	 academic	 literature	 makes	 a	 strong	 argument	 to	 include	 equity	dimensions	in	incentive-based	policy	instruments	(Calvet-Mir	et	al.,	2015;	Franks	and	Schreckenberg,	2016;	Gross-Campi,	Few	and	Martin,	2015;	Martin,	Gross-Camp	and	Akol,	2015;	Schroeder	and	McDermott,	2014;	Wong	et	al.,	2016).	 It	emphasises	that	widespread	 consultation,	 consideration	 of	 distributional	 designs	 and	 carefully	factorising	 enabling	 conditions	 can	 help	 improve	 their	 effectiveness	 (Assembe-Mvondo,	Brockhaus	and	Lescuyer,	2013;	Loft,	Gebara	and	Wong,	2016).	Nevertheless,	realistic	about	the	trade-offs,	they	highlight	that	including	such	dynamics	can	increase	transaction	 and	 implementation	 costs	 (Tjajadi,	 Yang,	 Naito	 and	 Arwida,	 2015).	 As	early	lessons	from	the	REDD+	come	trickling	in	(Dunlop	and	Corbera,	2016;	Hoang	et	al.,	 2012;	 Yang	 et	 al.,	 2015)	 and	 conservation	 science	 starts	 to	 focus	 on	 these	dimensions	(Baylis	et	al.,	2015),	more	evidence	can	tease	out	characteristics	of	failure	or	 success	 and	 more	 importantly	 the	 environments	 in	 which	 they	 occur	 (He	 and	Sikor,	 2015;	 Martin,	 Gross-Camp	 and	 Akol,	 2015;	 Pelletier,	 Gélinas	 and	 Skutsch,	2016).		With	this	in	mind,	a	post-hoc	evaluation	of	conservation	interventions	across	the	Mt.	Elgon	ecosystem	 is	preformed	through	an	equity	and	sustainability	 lens.	Looking	at	all	three	sustainability	pillars:	economic,	social	and	environmental,	here	three	major	questions	 are	 addressed	 throughout	 the	 research	 using	 the	 equity	 framework	developed	 by	 McDermott	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 (Fig	 2).	 The	 first	 is	 centred	 on	 social	sustainability.	 It	 seeks	 to	 investigate	 whether	 the	 implementation	 process	(procedural	 equity)	 and	 beneficiaries	 of	 (distributional	 equity)	 is	 accessible	 to	current	 and	 future	 community	 members	 (contextual	 equity).	 The	 second	 explores	environmental	sustainability,	more	specifically	focusing	on	whether	projects	have	or	are	 encouraging	 sustainable	 livelihood	 strategies	 (mitigation).	 The	 final	 question	considers	 whether	 current	 interventions	 have	 truly	 created	 long-term	 financial	support	systems	that	makes	 these	communities	resilient	 to	 the	effects	of	poverty	 in	the	future	(adaptation).		
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Targeting	a	single	protected	area	(Chapter	two),	the	research	begins	by	looking	at	the	promotion	of	conservation	agriculture	 in	Mt.	Elgon	Uganda	(Chapter	three),	and	the	resulting	 landscape	 changes	 from	 a	 community	 perspective	 (Chapter	 four).	Thereafter,	 a	 more	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 the	 Mt.	 Elgon	 Regional	 Ecosystem	Conservation	Programme	(MERECP)	Cash	Revolving	Fund	Benefit-Sharing	Scheme	is	used	 to	 explore	 equity	 issues	 in	 more	 detail	 (Chapter	 five).	 To	 meet	 this	 aim,	 the	following	four	objectives	will	be	addressed:	-	
Objective	 1.	 To	 characterise	monetary	 and	 non-monetary	 benefits	 associated	
with	 conservation	 interventions	 and	 consequently	 how	 these	 have	 impacted	
livelihoods.			The	purpose	of	 this	objective	 is	 to	understand	who	and	how	different	 stakeholders	are	benefiting	from	conservation	interventions	(distributional	equity).	Since	it	would	be	misleading	to	directly	attribute	changes	to	specific	projects,	the	perceived	impacts	are	collated.		
Objective	2.	To	understand	how	different	socio-political	processes	are	driving	
the	implementation	and	use	of	conservation	inputs	across	Mt.	Elgon.		
Figure	2.		Conceptualisation	of	research	questions	through	a	sustainability	and	equity	framework			
Are	forest	funds	reaching	rural	HHs,	growing	and	revolving	within	communities?		
Are	land	and	resource	use	decisions	in	favour	of	the	preservation	of	physical	assets?	
Are	Conservation	Projects	Sustainable	and	Equitable?		
Economically?	 Socially?		 Environmentally?		
• Do	community	members	have	the	ability	to	participate?	Contextual		 • Is	the	whole	community	beneFiting?	Procedural		 • How	are	the	community	beneFiting?	Distributional		
Is	there	access	to	social	resources	for	today	and	the	future?	McDermott	et	al	(2011)	Equity	Framework	
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Evaluating	 a	 Cash	 Revolving	 Fund	 benefit-sharing	 Scheme	 where	 each	 of	 the	participating	(CBO’s)	set	their	own	criteria	for	lending,	along	with	differing	terms	and	conditions	 of	 repayment,	 this	 objective	 seeks	 to	 understand	 how	 institutional	arrangements,	 participation	 and	 decision-making	 has	 led	 to	 the	 current	 benefit-sharing	 outcomes.	 The	 focus	 here	 is	 to	 explore	 contextual	 equity,	 looking	 at	knowledge,	 representation,	 inclusion	 and	 voices.	 The	 strengths	 and	 weaknesses	 of	such	 conditions	 will	 then	 be	 explored	 by	 participating	 stakeholders,	 compared	 to	those	that	have	not.		
Objective	 3.	 To	 identify	 the	 success	 conditions	 and	 further	 action	 that	 is	
required	to	upscale	CRF	activities	in	Mt.	Elgon.		Objective	 three	 asks	 the	 question	 what	 if.	 If	 participating	 communities	 had	 the	freedom,	 how,	 where	 and	 why	 would	 they	 do	 it	 differently?	 If	 neighbouring	communities	had	access,	which	types	of	activities	would	they	like	to	engage	in,	where	and	what	is	hindering	them	from	doing	so?	The	purpose	of	this	objective	is	to	try	and	capture	the	conditions	people	need	to	engage	in	benefit-schemes	(contextual	equity).		
Objective	4.	To	frame	the	advantages	and	disadvantages	of	using	CRF	in	relation	
to	other	benefit-sharing	schemes.		Drawing	 on	 the	 previous	 three	 objectives,	 the	 final	 element	 of	 the	 research	 is	 to	compare	and	contrast	CRF	to	other	benefit-sharing	schemes	in	order	to	form	strategic	policy	 recommendations.	Key	questions	 to	 address	here	 are	whether	CRF	 financing	mechanisms	 are	 different	 to	 other	 Integrated	 Conservation	 Development	 Projects	(ICDP),	and	if	so	do	they	provide	a	more	sustainable,	long-term	financing	mechanism?	
Thesis	Outline			This	thesis	is	split	into	five	further	chapters.		
Chapter	Two:	Taking	A	Case	Study	Approach:	Protected	Area	Management	Across	
Mt.	Elgon	Ecosystem,	Uganda.		With	 a	 rich	 history	 of	 forest	 use,	 ethnic	 conflict	 and	 differing	 forest	 management	regimes,	 this	 chapter	 provides	 a	 historical	 overview	 of	 the	 Mt.Elgon	 Ecosystem.	Starting	 with	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 ecosystem	 services	 it	 harbours,	 it	 goes	 on	 to	
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describe	the	conservation	initiatives	introduced	to	date	then	finishes	with	a	summary	of	the	MERECP	project	and	correspondingly	the	selection	of	field	sites.		
Chapter	Three:	Promoting	Conservation	Agricultural	Production	Systems:	How	
the	Structure	of	Information	Sharing	Networks	Influences	Technology	Adoption	
Across	the	Mt.	Elgon	Ecosystem,	Uganda.			At	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 Mt.	 Elgon	 conservation	 agenda	 is	 agricultural	 innovation,	especially	 the	 promotion	 of	 conservation	 agricultural	 production	 systems.	 Before	delving	 into	 the	 specific	 MERECP	 intervention,	 a	 broader	 overview	 of	 the	 types	 of	knowledge	 and	 collaborative	 arrangements	 occurring	between	 smallholder	 farmers	and	 supporting	 organisations	 has	 been	mapped	 out.	 Using	 Crowe’s	 (2007)	 analytic	framework,	 the	 analysis	 reveals	 that	 different	 network	 structures	 are	 suited	 to	different	 styles	of	 innovation,	but	above	all,	 external	personal	and	 the	 relationships	they	maintain	with	smallholder	farmers	are	crucial	to	their	on-farm	development.		
Chapter	Four:	Mapping	Intervention	Induced	Livelihood	Changes	and	Future	
Aspiration	for	Conservation:	Capturing	Community	Perceptions	from	Mt.	Elgon,	
Uganda.		Many	 conservation	 and	 restoration	 efforts	 in	 developing	 countries	 are	 increasingly	recognising	the	‘multifunctionality’	of	landscapes	(Gimona	and	Van	der	Horst,	2007).		After	years	of	 rigid	protected	area	management	of	 the	Mt.	Elgon	National	Park	and	the	 numerous	 government/private	 led	 conservation	 interventions,	 little	 has	 been	done	 to	 document	 the	 landscape	 and	 consequently	 livelihood	 impacts	 of	 these	interventions.	 Often	 working	 with	 rural	 farmers	 through	 Community	 Based	Organisation’s,	 this	 chapter	 therefore	 independently	 asks	 members	 and	 non-members	to	spatially	depict	how	their	landscapes	have	been	changed	by	conservation	interventions	and	their	future	livelihood	aspirations.	As	one	of	the	most	widely	used	approaches	 in	 understanding	 livelihood	 dimensions	 of	 the	 rural	 poor	 (Adato	 and	Meinzen-dick,	2002;	Schreckenberg	et	al.,	2010),	 the	Chambers	and	Conway	(1992)	Sustainable	Livelihood	(SL)	framework	was	then	applied	to	assess	how	these	mapped	outcomes	 translate	 into	 assets	 enjoyed.	 As	 active	 citizens,	 CBO	 members	 showed	greater	awareness,	access	and	willingness	to	adopt	conservation	practises,	indicating	that	they	are	enjoying	significantly	more	benefits	than	their	neighbours.	Despite	the	
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widespread	 uptake	 of	 conservation	 technologies,	 this	 has	 not	 prevented	 habitat	degradation	 and	 consequently	 communities	 unified	 in	 their	 aspirations	 for	 greener	technologies.	 Practitioners	 now	 need	 to	maximise	 on	 these	 opportunities,	 building	better-informed	 participatory	 land-use	 planning,	 tailored	 livelihood	 strategies	 and	the	right	incentives	to	help	make	this	a	reality.		
Chapter	Five:	Equity	in	Access:	Using	Network	Analysis	to	examine	the	role	of	
Social	Capital	in	the	Participation	of	the	Mt	.Elgon	Regional	Eco-system	
Conservation	Programme.		With	 training	 in	 micro-finance,	 20	 CBO’s	 were	 told	 to	 design	 and	 implement	 a	Community	 Revolving	 Fund	 to	 finance	 income-generating	 activities	 on	 their	 farms.	Devolving	 ownership	 to	 the	 grass-roots	 level,	 the	 process	 of	 horizontal	 benefit-sharing	 was	 therefore	 controlled	 by	 the	 executive	 CBO	 members	 within	 these	communities.	 In	 this	 chapter	 a	 combination	 of	 focus	 group	 discussions,	 well	 being	ranking	and	Social	Network	Analysis	(S.N.A)	are	used	to	assess	how	differing	socio-political	dynamics	drove	the	implementation	and	use	of	CRFs	across	Mt.	Elgon.	Akin	to	previous	studies	measuring	participation,	 the	political	and	social	elite	dominated	this	 process	with	 limited	 community	 involvement.	 However,	 building	 from	 chapter	three,	 the	 relationships	 established	with	 external	 organisations	 proved	 essential	 in	achieving	more	efficient	and	equitable	outcomes.			
Chapter	Six:	Concluding	Discussion.	Are	Community	Revolving	Funds	a	
Sustainable	and	Equitable	Method	of	Slicing	Forest	Capital?	A	Case	Study	from	
Mt.Elgon,	Uganda.		In	 conclusion	 this	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 bringing	 together	 the	 findings	 of	 previous	chapters.	Here	I	discuss	whether	the	evaluation	of	conservation	interventions	can	be	seen	as	sustainable	and	equitable.	An	examination	of	whether	projects	have	adopted	full	 and	 effective	 participation	 using	 free,	 prior	 and	 informed	 consent	 and	 if	 the	outcomes	of	the	programme	were	non-discriminatory	and	transparent.	To	conclude,	project	specific	recommendations	are	given	in	relation	to	the	boarder	benefit-sharing	literature.			
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Adopting	a	Mixed	Methods	Approach			Identifying	and	 choosing	 the	 right	worldview	before	data	 collection	 is	 important	 to	guide	 the	study	and	ensure	 the	 right	 type	of	knowledge	 is	derived	(Creswell,	2009;	Creswell	and	Clark,	2011).	Working	with	under-privileged	demographic	groups,	this	research	 is	 chiefly	 exploring	 political	 concerns;	 focusing	 on	 issues	 surrounding	equity,	 empowerment	 and	 advocacy	 (Creswell	 and	 Clark,	 2011).	 Consequently	adopting	 a	participatory	worldview	 is	 the	most	 appropriate	 i.e	 one	 that	 is	 oriented	towards	inquiry	and	an	action	agenda.		More	specifically,	this	research	will	use	the	level	of	participation	referred	to	by	Briggs	(1989)	 as	 contractual	 participation.	 Contractual	 participation	 simply	 asks	stakeholders	to	share	their	views	and	knowledge.	This	form	of	participation	aims	at	advancing	 the	 agenda	 by	 improving	 participants	 consciousness	 of	 the	 projects	 and	voicing	their	opinions	to	the	relevant	institutions	and	policy	makers	(Creswell,	2009).	Arnstein	(1969)	refers	 to	 this	participation	as	a	degree	of	 ‘tokenism’	as	 the	process	itself	does	not	aim	to	bring	about	change	or	ensure	follow-through.	It	is	important	to	highlight	this	level	of	participation	to	avoid	raising	community	expectations	about	the	research.		Using	 semi-structured	 interviews,	 it	 will	 start	 with	 a	 positivist	 view	 of	 measuring	knowledge.	It	is	positivist	in	the	sense	that	the	open	questions	will	narrow	down	the	topics	 discussed,	 directing	 inquiry	 to	 decision-making	 and	 participation	 (Creswell	and	 Clark,	 2011).	 	 It	 will	 look	 for	 patterns	 of	 reality,	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	interventions	by	extracting	social	data	in	a	quantitative	manner	(Denscombe,	2010).	As	 the	methodology	 develops,	 it	will,	 however,	 shift	 into	 a	more	 constructivist	 and	participatory	worldview.	The	use	of	mapping	exercises	will	provide	a	freer	platform	for	 interviewees	 to	 express	 different	 viewpoints	 (Creswell	 and	 Clark,	 2011).	 The	overall	 aim	 is	 to	 create	a	 collective	 learning	process	by	which	 ‘interviewers’	have	a	‘natural	 conversation’	 with	 ‘informants,’	 therefore	 everyone	 learns	 through	knowledge	exchange	(Schreckenberg	et	al.,	2012).		Combing	 both	 positivist	 and	 constructivist	 modes	 of	 inquiry	 is	 referred	 to	 as	pragmatism	in	social	sciences.	Hailed	as	the	foundations	of	mixed	methods	research	(Pansiri,	2005),	rather	than	focusing	on	a	philosophy,	pragmatism	looks	at	employing	
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strategies	of	inquiry	that	address	the	research	question,	more	often	than	not	involves	combining	more	 than	one	outlook	 (Creswell	 and	Clark,	2011;	Denscombe,	2010).	 It	sees	knowledge	as	provisional,	changing	over	time,	affected	by	cultural	and	historical	contexts	 (Denscombe,	2010).	While	 this	 research	hopes	 to	have	more	participatory	outcomes,	it	ultimately	holds	a	pragmatic	worldview	to	data	collection	and	analysis.		
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The	Mount	Elgon	National	Park	and	Landscape			Protruding	4321	meters	above	sea	level,	Mt.	Elgon	is	the	oldest	and	largest	solitary,	volcanic	mountain	found	in	the	rift	valley	(Sassen,	Sheil,	Giller	and	ter	Braak,	2013).	Bisecting	the	Kenya-Uganda	boarder	100	km	northeast	of	Lake	Victoria	(Himmelfarb,	2005),	 the	 central	 area	 of	 this	 extinct	 volcano	 now	 hosts	 a	 Protected	 Area	 (PA)	 of	largely	disturbed	 tropical	montane	 forest	 interspersed	with	 large	stands	of	bamboo	(Arundinaria	 alphina)	 with	 heathers	 (Philippia	 spp)	 and	 moorland	 (Senecio	 ssp.,	
Alchemilla	 ssp.)	 at	 higher	 elevations	 (Hitimana,	 Kiyiapi	 and	 Njunge,	 2004).	 Cutting	across	eight	different	Ugandan	districts	(Fig	3),	many	rare	Afromontane	species	can	be	found	within	the	110,971	ha	PA,	including	150	forest	bird	species	and	39	endemic	vascular	plants	(Muhweezi,	Sikoyo	and	Chemonges,	2007;	Sassen	et	al.,	2013).	Driven	by	dry	north-easterly	and	moist	south-westerly	winds,	the	climate	is	moist	to	moderately	dry	with	the	mean	annual	temperature	averaging	23°C	(Claessens	et	al.,	2007;	 Scott,	 1994).	 While	 rain	 can	 fall	 at	 any	 time	 of	 the	 year,	 typically	 the	 drier	seasons	 fall	 between	 July-August	 and	 December-February	 (Reed	 and	 Clokie,	 2000;	Claessens	et	al.,	2007;	Sassen	et	al.,	2013).	The	average	rainfall	across	the	mountain	is	1800	 mm	 yr-1	 (Claessens	 et	 al.,	 2007;	 Scott,	 1994)	 with	 the	 heaviest	 precipitation	falling	 in	western	and	south	westerns	slopes	at	about	2000-3000	m	altitude	 (IUCN,	2005;	Sassen	et	al.,	2013).		The	unique	climate	and	extensive	forest	cover	powers	one	the	most	important	water	catchments	in	the	area.	Feeding	three	lakes:	Kyoga,	Victoria	and	Turkana,	as	well	as	the	wider	Nile	system	-	keeping	this	catchment	intact	is	thus	clearly	of	 international	significance	(Chhetri,	Mugisha	and	White,	2003;	IUCN,	2005;	Oonyu,	2009).										
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																													Having	 faced	 extensive	 erosion	 in	 the	 past,	 parts	 of	 Mt.	 Elgon	 have	 long,	 ash	 rich,	gentle	(averaging	4°)	slopes	characterised	by	young,	fertile	soil	perfect	for	agriculture	(Baumann,	2011).	Consequently	of	 the	772,300	ha	 included	 in	 the	Mt.	Elgon	region,	550,899	 ha	 has	 been	 converted	 in	 farmland,	 settlements	 or	 another	 form	 of	 non-
Figure.	3	Map	of	Mt.	 Elgon,	Uganda	and	Kenya.	 For	 anonymity,	 exact	location	of	selected	study	sites	is	not	revealed		
	Adapted	using	data	on	Mt.	Elgon	boundaries	and	forests	from	Sassen	et	al	(2013).	Protected	Area	Boundaries	from	(UN	EP-WCMC).	
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forest	 use	 (Moyini,	 2007).	 The	 inhabiting	 communities	 are	 mainly	 small-scale	farmers,	 using	 low	 technology	 and	 growing	 crops	 such	 as	 beans,	maize,	wheat	 and	potatoes	(Nakakaawa	et	al.,	2015).	Introduced	in	1912,	coffee	once	made	the	farmers	of	Mt.	Elgon	amongst	 the	 richest	 in	Uganda.	Booming	 in	 the	1950’s,	political	unrest	during	the	1970’s	and	1980’s	soon	diminished	this	market	(Sassen	et	al.,	2013)	and	today	only	3%	of	agricultural	land		is	used	as	cash	crops	(LVBC,	2012).			Supporting	 over	 two	million	 people	 (Pétursson	 and	 Vedeld,	 2015),	 this	 region	 has	become	one	of	most	densely	populated	areas	 in	East	Africa	(Lamb	et	al.,	2015).	The	average	 landholding	 is	 0.8	 ha	 per	 capita	 (Muhweezi,	 Sikoyo	 and	Chemonges,	 2007;	Sassen	 et	 al.,	 2013),	 where	 20%	 of	 population	 own	 no	 land	 (LVBC,	 2012).	 As	 this	trend	 continues	 to	 grow	 at	 a	 rate	 of	 3.4	 %	 per	 year	 (Nakakaawa	 et	 al.,	 2015),	escalating	 human	 pressure	 has	 seen	 encroachment	 into	 marginal	 and	 ecologically	fragile	areas	such	as	steep	slopes	(above	80%),	swamps	and	river-banks	(Claessens	et	al.,	 2007;	 Knapen	 et	 al.,	 2006;	 Muhweezi,	 Sikoyo	 and	 Chemonges,	 2007).	 In	 a	landscape	with	 soil	 properties	 and	 topography	 are	 already	prone	 to	 landslides,	 the	result	 has	 been	 increasing	 fatalities	 and	 losses	 due	 to	 soil	 degradation,	 water	pollution	and	homelessness	(Claessens	et	al.,	2007).			Along	with	 its	diverse	 landscape,	 the	people	of	Mt.	Elgon	are	multi-ethnic	and	fairly	heterogenic	both	within	groups	and	between	them	(Nakakaawa	et	al.,	2015).	Arriving	in	1500	AD,	the	Sabiny	integrated	with	indigenous	people	and	came	to	dominate	the	whole	 Elgon	 population.	 Stemming	 from	 the	 Nilo-Hamitic	 cluster	 (Kalenjin),	 the	Sabiny	separated	into	two	ethnic	sub-groups:	the	plain	living	Soishek	or	Soi	and	the	highland	 living	 Moso,	 Benet,	 Ndorobo	 and	 Kony.	 Originally	 practising	 nomadic	pastoralism,	the	forest	inhabiting	Benet	supplemented	their	diet	with	herd	and	forage	from	within	the	forest	(Himmelfarb,	2005).	While	the	Benet	considers	themselves	the	indigenous	people,	 they	have	maintained	 long	cultural	and	economic	exchange	with	the	 Soi.	 Interrupting	 the	 Sabiny	 rule,	 the	 Bagishu	 of	 Bantu	 origin	 took	 over	 the	southern	 more	 fertile	 slopes,	 clearing	 land	 for	 agriculture	 and	 pushing	 the	 Sabei	North	and	East.	Thought	to	have	arrived	around	1700	AD	they	have	been	ethnic	rivals	ever	since	(Pétursson,	2011).	Despite	these	differences,	both	tribes	have	longstanding	
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cultural	 (burial	 and	 circumcision	 sites)	 and	 use	 (wood,	 medicine	 and	 food)	 values	associated	with	the	forests	of	Mt.	Elgon	(Nakakaawa	et	al.,	2015).		
Management	Overview	and	History		
Resettlement	and	Conflict:	The	Result	of	Exclusionary	Protectionism			The	 first	 formal	management	 of	 the	Mt.	 Elgon	 ecosystem	 began	 in	 1929	when	 the	British	Colonial	Forest	Department	took	control	of	a	large	forested	area.	Adopting	an	exclusionary	 protectionism	 philosophy	 (Himmelfarb,	 2005),	 park	 boundaries	 were	solidified	into	a	forest	reserve	in	1937,	cultivation	up	the	slopes	was	prevented	and	the	 forest	 was	 primarily	 managed	 for	 timber	 extraction	 (Hitimana,	 Kiyiapi	 and	Njunge,	 2004;	 Norgrove	 and	 Hulme,	 2006).	 At	 this	 time,	 surrounding	 farmers	continued	to	hold	their	land,	primarily	under	customary	tenure	without	formal	land	titles	-	a	system	that	is	still	in	place	today	(Pétursson,	2011).		The	years	to	follow	were	shaped	 by	many	 legal	 changes	 to	 the	 forest	 status.	 	 In	 1938	 the	 forest	 went	 from	Crown-owned	to	a	Central	Forest	Reserve	where	there	was	a	period	of	deforestation	for	 Cypress	 and	 ensuing	 pine	 plantations	 occurred	 in	 the	 North-East.	 Resident	cultivation	 systems	were	 established	 and	 independence	 from	Britain	 (1968)	 led	 to	centralisation	of	forest	management	with	officially	demarcated	boundaries	(Sassen	et	al.,	2013).			During	 Idi	 Amin’s	 rule	 (1971-1979)	 forest	 governance	 then	 fell	 apart.	 Bribes	 to	expand	 agriculture	 practices	within	 the	 forest	 boundary	were	 common	place	 (over	25,000	ha	of	 the	 forest	 reserve	was	 lost),	 as	part	 of	 the	 ‘economic	war’	 on	poverty	resettlement	within	park	boundaries	was	encouraged	and	the	use	of	forest	products	increased	(Norgrove	and	Hulme,	2006;	Petursson	and	Vedeld,	2017).	With	the	greater	availability	of	military	weapons,	political	unrest	prevailed	after	the	fall	of	Idi	Amin’s	government	 (1978).	 Once	 using	 bow	 and	 arrows,	 cattle	 raiding	 groups	 like	 the	Karamojong	and	Pokot	were	now	using	firearms	on	the	plain	living	Soi	(Himmelfarb,	2005).	 This	 resulted	 in	 hundreds	 of	 households	migrating	 up	 the	mountain	 slopes	towards	 the	 forest	 boundary.	 Having	 once	 served	 in	 Amin’s	 Army	 themselves,	 the	heavily	 armed	 Benet	 subsequently	 attacked	 their	 long	 rivals	 the	 Bagishu.	 After	continuous	fighting,	the	weaker	Bagishu	eventually	retreated	to	the	forested	lands	in	
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the	 south,	 further	 amplifying	 deforestation	 in	 these	 areas	 (Pétursson,	 Vedeld	 and	Sassen,	2013).			The	 complexity	 of	 land	 ownership	 and	 conflict	 was	 further	 complicated	 by	 the	relocation	of	the	Benet	from	their	traditional	moorlands	to	the	lowland	forests	1983	(Sassen	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Whilst	 a	 specific	 area	 of	 the	 forest	 was	 degazetted	 for	 their	resettlement	 (6000	 ha),	 without	 a	 clear	 demarcation	 process,	 land	 was	 seized	 by	neighbouring	 groups	 and	 the	 political	 elite.	 With	 a	 further	 1500	 ha	 of	 land	 being	degazetted	 than	 initially	 planned,	 the	 Benet	 were	 still	 left	 with	 unclear	 status,	residing	within	the	forest	reserve	(Pétursson,	2011).	In	1986	when	President	Yoweri	Museveni	 came	 to	 power,	 a	 brief	 period	 of	 peace	 then	 followed.	 Funded	 via	 donor	agency	USAID,	 a	 countrywide	 reform	 in	 PA	 governance	 then	 took	 place	 (Petursson	and	Vedeld,	2017).	Coupled	with	the	implementation	of	internationally-funded	Mount	Elgon	 Conservation	 and	 Development	 Project	 (MECDP),	 rehabilitation	 of	 the	protected	 area	 began	 (Oonyu,	 2009).	 Nevertheless,	 seven	 years	 later,	 institutional	change	from	the	Forest	Department	to	the	Uganda	Wildlife	Authority	(UWA)	resulted	in	 the	 forest	 officially	 being	 regazetted	 into	 the	 Mount	 Elgon	 National	 Park	 (its	current	 status)	 and	 instability	 returned	 to	 region	 once	 again.	 Reverting	 back	 to	 a	more	 ‘coercive,’	 centralised	 management	 style,	 the	 demarcation	 of	 new	 park	boundaries,	along	with	restricted	resource-use,	saw	the	disintegration	of	indigenous	forest	management	systems	with	high-politicised	evictions	involving	likely	more	than	100,000	people	creating	more	violent	battles	over	land	and	boundaries	(Gosalamang,	Vedeld	and	Gombya-Ssembajjwe,	2008).	Claims	that	land	was	illicitly	allocated,	both	in	terms	of	landholdings	and	whom	they	were	distributed	to,	have	yet	to	be	resolved.	This	includes	the	land	of	the	Benet,	whose	relocated	land	in	1983	was	gazetted	back	into	the	National	Park	in	1993	(Fig	4).									
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												Delineating	solid	boundaries	using	GPS	technology	in	2001,	this	on-going	conflict	still	lead	to	a	further	1700	ha	of	forest	loss	(Pétursson,	Vedeld	and	Sassen,	2013).	A	factor	that	 was	 made	 worse	 when	 UWA	 received	 further	 leverage	 and	 resources	 from	 a	Dutch	NGO	to	implement	the	Forest	Absorbing	Carbon	Emissions	(FACE)	foundation	reforestation	 and	 carbon	 offsetting	 scheme.	 Now	 with	 governments	 and	 donor	agencies	 (mainly	 USAID)	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 ‘fortress’	 discourse,	 formal	institutions	 were	 prohibiting	 access	 without	 compensation	 (Petursson	 and	 Vedeld,	2017).	 Coupled	with	 the	 harsh	methods	 adopted	 by	 UWA	 to	 restrict	 forest	 access,	including	beating	and	raping,	local	communities	adopted	numerous	resilience	tactics	towards	UWA	management	(Norgrove	and	Hulme,	2006).	Non-co-operation,	 feigned	ignorance,	 false	 oral	 histories,	 leaving	 roads	 in	 bad	 conditions,	 bribery,	 threats	 of	violence	and	mobilising	illegal	activities	were	just	some	of	the	strategies	used	by	local	communities	in	retaliation	(Norgrove	and	Hulme,	2006).			
Introducing	‘Community	Conservation’		In	an	effort	to	ease	such	community	tensions,	 from	1999	onwards,	UWA	introduced	community	 collaboration	 approaches	 including	 participatory	 park	 management	strategies	 and	 setting	 up	 numerous	 resource-use,	 beekeeping	 and	 boundary	management	agreements.		As	one	of	the	only	PA	regimes	to	allow	community	access	under	specific	conditions,	by	2011	more	66	agreements	were	in	place	in	26	different	parishes	around	the	park	(Sassen,	2014).	Funded	by	the	Government	of	Norway	and	
Figure	4.		Forest	cover	in	1973	and	2009	in	and	around	the	Bene7it	resettlement	area,	Uganda.	Taken	from	Pétursson	Vedeld	&	Sassen	(2013)	
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implemented	 under	 International	 Union	 for	 the	 Conservation	 Nature	 (IUCN),	programmes	 like	Mt.	Elgon	Conservation	and	Development	Project	 (MECDP)	played	an	instrumental	in	developing	these	relationships.	They	sensitised	communities	with	environmental	 education	 then	 helped	 them	 develop	 alternative	 livelihoods,	 build	revenue	 sharing	 schemes	 from	 ecotourism,	 create	 environmental	 plans	 and	rehabilitate	 degraded	 areas.	 Given	 the	 fluctuating	 coffee	 prices	 and	 increasing	demands	 on	 Mt.	 Elgon	 natural	 resources,	 promoting	 Conservation	 Agricultural	Production	 Systems	 (CAPS)	 was	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	 most	 interventions,	 especially	promoting	 soil	 and	water	 conservation	 techniques,	 agroforestry	 and	 energy-saving	technology	 (Oonyu,	 2009).	 Over	 the	 past	 twenty-five	 years,	 many	 different	 NGO’s	have	 partnered	 up	with	 different	 government	 agencies	 to	work	 on	 similar	 themed	projects.	For	example,	by	building	on	community	 innovation	skills	and	empowering	woman,	 over	 the	 past	 thirteen	 years	 the	 Kapchorwa	 District	 Landcare	 Chapter	(KADLACC)	 has	 been	 supporting	 smallholders	 in	managing	 their	 natural	 resources	more	 sustainably.	 Since	 2012,	 the	 Environmental	 Conservation	 Trust	 (ECOTRUST)	has	been	implementing	an	agroforestry	focused	carbon	project	under	Trees	for	Global	Benefits	(TGB).	Developed	in	Partnership	with	the	UN	Development	Project	(UNDP)	and	UN	Environment	Program	(UNEP)	with	a	total	budget	of	1,475,	271.65	US	dollars,	in	 2013	 the	 Territorial	 Approach	 to	 Climate	 Change	 established	 a	 small	 grants	programme	to	fund	activities	that	build	climate	resilience	(Rijal	and	Langoya,	2014).		NGO’s	 like	 HIEFER	 International	 have	 also	 played	 a	 key	 role,	 promoting	 biogas	technology	 by	 assisting	 on-farm	 enterprise	 mixing.	 Although	 with	 great	 success	 in	some	areas,	 some	communities	who	have	 faced	recurrent	evictions	and	continue	 to	dispute	 park	 boundaries	 have	 been	 less	 co-operative	 (Sassen	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 A	chronological	evolution	of	these	MENP	is	summarised	in	Table	1.									
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Table	1.	A	chronology	of	evolving	MENP	governance	from	1986	to	2012.	Sourced	Petursson	and	Vedeld	2017.		
Date	 Event	in	park	governance	on	Mt.	Elgon	
Pre	1986	
Mt.	Elgon	Forest	Reserve	Established	in	1930s.	Laissez-faire	approach	to	local	people	under	Forest	Department	(FD)	governance	for	long.	Collapse	of	governance	structures	under	the	Amin	and	Post	Amin	period	from	1971	to	1986.	
1986	
Civil	 unrest	 ends	 and	 Uganda	 comes	 from	 long	 conflict	 that	 dismantled	 most	structures	of	government,	including	governing	natural	resources.	
1988	
A	GoU	decision	to	implement	a	proposal	of	turning	forest	reserves	into		national	parks.	In	Mt.	 Elgon	 the	 area	 above	 tree	 line	would	 remain	 forest	 reserves.	 The	Ministry	 of	Environment	 enters	 the	 Mt.	 Elgon	 Conservation	 Development	 Project	 (MECDP)	through	NORAD	funding	with	IUCN	as	implementing	agent.	FD	recognized	the	need	for	collaborative	management	and	started	pilot	projects	in	Mt.	Elgon.	
1991	
FD	 carried	out	 inventories	 in	many	Tropical	 Forests	with	 an	 aim	 to	determine	what	percentage	should	be	set	aside	as	strict	nature	reserves.	The	President	instructed	his	prime	minister	to	direct	parliament	to	turn	the	remaining	parks	of	Mt.	Elgon,	Rwenzori	and	Bwindi	 into	national	parks.	Elgon	Forest	 reserve	upgraded	 to	 forest	park	within	FD.	
1993	
The	 forest	 reserve	 on	 Elgon	 formally	 converted	 to	 national	 park	 MENP	 with	 a	“fortress”	approaches	to	governance.	
1995	
Community	conservation	starts	with	CFM	pilot	schemes	in	two	Parishes	with	support	from	the	Mount	Elgon	Community	Development	Programme	(MECDP).	Formalized	in	1996.	
1996	
The	Uganda	Wildlife	Statute	established	UWA	as	a	new	organization	with	a	merge	of	the	Game	Department	(GD)	and	the	Uganda	National	Parks	(UNP).	
2002	
Transboundary	conservation	project	ideas	promoted	by	IUCN	and	brought	to	NORAD	and	East	African	Community	(EAC).	
2004	
A	 transboundary	 PA	 pioneer	 for	 East	 Africa	 signed.	 Mount	 Elgon	 Regional	Conservation	Program	(MERECP)	takes	off,	 funded	by	NORAD	implemented	by	IUCN.	EAC	has	the	ownership.	
2008	
IUCN	withdraws	after	ca.	20	years	work	on	Elgon.	East	African	Community	mandated	as	implementing	agency	of	MERECP.	
2010	 Cash	Revolving	Fund	benefit-sharing	scheme	undertaken	with	communities.	
2012	
The	 funding	of	MERECP	 from	NORAD	stops.	 Is	 currently	 run	by	EAC	 that	 recognizes	that	the	transboundary	work	needs	a	longer	timeframe.		
MERECP:	Working	Towards	a	Trans-boundary	Ecosystem	Approach			As	a	single	region	administered	under	 two	separate	national	governments,	 the	East	African	 Community	 secretariat	 soon	 recognised	 the	 importance	 of	 developing	harmonised	conservation	goals	between	Kenya	and	Uganda	(Larsen,	Kamugasha	and	Karani,	2008).	Building	on	an	East	African	Memorandum	of	Understanding	(MoU),	a	novel	 trans-boundary	 management	 agreement	 was	 created.	 Taking	 fours	 years	 of	
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negotiations	and	using	the	participation	of	numerous	stakeholders	(both	public	and	private),	 the	agreement	resulted	in	the	Mt.	Elgon	Regional	Eco-system	Conservation	Programme.	The	ambition	of	which	was	to	improve	the	work	carried	out	by	previous	ICDPs,	 whilst	 streamlining	 institutional	 arrangements	 to	 improve	 their	 capacity	 in	ecological	 monitoring,	 law	 enforcement	 and	 community	 outreach.	 With	 a	 jointly	funded	budget	of	4,869,501	US	dollars	by	the	governments	of	Norway	and	Sweden,	in	February	2004	the	project	launched	a	four-year	inception	phase	where	it	undertook	comprehensive	consultations	with	stakeholders,	baseline	surveys	and	pilot	studies.			After	 issues	 surrounding	 ownership,	 high	 administration	 costs	 and	 funds	 not	reaching	target	communities	(less	than	20%),	this	phase	of	the	project	achieved	very	little	 in	meeting	 these	 targets.	With	 the	 aid	 of	 the	 Lake	 Victoria	 Basin	 Commission	(LVBC),	 the	 project	 was	 re-designed	 in	 2008.	 Ownership	 was	 shifted	 to	 national	governments	and	funds	to	Protected	Area	Management	Institutions	(PAMI),	which	in	turn	distributed	 them	 to	 Focal	 Point	Ministries	 (FPM)	 in	what	 is	 known	as	 vertical	benefit	 sharing.	 To	 improve	 the	 efficiency	 of	 the	 programme,	 its	 redesign	 also	included	 a	 mixture	 of	 horizontal	 benefit-sharing	 arrangements	 with	 rule-based	principles	 embedded	 in	 their	 distribution.	 Like	 the	 UWA-FACE	 project,	 one	 of	 the	agreements	looked	at	restoring	degraded	parts	of	the	NP.	Aspiring	to	plant	400	ha	of	indigenous	 trees,	 and	 successfully	 planting	 331	 ha,	 the	 purpose	 was	 to	 sell	 the	generated	 carbon	 credits,	 whilst	 allowing	 communities	 to	 enjoy	 their	 provisioning,	regulatory	 and	 cultural	 services.	 Created	 through	 a	 deforestation	 fund,	 another	project	 was	 founded	 on	 merit-based	 sharing,	 where	 two	 communities	 who	 had	collaborated	well	with	UWA	 in	protection	of	 the	 forest	 received	7000	USD	 for	 their	environmental	stewardship.	In	final	two	agreements,	the	Community	Revolving	Fund	(CRF)	and	the	Livelihood	Plantation,	communities	were	compensated	for	restrictions	of	 forest	use	and	access.	The	CRF	 initiated	this	processes	via	 technical	and	financial	inputs,	 whereas	 the	 ambition	 to	 plant	 1200	 ha	 of	 fast	 growing	 timber	 species,	referred	 to	 be	MERECP	 as	 livelihood	 plantations,	was	 designed	 to	meet	 short-term	household	 demands	 i.e.	 timber,	 poles	 and	 fuel	 and	 prevent	 use	 of	 forest	 products	from	the	NP.			
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Based	on	the	concept	of	micro-finance,	the	purpose	of	CRF	was	to	give	households	the	economic	freedom	to	invest	in	sustainable	Income	Generating	Activities	(IGA).	Having	channeled	 10,000	 USD	 as	 a	 start-up	 fund	 to	 each	 group,	 participants	 of	 CRF	 were	expected	 to	 take	 a	 loan,	 invest	 in	 an	 activity,	 and	 then	pay	 the	 sum	of	money	with	some	small	interest.	After	being	repaid,	money	is	then	directed	back	into	the	fund	and	made	available	to	be	loaned	again.	It	is,	therefore,	not	a	shrinking	fund	(Mwayafu	et	al.,	 2012)	 but	 a	 revolving	 one.	 Providing	 technical	 training	 to	 three	 executive	members,	 each	 of	 the	 Community	Based	Organisation’s	 ((CBO’s)	 explained	 in	more	detail	below)	were	given	the	freedom	to	set	up	their	own	criteria,	building	terms	and	conditions	 for	 repayment	 that	 would	 suit	 their	 local	 realities.	 CBOs	 carried	 out	 a	diverse	range	of	IGA’s	with	varying	levels	of	success	in	terms	of	management	and	loan	repayment	(Hoefsloot,	Kahata	and	Nsita,	2011).	With	only	31.8	%	of	the	targeted	area	being	 planted,	 the	 livelihood	 plantation	 scheme	 was	 less	 successful	 (Hoefsloot,	Kahata	and	Nsita,	2011).	A	combination	of	land	ownership	issues,	poor	suitability	of	designated	 planting	 areas	 and	 the	 delayed	 payment	 from	 the	 bureaucratic	government	to	PAMI’s	lead	to	these	outcomes.		
Evaluating	the	Cash-Revolving	Fund			As	 an	 on-going,	 pioneer,	 transboundry,	 natural	 resource	 management	 programme,	the	 CRF	 uses	 a	 combination	 of	 decentralised	management	 and	 financial	 incentives,	two	of	the	widely-used	and	growing	approaches	in	conservation	(Wright,	Andersson,	Gibson	and	Evans,	2015a),	making	it	an	interesting	case	study	to	explore	the	themes	of	equity	in	benefit-sharing	(Mwayafu,	Kimbowa	and	Graham,	2012).		In	an	area	that	has	numerous	institutions	working	on	similar	goals,	disentangling	the	specific	 MERECP	 narrative,	 however,	 has	 not	 only	 been	 challenging	 but	 could	 be	misleading.	Firstly,	implementing	organisations	rarely	make	any	effort	in	monitoring	livelihood	 impacts,	particularly	carrying	out	baseline	studies	at	 the	onset.	Secondly,	the	 same	communities	 are	 targeted	by	different	organisations	making	 it	 even	more	difficult	 to	 attribute	 a	 specific	 cause	 and	 effect	 relationship.	 There	 are	 numerous	reasons	why	 this	happens	 in	practise,	 some	 include	CBO’s	being	good	at	marketing	themselves	 and	 in	 other	 cases,	 political	 relationships,	 community	 willingness	 and	access	have	driven	these	selections.	Thirdly,	 little	co-operation	between	agencies	 to	
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differentiate	 their	 goals	 and	 impacts	 have	 been	 made.	 Coupled	 with	 the	 lack	 of	information	sharing,	it	has	been	difficult	to	document	exactly	who	has	worked	in	the	area	and	what	changes	these	interventions	have	driven.	For	example,	the	Territorial	Approach	to	Climate	Change,	(TACC)	financed	CBO’s	to	invest	 low	emission	climate-resilient	 development	 strategies	 that	 were	 very	 similar	 to	 the	 IGA	 (tree-planting,	biogas,	 water	 conservation)	 that	 MERECEP	 used	 (UNDP,	 2010).	 More	 recent	 IUCN	interventions	 have	 sought	 to	 implemented	 performance-based	 payments,	 whilst	ECOTRUST	has	begun	paying	small	scale	 farmers	 for	carbon	offsetting	based	on	the	Plan	 Vivo	 standard	 (Ecotrust,	 2012).	 Amongst	 these	 players,	 the	 social	 network	analysis	 and	 focus	 group	discussions	with	 the	 targeted	 smallholder	 farmers	will	 be	used	to	provide	a	post-hoc,	users	overview	of	who	has	worked	 in	 the	area	and	how	these	interventions	have	shaped	their	livelihoods.		
Study	Sites		All	 bordering	 the	NP,	 the	 four	 study	 sites	were	 selected	 in	 regions	where	MERECP	participating	 Community-Based	 Organisation’s	 (CBO’s)	 had	 been	 established	 (see	Appendix	 1.	 B).	 These	 CBO’s	 are	 nonprofit	 groups	 that	 work	 at	 the	 local	 level	 to	improve	the	life	of	their	residents	by	engaging	in	human,	environmental,	public	safety	and	 other	 community	 needs.	 For	 ease	 of	 communication	 and	 management,	 most	interventions	 target	 these	 organisations	 for	 community	 level	 engagement,	 although	individual	farmers	voluntarily	choose	to	participate	in	different	programmes.		With	 over	 500	 organisations	 found	 across	 Mt.	 Elgon	 alone,	 there	 were	 many	variations	in	terms	of	their	size	and	structure.	As	prerequisite	for	MERECP	selection,	all	 the	 studied	 groups	were	 registered	with	 proper	 governance	 structures	 in	 place	including	 codified	 constitutions	 and	 bank	 accounts.	 To	 understand	 how	 different	contextual	 realities	 are	 impacting	 CRF	 outcomes,	 selection	 was	 made	 to	 include	communities	 from	different	 districts	 and	 tribes	 (see	Table	 2).	 In	 the	 last	 study	 site	(community	 4)	 individuals	 came	 from	 one	 specific	 village.	 In	 the	 rest	 there	 were	those	found	under	more	than	one	administrative	unit.	In	rural	areas	this	hierarchical	five-tier	administrative	system	consists	of	village	(governed	by	an	LC1),	Parish	(LC2),	Sub-County	(LC3),	County	(LC4)	and	District	(LC5).		
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Ideally	 standardising	 factors	 such	 as	 group	 size	 and	 distance	 to	 external	 markets	would	 have	 allowed	 more	 robust	 statistical	 analyses,	 however,	 pragmatically	 the	selection	 was	 confined	 to	 existing	 realities	 where	 each	 group	 had	 unique	characteristics		(Table	2).	This	included	the	size	of	their	membership,	the	Alternative	Livelihood	Activities	(ALA)	they	have	implemented	and	the	external	programmes	that	have	 provided	 incentives	 (i.e	 cash,	 technological	 inputs,	 training	 etc).	 The	 final	selection	was	ultimately	based	on	their	willingness	to	participate	in	the	research.			
Table	2.	Summary	of	CBO	Activities		
Community	 Ethnicity	
Main	
Cash	
Crop	
CBO	Activities	
CBO	
Membership	
	
Cash	Rewards	
1	
	
Bagishu	 Coffee	
-Energy	saving	cook-stoves	-Horticulture	seedlings	-Tree	nursery	-Zero-grazing	-Trench	digging	-Napier	grass	Planting	
146	members	from	17	different	villages	in	2			across	sub-counties		
-World	Wildlife	Fund	(WWF)	-Territorial	Approach	to	Climate	Change	(TACC)	-MERECP-Cash	Revolving	Funds	
2	 Bagishu	 Coffee	
-Horticulture	seedlings	-Zero-grazing	-Bee-keeping	-Tree	nursery	-Trench	digging	-Napier	grass	planting	-Bee-hives	
500	members	from	12	different	villages	across	2	sub-counties		
-World	Wildlife	Fund	(WWF)	-Territorial	Approach	to	Climate	Change	(TACC)	-MERECP-Cash	Revolving	Fund	
3	 Sabiny	 Coffee	
-Bamboo	demonstration	-Fish	pond	demonstration	-Trench	digging	-Bio-gas	-Woodlots	-Dairy	cows	-Bee-hives	-Tree	nursery	-Coffee	pulping	machine	-Infrastructure	-Napier	grass	planting	-Zero-grazing	
411	members	from	7	villages	across	1	sub-county		
-MERECP	-	Deforestation	Avoidance	Fund	&	Cash	Revolving	Fund	-HIEFER	International	(co-funding	biogas	units).		
4	 Bagishu	 Coffee	
-Woodlots	-Dairy	Cows	-Apiary	-Coffee	nursery	-Trench	Digging	-Napier	grass	planting	
25	members	from	one	village			 -MERECP-Cash	Revolving	Funds	
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Promoting	Conservation	Agricultural	Production	Systems:	
How	the	Structure	of	Information-Sharing	Networks	
Influences	Technology	Adoption	Across	the	Mt.	Elgon	Eco-
System	
	Lena	Jeha1,	Steve	Cinderby2	and	Rob	Marchant1		1Environment	Department,	University	of	York,	York,	North	Yorkshire,	YO10	5DD,	UK;	2Stockholm	
Environment	Institute,	Environment	Department,	University	of	York,	North	Yorkshire,	YO10	5DD,	UK	
Abstract		In	an	effort	 to	 improve	agricultural	 conservation,	 routes	 to	achieving	 its	 innovation	have	 received	 considerable	 academic	 attention.	 Often	 focusing	 on	 how	 individual	attributes	 affect	 a	 household’s	 ability	 to	 adapt,	 in	 this	 chapter	 the	 composition	 and	arrangement	 of	 agrarian	 information	 networks	 is	 analysed	 instead.	 Using	 data	collected	 from	 four	 geographically	 isolated	 communities,	 following	 Crowe’s	 (2007)	analytical	 framework	 an	 evaluation	 of	 the	 type	 of	 relational	 ties	 and	 technologies	producers	 have	 acquired	 was	 conducted	 surrounding	 the	 Mt.	 Elgon	 National	 Park.	The	results	suggest	that	there	is	no	single	network	structure	that	promotes	efficiency	however;	 that	 there	 are	 particular	 characteristics	 are	 more	 suited	 to	 certain	innovation	strategies.	More	cohesive	communities	tend	to	have	the	levels	of	trust	and	co-ordination	required	in	managing	more	complex	agri-ecological	practices,	yet	have	also	 shown	 to	 occur	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 exclusion.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 loose,	 expansive	networks	that	cut	across	different	sects	lead	to	the	effective	dissemination	of	simpler	technologies.	 In	 all	 accounts,	 the	 presence	 of	 organisational	 ties	 was	 the	 key	 in	driving	 change.	 This	 study	 therefore,	 advocates	 for	 further	 collaboration	 between	those	 promoting	 agricultural	 conservation	 and	 smallholder	 farmers.	 In	 particular,	establishing	 meaningful	 relationships	 that	 respect	 the	 cultural	 norms	 of	 their	participants	and	maximises	local	knowledge.			
Introduction			Protected	 Areas	 (PA)	 tend	 to	 be	 intricate	 socio-ecological	 systems	 not	 bound	 by	human-made	 jurisdictions	 or	 administrative	 boundaries	 (Bodin	 and	 Crona,	 2009).	
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Often	surrounded	by	multiple-actors	competing	for	their	use,	their	valuable	common	pool	 resources	 now	 face	 serious	 threat	 of	 depletion-	 especially	 in	 the	 21st	 century	where	demands	are	ever	increasing	(Hardin,	1968).	Consequently,	attempting	to	fine-tune	 resource	 management	 with	 sustainability	 has	 reached	 its	 most	 challenging	period	 (MEA,	 2005).	 After	 the	 failure	 of	 ‘exclusionist	 protection	 arrangements’	(Adams	 et	 al.,	 2004),	 practitioners	 have	 now	 sought	 to	 build	 alternative	 livelihood	pathways	with	an	emphasis	on	 redistributing	management	 responsibilities	 towards	local	level	institutions	(McDougall	and	Banjade,	2015;	Ribot,	2003).			At	the	forefront	of	this	agenda	is	agricultural	innovation,	aiming	to	reduce	extractive	pressures	whilst	 improving	smallholder	household	income	(Böhm	and	Collen,	2015;	Pretty,	 Toulmin	 and	 Williams,	 2011).	 Initiatives	 over	 the	 past	 twenty	 years	 have	promoted	sustainable	intensification	through	conservation	of	agricultural	production	systems	and	climate	smart	technologies	(Lamb	et	al.,	2015).	Across	Mt.	Elgon	this	has	included	 a	 range	 of	 on-farm	 management	 practices	 such	 as	 soil	 and	 water	conservation,	 crop	 diversification	 (including	 new	 varieties)	 and	 energy	 saving	technologies	(Moore	et	al.,	2014).		
Analysing	Social	Networks			In	a	dynamic	ecosystem	responding	to	human	and	climate	related	biophysical	drivers	of	 change	 access	 to	 information	 and	 resource	 networks	 is	 required	 in	 the	development	and	upscaling	of	these	management	practices	(Isaac	and	Dawoe,	2011;	Lamb	et	al.,	2015).	The	structural	patterns,	types	of	actors,	as	well	as	the	number	and	length	of	 social	 relations	 found	 in	 these	networks	 (Rogers,	2003;	Valente,	1995)	all	affect	 the	 technical	 knowledge,	 power,	 willingness	 and	 capacity	 of	 smallholder	farmers	in	adopting	the	right	conservation	technologies	(Barnes-Mauthe	et	al.,	2013;	Isaac,	 2012;	 Klerkx,	 Aarts	 and	 Leeuwis,	 2010).	 In	 other	 words,	 governance,	 which	Strassburg	et	al.	(2012)	define	as	‘any	attempt	to	co-ordinate	human	actions,	usually	directed	towards	particular	goals’	is	fundamental	to	this	process.	As	the	recent	body	of	 literature	 shows	 (Bandiera	 and	 Rasul,	 2006;	 Isaac,	 Erickson,	 Quashie-sam	 and	Timmer,	 2007;	 Isaac,	 2012;	 Isaac	 and	 Dawoe,	 2011;	 Lamb	 et	 al.,	 2015)	 analysing	informal	social	networks	can	help	determine	which	structures	facilitate	or	inhibit	the	governance	 of	 agricultural	 innovation.	 For	 example,	 the	 density	 of	 a	 network	 is	 a	
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powerful	 metric	 that	 exposes	 whether	 all	 members	 in	 the	 network	 are	receiving/providing	 agrarian	 knowledge	 (Isaac	 and	 Dawoe,	 2011).	 More	 cohesive	networks,	 indicating	 high	 degrees	 of	 trust,	 cooperation	 and	 reciprocity	 (Putnam	1993)	have	been	shown	to	yield	higher	levels	of	economic	development	in	contrast	to	loose,	expansive	networks	with	cliques	(Crowe,	2007).	Similarly	denser	networks	can	result	in	homogenisation	of	knowledge	reducing	the	range	of	adaptation	responses	of	farmers	 to	 resource	 restrictions	 and/or	 the	 impacts	 of	 climate	 change	 (Gray,	 Chan,	Clark	and	Jordan,	2012).		Network	 configuration,	 particularly	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 a	 network	 is	 organised	around	 focal	 actors,	 also	 affects	 knowledge	 dissemination.	 Highly	 centralised	networks	 (where	 only	 one	 or	 two	 powerful	 actors	 exist),	 tend	 to	 have	 better	 co-ordination	and	control	therefore	making	it	easier	to	have	unified	goals	(Kowalski	and	Jenkins,	 2015).	 In	 a	 complex	 landscape	 that	 involves	 diverse	 actors	 from	 different	institutional	 boundaries,	 such	 individuals	 can	 be	 targeted	 to	 act	 as	 cross-scale	brokers,	 bridging	 information	 flows	 and	 voicing	 community	 concerns	 at	 higher	management	levels	(Barnes-Mauthe	et	al.,	2013).	Seen	as	a	cost-effective,	time-saving	approach;	 targeting	 certain	 actors	 can	 be	 risky	 as	 the	 network	 may	 break	 into	isolated	 sub-groups	 if	 they	 are	 removed	 or	 fail	 to	 communicate	 with	 and	 include	other	 cliques.	 The	 literature,	 therefore	 argues	 that	 communication	 within	 and	between	 communities	 forms	 broader	 and	more	 resilient	 networks	 (Berman,	 Quinn	and	Paavola,	2014).			To	 contribute	 to	 the	 growing	 empirical	 base	 that	 adopts	 Social	 Network	 Analysis	(S.N.A)	 methods,	 the	 goal	 of	 this	 study	 is	 to	 examine	 emerging	 communication	patterns	 in	 a	 context	 where	 numerous	 different	 stakeholders	 are	 implementing	conservation	agricultural	production	systems.	More	specifically	it	aims	to	identify	the	key	players	and	in	turn	deduce	how	social	relationships	at	the	grass-roots	level	affect	extension	services.	Appreciating	these	dynamics	can	then	provide	practitioners	with	better	strategies	to	upscale	their	efforts	across	Mt.	Elgon.			The	analysis	begins	by	mapping	three	types	of	ties:	(1)	bonding	(2)	bridging	and	(3)	cross-scale	 linkages	 (Barnes-Mauthe	 et	 al	 2013)	 and	 uses	 them	 to	 construct	 the	structure	 of	 different	 networks.	Whilst	 there	 are	 numerous	 opposing	 definitions	 of	
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these	 terms	 in	 the	 literature	 (Crowe,	 2007),	 here	 bonding	 capital	 is	 taken	 as	 the	relational	 links	 between	 like-minded	 farmers	 at	 the	 community	 level.	 Thereafter,	bridging	 ties	 are	 those	 formed	 between	 different	 groups	 within	 the	 community	(Portes,	1998)	and	cross-scale	between	farmers	and	external	organisations	of	higher	management	 (Pretty	 and	 Smith,	 2004).	 The	 role	 of	 individual	 actors	 in	 controlling	information	 networks/resources	 is	 then	 investigated	 using	 betweenness	 and	eigenvector	 centrality	 measures	 (detailed	 description	 below)	 and	 used	 to	 test	whether	 power	 relations	 or	 heterogenic	 information	 results	 in	 better	 adoption	 of	technologies.	Accordingly,	the	specific	hypotheses	are	tested:		
H1:	Communities	with	relatively	closed,	cohesive	associational	networks	adopt	a	
higher	number	of	conservation	technologies.		
	
H2:	 Communities	 whose	 associational	 networks	 are	 loosely	 connected,	 with	
diverse	actors,	share	more	heterogenic	agrarian	knowledge.			
	
H3:	Networks	about	 incentive-based	initiatives	have	a	higher	 level	of	cross-scale	
linkages	than	networks	about	pre-existing	practices.		
	Along	with	 these	 hypotheses,	 the	 results	work	 towards	 comparing	 and	 contrasting	the	 connections	made	 between	 pre-existing	 practices	 and	 ones	 introduced	 through	incentive-based	initiatives.	The	chapter	then	finishes	by	discussing	the	implications	of	network	composition	on	the	facilitation	of	technology	transfer	and	adoption.		
Study	Site		 	Bisecting	the	Uganda/Kenya	border	 is	 the	extinct	Miocene	volcano,	home	to	the	Mt.	Elgon	 PA.	 Rich	 in	 closed	 canopy	 tropical	 hardwood,	 bamboo	 and	 heath	moorlands	high	 in	 endemic	 flora,	 this	 forest	 ecosystem	 hosts	 some	 seventy	 six	 threatened	species	 of	 global	 conservation	 value	 (Nakakaawa	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 Protected	 under	different	 jurisdictions	 (Fig	 5),	 in	 Uganda,	 a	 single	 1120	 km2	 National	 Park	 (NP)	 is	administered	by	the	Uganda	Wildlife	Authority	(UWA)	(Sassen	et	al.,	2013).		
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Below	 these	 demarcated	 boundaries	 smallholder	 farmers	 have	 converted	 the	landscape	 into	 intensively	managed	 crop	 production	 sites	 intertwined	with	 animal	rearing	and	Eucalyptus	woodlots	(Hitimana,	Kiyiapi	and	Njunge,	2004;	LVBC,	2012).	The	abundant	rains,	fertile	soils	and	access	to	the	parks	environmental	incomes	and	services	 have	 made	 this	 one	 of	 most	 populous	 (1.6	 million	 people)	 and	 rapidly	growing	regions	(3.4%	per	year)	in	east	Africa	(Nakakaawa	et	al.,	2015).		
Inside	 a	 landscape	 where	 soil	 properties	 and	 layering	 are	 naturally	 prone	 to	landslides,	escalating	human	pressure	is	causing	severe	soil	degradation,	habitat	loss,	water	pollution	and	homelessness	(Claessens	et	al.,	2007).	In	a	bid	to	reconcile	such	hostile	relationships	and	build	sustainable	livelihood	strategies,	over	the	past	twenty	years	several	 conservation	 initiatives	and	resources	agreements	have	been	put	 into	place	(Oonyu,	2009).	Aided	by	 international	 funding,	 their	main	agenda	has	been	to	reduce	 deforestation	 and	 promote	 habitat	 restoration	 through	 the	 development	 of	on-farm	diversification.		
All	 bordering	 the	 NP,	 several	 focus	 group	 discussions	 with	 MERECP	 participating	CBO’s	lead	to	the	selection	of	four	study	sites	(Appendix	I.	B).	The	groups	were	spread	across	 four	 different	 districts	 and	 varied	 in	 geographical	 cover	 (village,	 parish	through	to	sub-county	level),	access	to	roads	and	markets,	CBO	membership	size	and	number	of	organisations	supporting	them.		
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Figure	5.	Map	of	Mt.	Elgon,	Uganda	and	Kenya.	For	anonymity,	exact	location	of	selected	study	sites	is	not	revealed.		
Adapted	using	data	on	Mt.	Elgon	boundaries	and	forests	from	Sassen	et	al	(2013).	Protected	Area	Boundaries	sourced	from	UN	EP-WCMC		
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Three	of	the	study-sites	were	predominately	from	the	Bantu	ethnicity	and	one	from	the	 Sabiny,	 a	 proportion	 that	 reflects	 the	 broader	 ethnic	 composition	 of	 the	 ten	MERECP	 participating	 CBO’s.	 Historically,	 the	 Sabiny	 and	 Bagishu	 practiced	 very	different	 livelihood	strategies.	The	 forest	dwelling	Sabiny	were	nomadic	pastoralist,	supplementing	 their	diet	with	herd	and	 forage	 from	within	 the	 forest	 (Himmelfarb,	2005),	 whereas	 the	 Bagishu	 cleared	 land	 for	 agriculture.	 Despite	 their	 differences,	both	tribes	have	longstanding	cultural	(burial	and	circumcision	sites)	and	use	(wood,	medicine	and	food)	values	associated	with	the	park	(Nakakaawa	et	al.,	2015).	Today,	the	main	cash	crop	for	all	the	sampled	communities	was	coffee,	however,	horticulture	is	 a	 rapidly	 rising	 alternative.	 Planted	 crops	 vary	 seasonally	 but	 trend	 to	 include	maize,	beans,	cassava	and	potatoes.	
Methods		
Data	Collection			A	 single	 data	 collection	 period	 was	 conducted	 between	 September	 2013	 to	 March	2014.	 In	 each	 of	 the	 respective	 sites,	 this	 began	 with	 a	 focus	 group	 discussion	introducing	the	community	to	the	research	team	and	objectives.	Commencing	with	a	randomly	 selected	 household	 from	 a	 list	 of	 CBO	members,	 a	 total	 of	 132	 in-depth,	semi-interviews	at	the	household	level	and	31	at	the	expert	were	conducted	across	all	the	 study	 sites	 (see	 Appendix	 1	 for	 survey	 guidelines).	 Using	 one	 set	 of	 household	interviews,	 two	 separate	 network	 questions	 were	 asked.	 With	 some	 of	 the	 same	actors	 listed	 in	 both,	 this	 chapter	 only	 focuses	 on	 the	 first	 surrounding	 general	agrarian	 information,	 however,	 it	 is	 the	 second,	 looking	 at	 MERECP	 networks	(chapter	five),	which	provided	the	focus	of	the	study-site	selection.				Following	an	egocentric	design,	i.e.	one	in	which	an	ego	and	their	alters	are	mapped	as	 opposed	 to	 a	 complete	 network	 (Prell,	 2012),	 a	 five	 actor	 free	 recall	 name	generator	 technique	was	used	 in	 the	household	 interviews	 to	 identify	 “to	whom	do	you	talk	to	for	farmer	knowledge?”	The	farmers	listed	within	the	community	became	the	 further	 study	 participants,	 also	 referred	 to	 as	 snowball	 sampling	 (Prell,	 2012).	The	 fact	 that	 “A”	mentioned	 “B”	 does	 not	 necessarily	 imply	 that	 “B’	mentioned	 “A”	
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therefore	a	directional,	binary,	actor-by-actor	matrix	is	derived	(García-Amado	et	al.,	2012).			Without	a	natural	 frontier,	a	combination	of	relational	and	positional	approach	was	taken	 in	 defining	 the	 network	 boundary.	 Executive	members	 of	 the	 CBO	 and	 local	leaders	 (culturally	 important)	were	 purposively	 sampled	 (positional),	 however,	 the	sampling	 in	 each	 study	 site	 finished	 when	 the	 same	 names	 were	 continuously	repeated	(relational).	 It	 is	not	possible	 to	 track	down	the	 full	still	of	network	nodes	involved	in	the	agrarian	networks,	instead	the	analysis	focuses	on	quantifying	micro-level	 social	 support	 networks	 developed	 through	 community	 relations.	 It	 is,	therefore,	beyond	the	scope	of	this	study	to	look	at	feedback	loops	occurring	between	higher	management	and	amongst	different	organisations.	The	 ties	 that	 respondents	mention	beyond	the	community	(31	expert	interviews)	will	simply	be	used	to	cross-check	 information	 given	 by	 communities	 and	 explain	 contextual	 realities	 (García-Amado	et	al.,	2012).	As	a	result	of	these	factors	the	size	of	networks	sampled	varied	between	 the	 different	 study	 sites.	 Given	 the	 different	 network	 sizes,	 no	 direct	comparison	 between	 villages	 can	 be	 made,	 however	 a	 qualitative	 comparative	interpretation	 of	 which	 network	 structures	 are	 associated	 with	 better	 adoption	 of	technologies	can	be	made	(Berman,	Quinn	and	Paavola,	2014;	Crowe,	2007).			In	addition	to	sources	of	agricultural	knowledge,	participants	were	asked	to	identify	which	types	of	information	they	received	from	each	actor	(common	knowledge),	their	membership	 to	 organisations	 and,	 socio-demographic	 statistics	 (Isaac	 et	 al.,	 2007).	With	 permission	 of	 the	 survey	 respondent,	 interviews	 were	 tape	 recorded,	transcribed	verbatim	and	thematically	coded	following	a	discourse	analysis	approach	(Weiss,	Hamann,	Kinney	and	Marsh,	2012).		
Typology	of	Actor	Roles		
To	help	identify	the	types	of	actors,	the	management	role	or	social	status	of	each	actor	was	 identified	 according	 to	 their	 position	 within	 Uganda’s	 hierarchical	 five	 tier	administrative	 system.	 Having	 experienced	 one	 of	 the	 most	 transformative	decentralisations	seen	throughout	sub-Saharan	Africa	(Cooper	&	Wheeler	2015),	this	categorisation	 system	was	 introduced	 in	 the	 1980’s	 and	 is	 based	 on	 geographical,	
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rural-urban	divisions	where	specific	legislative,	financial	and	administrative	roles	are	assigned	to	each	tier.	Starting	with	the	smallest	and	least	powerful	at	the	rural	level,	the	LC1	governs	at	the	village	tier.	This	system	then	goes	to	parish	(LC2),	sub-county	(LC3),	 county	 (LC4)	 up	 to	 the	 parliamentary	 candidate	 that	 represents	 the	 whole	district	(LC5)	(Nakakaawa	et	al.	2015).	Other	stakeholders,	such	as	chiefs,	NGO’s	and	private	developers	were	also	included.		
Data	Analysis		Data	 were	 analysed	 using	 UCINET	 Social	 Network	 Analysis	 Version	 6	 (Borgatti,	Everett	 and	 Freeman,	 2002).	 Respondents	 who	 failed	 to	 list	 alters	 and	 were	 not	mentioned	 by	 any	 other	 egos	were	 removed	 from	 the	 network.	 Egos	 that	 listed	 an	alter	 with	 no	 information	 flow	 were	 included	 in	 the	 overall	 visualisation	 of	 the	network,	however,	they	were	removed	from	the	analysis	on	information	networks.		All	 visualisations	 were	 created	 using	 NetDraw	 (Borgatti,	 2002)	 where	 a	multidimensional	algorithm	was	used	 to	 lay	out	actors	 	based	on	 their	 similarity	 in	geodesic	distances	 (shortest	path	 lengths)	 to	other	actors	 (Weiss	et	al.,	2012).	 	The	size	 of	 the	 nodes	 reflects	 the	 actors	 betweenness,	 a	 statistic	 that	 measures	 gate-keepers	in	a	network	by	calculating	the	proportion	of	actors	which	frequently	lie	on	the	shortest	path	between	all	pairs	on	actors	in	the	network	(Freeman,	1979).		With	the	interest	in	understanding	how	network	structure	impacts	information	flows	and	 technology	 adoption	 (like	 Ramirez-Sanchez	 and	 Pinkerton	 (2009),	 Barnes-Mauthe	 et	 al	 (2013)	 and	Berman	et	 al	 (2014)),	 the	 analysis	 adopts	Crowe’s	 (2007)	framework	 to	 determine	 the	 levels	 of	 bonding	 and	 bridging	 in	 a	 network.	 Here	 a	combination	 of	 component,	 K-core	 analysis	 and	 cut-off	 points	 are	 loosely	 used	 to	categorise	each	network	as	either	complete,	coalition,	or	bridging	(for	definition	see	Fig	6).	More	specifically,	an	ANOVA	density	model	is	used	to	test	whether	smallholder	farmers	are	more	likely	to	share	information	with	one-another,	or	whether	they	are	receiving	 it	 directly	 from	 higher	 management	 (cross-scale	 linkages).	 Below	 these	statistics	are	explained	in	more	detail.				
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																In	this	context	K-core	analysis	builds	on	the	density	measure	of	social	cohesion.	The	higher	 the	K-core,	 that	being	a	 subgroup	 in	which	each	actor	connects	 to	at	 least	K	other	 actors	 (Seidman,	 1983),	 the	more	 cohesive	 a	 network	 (Barnes-Mauthe	 et	 al.,	2013;	 Berman,	 Quinn	 and	 Paavola,	 2014;	 Crowe,	 2007;	 Ramirez-Sanchez	 and	Pinkerton,	 2009).	 In	 contrast,	 cutoff	 point	 analysis	 is	 used	 to	 reflect	 the	 level	 of	fragmentation	within	a	network.	By	removing	key	actors,	this	analysis	indicates	how	many	subgroups,	termed	blocks,	would	form.		The	proportion	of	cutoff	points	to	total	points	is	reported	here	and	ultimately	used	to	signify	structural	holes	or	weakness	in	a	network	(Hanneman	and	Riddle,	2005).	In	some	networks,	isolated	subgroups	(i.e.	a	cluster	 of	 actors	 that	 are	 not	 connected	 to	 the	main	 network)	 exist.	 By	 coding	 key	words	 and	 phrases,	 content	 analysis	was	 used	 to	 calculate	 the	 number	 of	 separate	subgroups	 (called	 components),	 which	 is	 another	 measure	 of	 how	 fragmented	 the	network	is.			Adopting	 an	 evolutionary	 approach	 to	 coding	 (Mayring,	 2002),	 from	 the	 semi-structured	 interviews	 13	 main	 types	 of	 agrarian	 knowledge	 across	 the	 four	 study	sites	were	deduced.	According,	the	13	knowledge	types	were	collapsed	into	2	major	
COMPLETE	
 	High	proportion	of	 actors	 in	relatively	 high	 k-cores,	 and	no	cut-off-points	or	very	low	proportion	 of	 cut-points	 to	total	 number	 of	 points	(actors)	of	the	network.	
COALITONAL		
	High	proportion	of	households	in	relatively	high	k-cores,	and	high	proportion	of	cut	points	
BRIDGING		
		Low	proportion	of	actors	in	relatively	high	k-cores,	and	low	proportion	of	cut-points	
Figure	 6.	 Example	 of	 Crowe’s	 typology	 of	 complete,	 coalitional	 and	 bridging	 network	 structures	 deCined	through	k-cores	and	cut-off	points.	Adapted	from	Crowe	(2007)	and	Ramirez-Sanchez	and	Pinkerton	(2009)	
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networks	depending	on	whether	they	were	based	on:	(1)	pre-existing	practices	or	(2)	Incentive-based	 initiatives	 (Table	 3).	 By	 ranking	 the	 actors	 with	 the	 highest	eigenvector	 centrality	 within	 both	 networks,	 a	 measure	 that	 captures	 how	 well	connected	an	actor	is	in	addition	to	how	well	connected	the	actors	they	have	ties	to	are	(explained	in	more	detail	below)	(Bonacich,	1972),	the	type	of	actors	involved	in	pre-existing	networks	were	compared	to	those	of	incentive-based	initiatives	using	an	ANOVA	density	model	of	variable	homophily.		
	After	 grasping	 the	 overall	 level	 of	 cohesion	 within	 the	 four	 networks,	 the	 role	 of	individuals	in	shaping	them	was	then	investigated	using	eigenvector	and	betweeness	centrality.	In	SNA	theory,	it	is	assumed	that	the	number	and	type	of	relational	ties	you	maintain	is	an	indication	of	the	power	you	occupy.	For	example,	an	actor	may	have	a	few	ties,	but	these	ties	are	established	with	actors	who	are	well	connected	to	others,	i.e.	at	the	core	of	the	network	(Barnes-Mauthe	et	al.,	2015)	that	will	thereby	derive	a	high	 eigenvector	 centrality	 (Bonacich,	 1972).	 In	 this	 analysis,	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	higher	 scoring	 actors	 hold	 greater	 influence	 within	 their	 network	 (Prell,	 2012).	Subsequently	 the	 specific	 individuals,	 who	 are	 bridging	 different	 groups,	 including	cross-scale	links,	were	also	presented	in	the	socio-grams	(network	visualisations).	At	the	micro-level	this	is	the	extent	to	which	an	actor	falls	on	the	shortest	geodesic	path	length	between	two	others	who	are	not	directly	connected	(Freeman,	1979).			Finally,	I	acknowledge	that	there	are	potentially	many	factors	that	could	be	included	in	this	analysis,	such	as	membership	to	CBO,	wealth,	education	and	so	on,	all	of	which	could	influence	smallholder	networks,	but	here	I	decided	to	run	a	linear	regression	to	
Table	3.	Collapsed	agrarian	knowledge	types	found	across	all	four	networks	
Pre-existing	Practices		 Incentive-based	Initiatives		Species	Selection	 Dairy	Management	Planting	Patterns	 Market/Income	Generating	Activities	Pest	Control	 Soil	and	Water	Conservation	Animal	Husbandry	 Agroforestry	Coffee	Management	 Apiary	Nutrients,	Fertilizers	and	Manure	 Fish	Farming	
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see	whether	knowledge	(taken	as	number	of	information	types	exchanged)	or	power,	(using	eigenvector	centrality	figures)	by	themselves	were	positively	associated	with	number	of	adopted	technologies.		
Results		Each	 of	 the	 study	 sites	 sampled	 had	 very	 different	 network	 characteristics	 but	showed	that	farmers	are	connected	to	a	wide	range	of	individuals	and	organisations	across	a	range	of	sectors	including	private	businesses,	NGO’s	and	government	officials	(Table	4).	Network	1	(the	 largest)	had	the	biggest	number	of	actors	 listed	however,	relatively	similar	diversity	in	the	types	of	actors	as	compared	to	smaller	networks	2	and	 3	 (Table	 4).	 Whilst	 a	 comparable	 number	 of	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 in	network	 2	 and	 3,	 network	 three	 received	 more	 agrarian	 knowledge	 from	 actors	within	 the	 community	 and	 from	 local	 government	 structures	 (sub-county	 and	district),	 therefore,	 has	 proportionally	 less	 household	 interviews	 than	 network	 2	(Table	3).	 In	contrast	network	2	received	more	funds	and	quoted	more	interactions	with	external	NGO’s	than	network	three.			Network	 4	was	 substantially	 smaller	 than	 all	 the	 other	 networks	with	 participants	only	 coming	 from	one	 village.	 This	 CBO	has	 only	worked	with	 one	NGO	 (MERECP)	with	 the	 main	 sources	 of	 information	 exchange	 occurring	 from	 supporting	government	 officials.	 Given	 its	 small	 size,	 it	 would	 be	 misleading	 to	 form	 any	judgments	on	density	and	centralization	from	this	network	as	fewer	actors	means	the	likelihood	that	actors	will	connect	to	a	higher	proportion	of	other	actors	is	higher	in	this	network	(Prell,	2012).		
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Table	4.	The	type	of	actors	listed	across	all	four	networks	
Type	of	Actor	 1		 2	 3	 4	
Village	
Small-Scale	Farmer	Ordinary	CBO	Member	Executive	CBO	Member	 Small-Scale	Farmer	Ordinary	CBO	Member	Executive	CBO	Member	 Small-Scale	Farmer	Ordinary	CBO	Member	Executive	CBO	Member	 Small-Scale	Farmer	Ordinary	CBO	Member	Executive	CBO	Member	
Local	Council	
(Village	and	Parish)	
LC1	LC2	 LC1	LC2	 LC1	LC2	 LC1	
Sub-County	Council	
LC3	Agricultural	Extension	Officer	Sub-County	Chief	Community	Development	Officer	Veterinary	Officer	National	Agricultural	Advisory	Services	(NAADs)	
LC3	Sub-County	Chief	Community	Development	Officer	Veterinary	Officer	Agricultural	Extension	Officer	National	Agricultural	Advisory	Services	(NAADs)	
LC3	Sub-County	Chief	Veterinary	Office	National	Agricultural	Advisory	Services	(NAADs)	
LC3	
District	
Government	
Agricultural	Extension	Officer	Community	Development	Officer	Forest	Officer	Production	Officer	Procurement	Chair	National	Agricultural	Advisory	Services	
Community	Development	Officer	Forest	Officer	Agricultural	Extension	Officer	National	Agricultural	Advisory	Services	(NAADs)		
Agricultural	Extension	Officer	Ecraft	NARO	Kapchorwa	District	Landcare	Chapter	(KADLACC)	National	Agricultural	Advisory	Services	(NAADs)	Natural	Resource	Officer	Northern	Uganda	Social	Action	Fund	(NUSAF)	Veterinary	Office	
National	Agricultural	Advisory	Services	(NAADs)	Agricultural	Extension	Officer	Community	Development	Officer	Entomologist	Natural	District	Resource	Officer	
Private	
Developer/Business	
Coffee-a-Cup	Kyagalanyi	Coffee	 Bugisu	Co-operative	Union	Coffee-a-Cup	Uganda	Limited	 Kawacom	Uganda	Limited	KACODA	Uganda	Limited		 	
Faith-Based	
Organisation	
Reverend	 Planning,	Development	and	Rehabilitation	Mbale	Diocese	(Church	of	Uganda)	 Reverend	 	
NGO	
Center	for	International	Forest	Research	(CIFOR)	Mount	Elgon	Regional	Eco-system	Conservation	Porgramme	(MERECP)	International	Union	for	Conservation	of	Nature	(IUCN)	WARF	
Banana	Wild	Integrated	Rural	Development	Initiative	(IRDI)	Kulika	Uganda	Mt.	Elgon	Conservation	and	Development	Project	(MECDP)	Territorial	Approach	to	Climate	Change	(TACC)	Students	Partnership	Worldwide	(SPW)	Mount	Elgon	Regional	Eco-system	Conservation	Programme	(MERECP)	
Mount	Elgon	Regional	Eco-system	Conservation	Programme	(MERECP)	 Mount	Elgon	Regional	Eco-system	Conservation	Programme	(MERECP)	
National	
Government	
Member	of	Parliament	 Uganda	Wildlife	Authority	(UWA)	 Uganda	Wildlife	Authority	(UWA)	 Uganda	Wildlife	Authority	(UWA)	
Note:	There	may	be	more	than	one	actor	listed	under	the	same	title,	some	of	which	work	at	different	governance	levels	
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The	 results	 of	 Crowe’s	 analysis	 reveals	 that	 network	 3	 and	 4	were	 the	most	 cohesive	networks	 as	 they	 had	 relatively	 high	 K-cores	 with	 a	 high	 proportion	 of	 actors	 falling	within	 them	 (Table	 5).	 The	 high	 indegree	 reported	 in	 network	 3,	 especially	 in	comparison	to	the	similarly	sized	network	2,	confirms	that	proportionally	more	agrarian	knowledge	was	 exchanged	within	 this	 network.	Nevertheless,	 the	 larger	 proportion	 of	cut-off	 points	 and	 isolates	 suggests	 that	 there	 are	 also	 some	 structural	 holes	 and	fractional	characteristics	(bridging	ties)	within	network.	The	surprisingly	 low	adoption	of	conservation	technologies	at	the	household	level	compared	to	CBO	level	means	certain	cliques	 are	not	 receiving	 information	 and/or	 access	 to	 conservation	 technologies.	This	could	 also	 point	 towards	 more	 of	 a	 core-periphery	 structure	 where	 central	 actors,	through	 bonding	 ties,	 are	 highly	 connected	 and	 excluding	 those	 at	 the	 periphery.	Consequently,	in	line	with	the	theory	and	hypothesis	one,	this	case-study	shows	closed,	cohesive	groups,	at	the	community	level,	have	adopted	the	most	technologies.			As	the	biggest	network,	network	1	had	the	highest	order	of	K-cores	and	blocks	but	it	was	the	larger	proportion	of	cut-off	points	to	total	points	(0.31)	and	relatively	low	indegree	(15.7%)	that	lead	to	its	classification	as	coalitional.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	number	of	K-cores	was	relatively	lower	in	network	2,	it	is	the	lower	proportion	of	actors	in	the	K-core	(0.49)	 and	 cut-off	 points	 (0.25)	 that	 indicate	 it	 has	 some	 bridging	 characteristics.	 The	large	numbers	of	external	organisations	cited	in	this	network	also	signify	the	multi-level	ties	 common	 in	 this	 community.	 Assuming	 that	 diversity	 in	 actors	 results	 in	 more	heterogenetic	 information	 flows,	 when	 comparing	 network	 features	 with	 technology	adoption	 levels,	 network	 one	 confirms	 hypothesis	 two	 that	 looser,	 more	 expansive	networks	results	in	more	heterogenic	information	flows.	In	combination	with	the	level	of	bonding	(farmers	with	common	interests),	bridging	(farmers	from	different	groups)	and	linking	 ties	 (external	 organisations	 tend	 to	 have	 connections	 to	 outside	 markets	 and	businesses)	 these	 features	have	 lead	 to	 the	most	widespread	uptake	of	 technologies	at	the	household	level.			
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Table	5.	Descriptive	summary	of	organisations,	networks	and	conservation	activities.		
	 1	 2	 3	 4	
Number	of	Actors		 112	 87	 72	 28	
Types	of	Actors		 22	 22	 18	 12	
Number	of	Ties		 194	 135	 137	 48	
Largest	Component		
No.	of	actors	in	largest	
Component	
108	 87	 67	 28	
Isolated	actors		 4	 0	 5	 0	
Indicators	of	Network	Closure		
Indegree	(%)	 15.7	 15.82	 25.85	 31.84	
Largest	k-core	 4	 3	 4	 3	
No.	of	actors	in	largest	k-core	 14	 25	 14	 12	
Proportion	in	2-core	and	
higher		
0.49	 0.49	 0.6	 0.68	
Indicators	of	Structural	holes	
No	of	cut-points	 35	 22	 20	 6	
No	of	blocks	 57	 45	 28	 10	
Proportion	of	cut-points	to	
total	points		
0.31	 0.25	 0.28	 0.21	
Measures	of	Collective	Active		
Proportion	of	conservation	
technologies	adopted	at	HH	
level	
0.46		 0.41		 0.36		 0.41		
No.	of	conservation	activities	
implemented	at	the	CBO	level		
5	 6	 12	 6	
Estimated	Network	
Configuration	
Coalitional	 Bridging	 Complete/	Coalitional	 Complete			
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	Of	 all	 the	 information	 shared,	 species	 choice	 and	 their	 appropriate	 planting	requirements	were	the	most	frequent,	accounting	for	over	forty	percent	of	all	exchanges	(Fig	7).	Within	 the	broad	 category	of	 farmer	knowledge,	 a	 variety	of	 conservation	and	income	 generating	 activities	 were	 cited,	 yet	 this	 only	 accounted	 for	 a	 third	 of	 all	interactions.	Soil	and	water	conservation	was	the	most	recurrent	technology	mentioned	(Fig	8),	making	up	nearly	a	half	of	all	conservation/market	exchanges	(14.	78	%	of	total	ties),	and	fish	farming	the	least	(0.41%	of	total	ties).	Notably,	in	the	only	network	to	be	sampled	 from	 the	 Sabiny	 ethnicity,	 there	 were	 a	 larger	 proportion	 of	 information	exchanges	based	around	animal	husbandry	and	dairy	management	(Network	3).	On	the	other	hand,	 in	all	of	 the	Bagishu	 tribes	 (Network	1,	2,	4),	agroforestry	exchanges	were	more	prevalent.																					
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Figure	7.	Frequency	of	total	information	exchanges	according	to	pre-existing	knowledge	types	across	all	four	communities.	
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Figure	8.	Frequency	of	total	information	exchanges	according	to	incentive-based	initiative	knowledge	types	introduced	across	all	four	communities.	
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Cross	Scale	Linkages			To	gain	an	understanding	of	how	cross-scale	linkages	are	impacting	information	sharing,	I	explored	whether	farmers	were	gaining	agrarian	knowledge	from	one-another	or	had	direct	 access	 to	 external	 actors	 using	 an	 ANOVA	 density	model	 of	 variable	 homophily	(Table	6).	With	the	exception	of	network	1,	the	within	group	tie	density	was	lower	than	with	 external	 organisations	 suggesting	 low	 tendencies	 towards	 homophily	 (hence	 low	adjusted	r-square	values	for	the	model	showing	only	a	small	proportion	of	the	variance	is	accounted	 for	 by	 within-group	 ties).	 The	 significance	 level	 (<	 0.05)	 of	 all	 these	 tests	indicate	that	they	are	not	random	(due	to	chance).	Farmers	were	more	likely	to	receive	information	from	higher	order	organisations	than	one	another	that	indicating	that	either	a)	 there	are	high	 levels	of	 external	 support	b)	 there	 is	hierarchical	 governance	 system	that	 would	 lead	 smallholders	 to	 list	 superiors	 above	 their	 neighbours	 and/or	 c)	 that	smallholder	farmers	value	external	information	sources	above	their	peers.	Overall	these	results	 falsify	 hypothesis	 three,	 demonstrating	 that	 external	 organisations	 such	 as	National	 Agricultural	 Advisory	 Services	 (NAADs)	 and	 Coffee-a-Cup	 Limited	 play	 an	equally	 important	 role	 in	 supporting	 pre-existing	 practices	 as	 NGO’s	 do	 in	 incentive-based	 initiatives.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 bigger,	 less	 fragmented	 structure	 of	 pre-existing	practices	(Socio-gram’s	A)	indicate	that	 incentive-based	knowledge	is	not	as	embedded	in	smallholder	practices	as	conventional	 farming	methods.	Overall,	 the	 lack	of	external	support,	and	subsequently	small	size	of	network	 four,	demonstrates	 the	significance	of	these	organisations	in	driving	agrarian	knowledge.										
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		Notwithstanding	this	association,	the	composition	of	the	different	networks	did	not	infer	that	external	organisations	were	directly	responsible	for	the	widespread	dissemination	of	knowledge.	In	network	1,	the	most	expansive,	smallholder	farmers	were	more	likely	to	source	information	from	their	neighbours	than	the	numerous	personal	listed.	Then	in	the	second	 largest	 network,	 network	 2,	 the	 main	 knowledge	 mediator	 (agricultural	extension	officer	Table	 8),	was	 once	 a	 focal	 farmer	within	 their	 community.	 Following	this	argument	but	from	the	opposite	perspective,	in	network	3,	(which	had	a	small,	dense	core-periphery	 structure),	 more	 weighting	 was	 given	 to	 external	 organisations,	particularly	NGO	personnel	 (Table	7).	With	 the	 fact	 that	eigenvector	centrality	statistic	gives	more	weighting	to	individuals	who	have	well-connected	ties,	this	result	also	points	to	external	personnel	working	with	a	hand	full	of	principles	members,	as	oppose	to	the	broader	community.	Considering	these	dynamics	in	relation	to	technology	adoption,	the	findings	show	that	forming	cross-scale	links	through	a	trustworthy	broker	can	improve	knowledge	dissemination.		
Table	 6.	 Density	 of	 ties	 found	 between	 actors	 sharing	 knowledge	 within	 the	community	 and	actors	 gaining	knowledge	 from	outside	 the	 community,	 separated	into	 pre-existing	 practices	 and	 incentive-based	 initiatives	 networks.	 Figures	
highlighted	in	bold	are	not	significant	at	5%	level.		
Community	 Network	 External	 Within		 Adj	R-square	 P-Value	
1	
Pre-existing	Practices		 5	 19	 0.01	 <0.00	Incentive-based	Initiatives		 4	 2	 0.05	 <0.02	
2	
Pre-existing	Practices	 5	 3	 0.01	 <0.00	Incentive-based	Initiatives	 4	 2	 0.01	 <0.00	
3	
Pre-existing	Practices	 9	 3	 0.02	 <0.00	Incentive-based	Initiatives	 10	 2	 0.03	 <0.00	
4	
Pre-existing	Practices	 10	 7	 0.02	 <0.04			Incentive-based	Initiatives	 1	 12.5	 0.01	 <0.21	
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	Indeed,	 taking	 a	 closer	 look	 at	which	 specific	 individuals	 holds	power	 in	 a	 community	(Table	7,	8	&	10),	the	role	of	external	organisations	becomes	even	less	pronounced	and	the	political	and	social	elite	start	 to	dominate.	When	comparing	 land	and	management	networks	 to	 conservation	 networks,	 the	 same	 trend	 emerges	 with	 the	 same	 central	actors	 taking	 control.	 Conservation	 networks	 are,	 therefore,	 capitalising	 on	 existing	governance	structures	 to	 implement	 their	agenda.	Again,	 this	could	reflect	a	hierarchal	governance	 system	 where	 specific	 individuals	 take	 ownership	 or	 alternatively	 that	practitioners	 are	 working	 through	 pre-existing	 governance	 systems.	 Certainly	 the	sampling	strategy	 that	 stemmed	 from	CBO’s,	and	 the	 fact	 that	 they	are	often	used	as	a	forum	 to	 work	 with	 smallholders,	 explains	 why	 their	 members	 featured	 in	 some	 top	centrality	rankings.																	 	
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Table	7.	The	top	three	types	of	actors	with	the	highest	normalised	eigenvector	centrality	in	community	one.	
Pre-existing	Practices	 Incentive-based	Initiatives		
Rank	 Type	of	Actor	 Centrality	 Rank	 Type	of	Actor	 Centrality		
1	 Sub-county	Chief		 69.90	 1	 Sub-county	Chief	 61.73	
2	 Executive	member		 41.86	 2	 Executive	member	 51.25	
3	 LC3	 36.89	 3	 Ordinary	member	 44.80	
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Figure	9.	Socio-grams	for	knowledge	exchange	networks	 in	community	1	where	A)	 is	 the	pre-existing	practices	network	and	B)	 is	 the	 incentive-based	 initiative	network.	The	size	of	each	node	correlates	with	the	betweenness	value	for	each	actor	(larger	node	 indicates	higher	betweenness).	Arrows	 indicate	 directional	 relation.	 Nodes	 coloured	 in	 light	 purple	 are	 actors	 found	 within	 the	 community	 and	 those	 in	 green	 are	 external	organizations.	The	shape	of	the	node	indicates	the	level	the	actor	comes	from	(actor	key).	Refer	back	to	Table	4	for	more	information	about	the	actor	types.		
A)	 B)	
66		
																						
Table	8.	The	top	three	types	of	actors	with	highest	normalised	eigenvector	centrality	in	community	two	
Pre-existing	Practices		 Incentive-based	Initiatives		
Rank	 Type	of	Actor	 Centrality		 Rank	 Type	of	Actor	 Centrality		
1	 Agric	Ext	Officer		 66.26	 1	 Agric	Ext	Officer		 81.51	
2	 LC3		 53.81	 2	 LC3	 55.50	
3	 LC3	 38.67	 3	 Farmer		 38.25	Act
or
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Figure	10.	Socio-grams	for	knowledge	exchange	networks	 in	community	2	where	A)	 is	 the	pre-existing	practices	network	and	B)	 is	 the	 incentive-based	 initiative	network.	The	 size	of	 each	node	 correlates	with	 the	 betweenness	value	 for	 each	actor	 (larger	node	 indicates	higher	betweenness).	Arrows	 indicate	 directional	 relation.	 Nodes	 coloured	 in	 light	 purple	 are	 actors	 found	 within	 the	 community	 and	 those	 in	 green	 are	 external	organizations.	The	shape	of	the	node	indicates	the	level	the	actor	comes	from	(actor	key).	Refer	back	to	Table	4	for	more	information	about	the	actor	types.		
A)	
B)	
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Table	9.The	top	three	types	of	actors	with	highest	normalised	eigenvector	centrality	in	community	three	
Pre-existing	Practices		 Incentive-based	Initiatives		
Rank	 Type	of	Actor	 Centrality		 Rank	 Type	of	Actor	 Centrality		
1	 Executive	Member	 55.72	 1	 Executive	Member	 55.84	
2	 District	Gov	 55.50	 2	 NGO	 48.59	
3	 Farmer		 38.25	 3	 NGO	 48.59	
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Figure	11.	Socio-grams	for	knowledge	exchange	networks	 in	community	3	where	A)	 is	 the	pre-existing	practices	network	and	B)	 is	 the	 incentive-based	 initiative	network.	The	 size	of	 each	node	 correlates	with	 the	 betweenness	value	 for	 each	actor	 (larger	node	 indicates	higher	betweenness).	Arrows	 indicate	 directional	 relation.	 Nodes	 coloured	 in	 light	 purple	 are	 actors	 found	 within	 the	 community	 and	 those	 in	 green	 are	 external	organizations.	The	shape	of	the	node	indicates	the	level	the	actor	comes	from	(actor	key).	Refer	back	to	Table	4	for	more	information	about	the	actor	types.	
B)	A)	
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Table	10.		The	top	three	types	of	actors	with	highest	normalized	eigenvector	centrality	in	community	three	
Pre-existing	Practices	 Incentive-based	Initiatives		
Rank	 Type	of	Actor	 Centrality		 Rank	 Type	of	Actor	 Centrality		
1	 LC1	 84.69	 1	 LC1			 25.47	
2	 Executive	Member		 62.77	 2	 Ordinary	Member	 19.91	
3	 Executive	Member			 51.49	 3	 Executive	Member		 15.87	
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Figure	12.	Socio-grams	for	knowledge	exchange	networks	 in	community	4	where	A)	 is	 the	pre-existing	practices	network	and	B)	 is	 the	 incentive-based	 initiative	network.	The	 size	of	 each	node	 correlates	with	 the	 betweenness	value	 for	 each	actor	 (larger	node	 indicates	higher	betweenness).	Arrows	 indicate	 directional	 relation.	 Nodes	 coloured	 in	 light	 purple	 are	 actors	 found	 within	 the	 community	 and	 those	 in	 green	 are	 external	organizations.	The	shape	of	the	node	indicates	the	level	the	actor	comes	from	(actor	key).	Refer	back	to	Table	4	for	more	information	about	the	actor	types.		
B)	A)	
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	For	 each	 of	 the	 network,	 the	 frequency	 of	 adopted	 conservation	 at	 the	 household	level	presented	in	Fig	13.	Across	the	whole	Mt.	Elgon	ecosystem	planting	exotic	tree-species,	 particularly	 the	 fast	 growing	 Eucalyptus	 grandis	 species,	 is	 the	 most	commonly	 adopted	 agri-ecological	 technology.	 Thereafter,	 soil	 and	 water	 practices	were	 the	 most	 frequently	 cited.	 Less	 popular	 choices	 included	 indigenous	 trees,	apiaries	and	fishponds.																										
	Finally,	 this	 chapter	 looked	 at	 the	 role	 of	 information	 and	 power	 (eigenvector	centrality)	in	explaining	the	number	of	technologies	adopted	(Table.	11).	For	all	four	networks,	 heterogenic	 information	 exchanges	 had	 a	 higher	 explanatory	 factor	 in	determining	 the	 number	 of	 technologies	 adopted	 then	 being	 in	 a	 better	 structural	position	to	access	it.	Nevertheless,	given	that	we	are	dealing	with	social	networks,	the	adjusted	r-square	values	were	fairly	high,	signifying	the	importance	of	both.		
Figure	13.	The	adoption	of	different	conservation	technologies	at	the	household	level	found	across	the	four	communities	
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Table	11.		Linear	Regression	correlation	between	power	(eigenvector	centrality)	and	information	in	explaining	number	of	technologies	adopted.	Figures	highlighted	in	
bold	are	not	significant	at	5%	level.	
Community	 Variable	 	 Adj	R-Square	 Sig	
1	
Centrality	 0.01	 0.37	 <0.00	Information	 0.92	
2	
Centrality	 -0.04	 0.68	 <0.00	Information	 1.10	
3	
Centrality	 -0.01	 0.49	 <0.00	Information	 1.21	
4	 Centrality	 0.04	 0.55	 <0.00	Information	 0.40	
Discussion			This	 chapter	 found	 that	 communities	 with	 relatively	 closed,	 cohesive	 associational	networks	adopted	a	higher	number	of	conservation	technologies.	Equally	those	that	are	 loosely	 connected,	 with	 diverse	 actors,	 share	 more	 heterogenic	 agrarian	knowledge.	 Nevertheless,	 not	 many	 patterns	 of	 homophily	 emerged	 within	communities	with	 a	 high	 level	 of	 cross-scale	 linkages	 emerging	 both	 for	 incentive-based	and	pre-existing	information	flows.			
Network	Composition	and	Agricultural	Innovation			Agricultural	 innovation	 is	 rarely	 uniform	 in	 its	 evolution	 (Knowler	 and	 Bradshaw,	2007).	 Its	 potential	 is	 site	 specific,	 depending	 on	 biophysical,	 socio-economic	 and	political	 factors	 (Giller,	 Witter,	 Corbeels	 and	 Tittonell,	 2009)	 that	 the	 inconclusive	studies	 statistically	 correlating	 individual	 attributes	 to	 technology	 adoption	 show	well.	 	 Following	Crowe	 (2007)	 the	 results	 advocate	 that	 certain	network	 structures	lend	 themselves	 to	 specific	 agricultural	 development	 goals	 more	 than	 others	 and	success	can	only	be	valued	by	the	path	in	which	you	choose	to	implement	it	(Muñoz-Erickson	 and	 Cutts,	 2016).	 Akin	 to	 Bandiera	 &	 Rasul	 (2006);	 Isaac	 (2012)	 and	Shiroyama	et	al.	(2012).	These	findings	show	that	knowledge	is	undeniably	the	key	to	change,	 yet	 realistically	 there	 are	 limitations	 to	 the	 scope	 of	 disseminating	 agro-ecological	 agendas.	 A	 trade-off,	 therefore,	 presents	 itself.	 Are	 you	 aiming	 to	 make	marked	differences	with	a	handful	of	smallholders,	which	shown	in	the	next	chapter	
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can	 make	 significant	 environmental	 gains,	 or	 piecemeal	 changes	 with	 the	 masses?	This	study	has	demonstrated	that	both	types	of	development	are	occurring	across	Mt.	Elgon.	 Influenced	by	 the	 actors	 and	 the	 relationships	 they	maintain,	 this	discussion	explores	the	merits	and	drawbacks	of	both.			In	 the	 first	 community,	 the	 formation	 of	 an	 expansive	 network	 across	 loosely	connected	 actors	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	 widespread	 uptake	 of	 technologies	 at	 the	household	 level.	 As	 previous	 studies	 have	 also	 shown	 (Isaac,	 2012;	 Krishna,	 2001;	Newman	 and	 Dale,	 2007;	 Pretty,	 Toulmin	 and	 Williams,	 2011),	 in	 this	 scenario,	heterogeneity	 (i.e.	 a	 more	 coalitional	 network	 structure)	 has	 proven	 effective.	Reaching	 the	 optimal	 dynamic	 between	 bonding,	 bridging	 and	 linking	 capital	 has	facilitated	the	democratic	governance,	economic	efficiency	and	levels	trust	needed	in	agricultural	 innovation	 (Szreter,	 2002).	 More	 specifically,	 bridging	 and	 cross-scale	ties	have	been	found	to	be	important	by	increasing	smallholders	access	to	resources	(Berman,	 Quinn	 and	 Paavola,	 2014),	 whereas	 the	 underlying	 bonding	 ties	 have	provided	 the	 foundations	 for	 sharing,	 those	of	 common	values	and	goals.	Here,	 less	formal,	 local	 management	 has	 compensated	 for	 barriers	 to	 specialised	 support	(Harvey	et	al.,	2014),	where	trust	amongst	neighbours	and	the	operational	role	of	the	knowledge	 broker	 (in	 this	 case	 the	 sub-county	 chief)	 was	 central	 in	 up-scaling	activities.	 Efforts	 in	 lobbying	 and	 translating	 change	 in	 political	 terms	 has	 been	particularly	successful	in	this	network	(Hermans,	Stuiver,	Beers	and	Kok,	2013).			Given	 the	 large	 number	 of	 NGO’s/Government	 programmes	 that	 have	 and	 are	functioning	 across	 Mt.	 Elgon,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 draw	 a	 direct	 cause	 and	 effective	relationship	 between	 information/resources	 shared	 by	 a	 specific	 intervention	 and	the	frequency	of	uptake.	Nevertheless	there	are	some	clear	correlations	between	the	technologies	promoted	and	 those	adopted.	Working	with	TACC,	WWF	and	MERECP	funding,	community	1	chose	to	focus	on	installing	energy-saving	cook	stoves.	After	a	free	 bio-gas	 demonstration	 by	 MERECP,	 with	 the	 aid	 of	 HIEFER	 Interactional	 co-funding	scheme,	several	households	in	community	three	reported	the	installation	of	biogas	units.	Having	signed	an	agreement	with	UWA,	at	the	periphery	of	the	NP	thirty	beehives	were	established	in	community	4.			
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In	 a	 landscape	where	 communities	 are	 skeptical	 about	 the	motivations	 of	 external	organisations,	 in	 network	 2,	 using	 a	 trustworthy	 mediator	 from	 within	 the	community	was	also	a	successful	way	of	disseminating	agro-ecological	knowledge.	As	a	well-respected	farmer	from	within	the	community,	 the	now	agricultural	extension	officer	 worked	 as	 a	 neutral	 party	 in	 communicating	 the	 messages	 of	 the	 Uganda	Wildlife	Authority	(UWA)	and	International	Union	for	Conservation	of	Nature	(IUCN)	after	 tensions	arose	when	 community	members	were	evicted	 from	 the	NP	 in	1993.	His	small	farm	at	the	periphery	of	the	park	was	used	as	a	trial	site	to	introduce	new	conservation	 technologies	 and	 train	 local	 farmers	 (personal	 communication,	 2014).	Unfortunately	in	the	absence	of	bonding	ties,	this	did	not	translate	into	the	sustained	adoption	 of	 conservation	 technologies.	 After	 receiving	 a	 diploma	 in	 organic	management	 from	 Reading	 University	 (U.K),	 the	 agricultural	 extension	 officer	 now	works	across	the	whole	of	East	Africa	 limiting	his	availability	within	his	community	and	thus	causing	the	efforts	both	on	his	personal	farm	and	with	friends	to	diminish.	Ultimately	 this	 shows	 that	 centralisation	 of	 power	 to	 specific	 gatekeepers	 does	 not	always	 create	 resilience	 in	 socio-ecological	 systems,	 particularly	when	 farmers	 are	not	relying	on	one-another	for	agrarian	support	nor	are	they	working	together	(low	bonding	capital).			Shown	 in	 network	 1,	 capitalising	 on	 the	 right	 actors	 is	 fundamental	 in	 bringing	communities	together.	In	Uganda,	under	the	deployment	of	good	manners	(in	what	is	known	 as	 ‘Kiganda’),	 respect	 towards	 social	 hierarchies	 is	 ingrained	 within	 the	culture	regardless	of	whether	 these	 individuals	promote	resource-sharing	 (Berman,	Quinn	and	Paavola,	2014;	Roncoli,	Orlove,	Kabugo	and	Waiswa,	2011).	Affirming	ties	to	the	political	elite,	like	the	local	council	leaders	in	this	network,	could	therefore	be	a	reflection	of	the	power	they	hold,	not	necessarily	their	value	in	promoting	innovation.	In	 fact,	 cases	of	 corruption	are	not	uncommon	 in	 the	agricultural	 sector	 in	Uganda.	For	 example,	 in	 Mbarara,	 Cooper	 &	 Wheeler	 (2015)	 have	 documented	 the	misappropriation	 of	 NAADs	 inputs	 by	 the	 local	 elite.	 Under	 such	 circumstances	forming	bridging	and	cross-scale	 ties	 through	pre-existing	governance	systems	may	not	 build	 the	 positive	 rapport	 that	 would	 encourage	 or	 even	 allow	 positive	development.			
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Directly	establishing	individual	ties,	as	seen	in	network	3,	may	be	a	more	pragmatic	way	 to	overcome	 these	obstacles	 (Tindall,	2008).	Strong	connections	with	a	core	of	proactive	 farmers,	 i.e.	 those	 characterised	 by	 bonding	 ties,	 show	 a	 greater	 level	 of	trust	and	co-operation	amongst	their	neighbours	making	the	facilitation	of	collective	action	easier	and	hence	observing	a	higher	number	of	technologies	at	the	community	level.	In	particular,	more	complex	technologies	require	these	levels	of	social	capital	as	specialised,	 issue-specific	 knowledge	 flows	 and	 access	 to	 resources	 are	 needed.	Members	that	form	these	dense	relationships	with	external	organisations	have	done	so	 at	 the	 expense	of	 those	with	 the	broader	 community	 (García-Amado,	Ruiz	Pérez	and	Barrasa	García,	2013;	Ernstson,	Sörlin	and	Elmqvist,	2008)	and	is	the	most	likely	explanation	 of	 the	 low	 level	 of	 technologies	 reported	within	 households.	 In	 future,	extension	personnel	should	continue	to	support	more	pro-active	 farmer	groups	 like	these,	but	perhaps	make	a	more	concentrated	effort	in	ensuring	equitable	outcomes	are	achieved	with	greater	number	of	community	members.	
Knowledge	Acquisition	and	the	Obstacles	in	Adaptation			What	is	clear	from	this	study,	and	others	across	Sub-Saharan	Africa,	is	that	the	lack	of	information	 is	still	a	key	barrier	 to	 technology	adoption	(Bandiera	and	Rasul,	2006;	Barry,	 Steyn	 and	 Brent,	 2011).	 This	 includes	 perceptions	 of	 the	 advantages	 and	opportunities	 of	 using	 conservation	 technologies	 (Giller	 et	 al.,	 2009;	 Prasad	 and	Visagie,	2005).	The	 smaller,	more	 fragmented	nature	of	 conservation	networks	and	lack	 of	 responses	 detailing	 their	 techniques	 suggest	 farmers	 are	 still	 not	 as	knowledgeable	 about	 their	 benefits.	 In	 some	 cases	 it	 is	 the	 long	 timeframes	 before	notable	 changes	 occur	 or	 poor	 understanding	 of	 conservation	 agriculture	 that	 is	limiting	 this	 viewpoint.	 Giller	 et	 al	 (2009)	 clarifies	 that	 although	 physical	 control	measures	to	reduce	soil	erosion	will	improve	Soil	Organic	Matter	(SOM)	in	the	long-run,	 the	 amounts	 of	 organic	mattered	 returned	 to	 the	 soil	 (through	 crop	 residues,	manure	or	compost)	is	the	primarily	factor	that	controls	their	levels	in	soil.	So	whilst	farmers	 often	 reported	 taking	 action	 to	 prevent	 soil	 erosion	 (high	 number	 of	exchanges	and	adoption),	the	lack	of	exchanges	surrounding	nutrients,	fertilisers	and	manure	 could	 mean	 they	 are	 not	 returning	 SOM	 into	 the	 soil	 and	 fertility	 will	consequently	remain	low.		
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Considering	 the	 scientific	 reasoning	 behind	 introduced	 technologies	 is	 still	 poorly	understood	by	the	communities,	 it	 is	not	unsurprising	that	they	are	not	adapting.	In	some	 interviews	 respondents	 believed	 that	 god	 controlled	 rainfall	 patterns	 in	 the	region,	taking	no	acknowledgement	that	deforestation	of	the	park	or	external	factors	such	as	climate	change	could	have	impacts	upon	precipitation.	In	Kibale,	a	successful	partnership	 with	 NAADs	 extension	 officers	 helped	 improve	 knowledge	 of	 the	changing	 rainfall	 patterns,	 resulting	 in	 improved	 farming	 methods	 (Hartter	 et	 al.,	2014).	 Information	 networks,	 therefore,	 need	 to	 work	 on	 establishing	 scientific	foundations	 before	 they	 can	 promote	 innovation.	 Furthermore,	 although	conservation	 strategies	 are	 capitalising	 on	 agricultural	 networks	 at	 the	 grass-roots	level,	 there	 is	 scope	 for	 further	 collaboration	 between	 different	 NGO’s	 and	government	seeking	a	conservation	agenda.		Constrained	 by	 barriers	 such	 food	 security,	 income,	 land	 availability	 and	 access	 to	markets,	farmers	simply	may	not	have	the	capacity	to	implement	these	technologies	without	 seeing	 short-term	 returns	 (Giller	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Equally,	 the	maintenance	 in	their	upkeep	can	also	discourage	farmers	(Barry,	Steyn	and	Brent,	2011).	In	a	remote,	resource	poor	 landscape,	 accessing	 and	affording	materials	 can	 limit	 the	 scope	 and	upkeep	 of	 introduced	 technologies	 (Roncoli	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 As	mentioned	 above,	 this	was	 a	 particularly	 recurrent	 theme	 in	 network	 2,	 where	 several	 respondents	highlighted	that	after	IUCN	stopped	supporting	farmers,	they	could	no	longer	finance	biogas	 repairs	 or	 restock	 the	 fish	 ponds	 they	 introduced.	 This	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	observed	 expansive,	 heterogenic	 network	 yet	 with	 low	 reporting	 of	 technologies.	These	observations	draw	attention	to	several	points.	The	first	is	that	this	study	only	reflects	a	snapshot	of	the	agricultural	innovation	occurring	across	Mt.	Elgon	(Muñoz-Erickson	 and	 Cutts,	 2016).	 Related	 to	 the	 first,	 the	 second	 is	 that	 introduced	techniques	 are	 not	 always	 self-sustaining,	 therefore,	 there	 is	 a	 dependency	 culture	where	 new	 enthusiasm	 and	 people	 are	 constantly	 required	 for	 success	 (Geels	 and	Raven,	2006).	Thirdly,	or	alternatively,	 farmers	are	not	getting	adequate	support	 to	implement	these	technologies.	Previous	studies	exploring	agricultural	knowledge	sets	across	 Mt.	 Elgon	 have	 highlighted	 that	 like	 the	 findings	 presented	 here	intercommunity	 variations	 exist	 between	 and	 within	 communities	 (Moore	 et	 al.,	
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2014)	 that	 would	 make	 facilitating	 the	 collaboration	 required	 in	 implementing	technologies	even	harder.			Accordingly,	 trends	 associated	 with	 culture	 were	 clearly	 noticeable	 in	 the	 results.	Being	the	only	network	sampled	 from	the	Sabiny	ethnicity,	a	historically	pastoralist	tribe	that	grazed	cattle	within	the	national	park	(Himmelfarb,	2005),	the	significance	of	 cattle	 in	 their	 social	 relations	 and	 ritual	 activities	 (high	 frequency	 of	 exchanges	surrounding	 animal	 husbandry	 and	 dairy	 management)	 is	 reflected	 through	 their	preference	towards	biogas.	Similarly,	the	Bagishu’s	long	history	of	farming	with	trees	may	 account	 for	 the	 high	 level	 of	 agroforestry	 practices	 found	 within	 these	communities.	 Given	 the	 heterogenic	 knowledge	 and	 beliefs	 systems	 that	 exist,	perhaps	promoting	practices	that	are	more	sympathetic	to	these	differences	would	be	more	successful.	Nevertheless,	the	development	of	agricultural	technologies	remains	a	 predominantly	 top	 down,	 linear	 process	 where	 knowledge	 is	 produced	 at	universities,	 disseminated	 through	 extension	 services	 and	 then	 shared	 amongst	farmers	(Hermans	et	al.,	2013;	Klerkx,	Aarts	and	Leeuwis,	2010).	Such	an	approach	functions	on	the	assumption	that	scientific	knowledge	 is	optimal,	yet	evidence	 from	studies	 such	 as	 Pretty	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 show	 that	 developing	 crop	 varieties	with	 local	plant	 and	 animal	 material,	 using	 traditional	 knowledge	 positively	 influenced	adoption.	Alternatively	put,	collaborative	arrangements	with	built	 in	 feedback	 loops	achieve	 efficiency.	 Both	 Moore	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 and	 the	 evidence	 from	 this	 analysis	support	 this	 argument	 as	 communities	 that	 had	 weak	 ties	 with	 NGO's/exention	services	(network	2)	showed	low	adoption	rates,	yet	those	with	frequent	interactions	(network	three)	showed	higher	uptake.		Finally,	Hermans	et	al.	(2013)	argues	that	it	is	 also	 the	 collaborative	 process	 with	 interactive	 learning	 and	 knowledge	 co-production	 that	 leads	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 new	 information	 and	 practices	 amongst	smallholders.			
Conclusion				Mt.	Elgon	is	a	valuable	East	African	ecosystem	facing	numerous	socio-economic	and	environmental	 stresses	 (Sassen	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Characterised	 by	 a	 rapidly	 growing	population,	a	significant	shift	towards	sustainable	agricultural	 intensification	is	vital	to	its	ability	in	continuing	support	these	livelihoods	(Lamb	et	al.,	2015;	Moore	et	al.,	
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2014).	 Despite	 becoming	 a	 hotbed	 for	 environmental	 NGO’s	 and	 government	programmes	alike,	by	and	 large	 the	extension	required	 in	up-scaling	 their	activities	remains	weak,	a	trend	seen	across	the	whole	of	Sub-Saharan	Africa	(Barry,	Steyn	and	Brent,	2011).		Through	 the	 construction	 of	 social	 networks,	 this	 study	 has	 provided	 further	empirical	evidence	in	how	the	relationships	formulated	between	different	actors	can	impact	innovation.	More	specifically,	that	societies	are	heterogenic	and	require	more	tailored	 styles	 in	 delivering	 and	 building	 new	 production	 systems.	 In	 the	 network	characterised	by	weak	bonding	ties,	more	emphasis	needs	to	be	placed	on	the	type	of	training	 that	brings	 farmers	 together,	working	on	 improving	 the	 levels	of	 trust	 and	co-operation.	Developing	farmer	field	schools,	that	complement	information	provided	by	 traditional	 extension	 services	may	 be	 useful,	 as	would	 deploying,	 simpler	more	robust	 technologies	 that	 require	 minimal	 maintenance	 (Barry,	 Steyn	 and	 Brent,	2011).	 Conversely,	 in	 cohesive	 groups,	 promoting	 more	 ownership	 and	 the	installation	of	more	complex	technologies	may	be	possible,	however,	care	needs	to	be	taken	 to	 ensure	 that	 a	more	 inclusive	progress	 occurs.	 It	would	be	 very	difficult	 to	work	 with	 a	 large	 number	 of	 individuals	 and	 effectively	 deliver	 the	 same	 level	 of	training.	 Transferring	 power	 to	 a	 local	 champion,	 one	 that	 promotes	 efficiency	 and	equity,	is	the	key	to	up-scaling	here	(Hermans	et	al.,	2013).			Overall,	what	is	clear	from	this	study	is	that	the	adequate	knowledge	surrounding	the	purpose,	 benefits	 and	upkeep	of	 technologies	 remains	 low,	 as	 are	 the	 relationships	required	 to	 access	 resources	 and	 external	 markets.	 Better	 quality	 training	 and	delivery	 of	 equipment	 needs	 to	 persist	 amongst	 the	 numerous	 organisations	functioning	in	the	region.	With	regards	to	policy	efforts	and	projects	agendas,	better	co-ordination	 amongst	 these	 actors	 could	 help	 in	 the	 delivery	 of	 these	 projects	 as	would	 creating	 adaptive	 technologies	 that	 legitimise	 distinct	 cultural	 knowledge	differences	seen	in	Mt.	Elgon.			
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Chapter	Four		Mapping	Intervention	Induced	Livelihood	Changes	and	Future	Aspirations	for	Conservation:		Capturing	Community	Perceptions	from	Mt.	Elgon,	Uganda		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	“Passing	the	Stick”	during	Participatory	Mapping	in	Kapchorwa,	Mt.	Elgon.	
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Mapping	Intervention	Induced	Livelihood	Changes	and	
Future	Aspirations	for	Conservation:		Capturing	
Community	Perceptions	from	Mt.	Elgon,	Uganda	
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Abstract			After	more	than	five	twenty	years	of	using	Alternative	Livelihood	Projects	(ALP),	little	has	been	done	to	document	their	effectiveness	across	Mt.	Elgon	(Boedhihartono	and	Barrow,	 2008).	 Consequently,	 using	 a	 quasi-experimental	 design,	 a	 self-reported	evaluation	 of	 how	 conservation	 interventions	 have	 been	 shaping	 the	 cultural	landscapes	 of	 their	 principal	 beneficiaries	 (CBO’s)	 was	 compared	 with	 their	neighbours.	 Through	 a	 time-	 series	 of	 participatory	 mapping	 activities,	 a	retrospective	 baseline,	 visualisations	 of	 the	 present	 day	 outcomes	 and	 visioning	activities	 were	 used	 to	 quantify	 livelihood	 diversification,	 the	 changes	 in	 capital	assets	alongside	 the	 future	aspirations	of	 these	communities.	Having	depicted	more	coherent	storylines,	CBO	members	showed	greater	awareness,	access	and	willingness	to	adopt	conservation	practises,	 indicating	 that	 they	are	enjoying	significantly	more	benefits	(particularly	in	household	income	and	avoided	deforestation)	than	their	non-member	 counterparts	 (two	 sample	 t-test,	 p	 <	 0.05).	 Nevertheless,	 the	 portrayal	 of	continued	habitat	degradation	with	time	suggests	that	these	alternatives	are	failing	to	meet	 growing	 human	 demands.	 Concerned	 about	 the	 productivity	 of	 their	 farms,	communities,	 converged	 in	 their	 aspirations	 for	 sustainability,	 portraying	 a	 future	rich	in	green	technologies,	improved	agricultural	techniques	and	built	capital.	Better-informed	participatory	land-use	planning,	tailored	livelihood	strategies	and	the	right	incentives	could	help	make	this	a	reality.		
Introduction		Moving	 away	 from	 the	 protection	 of	 stark,	 standalone	 national	 parks,	 field	conservation	 activities	 are	 increasingly	 operating	 at	 larger	 spatial	 scales,	
80		
encompassing	a	mosaic	of	different	habitat	types	and	the	people	that	depend	on	them	(Sayer	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 Known	 as	 the	 ‘landscape’	 approach,	 this	 more	 holistic	management	style	seeks	to	balance	the	needs	of	various	different	stakeholders	whilst	maintaining	the	numerous	eco-system	services	their	environments	provide	(Reyers,	O’	Farrell,	Nel	and	Wilson,	2012).	Through	 the	 integration	of	 sectors	such	as	water,	agriculture	 and	 housing,	 practitioners	 have	 now	 been	 working	 towards	 creating	sustainable	 landscapes	 where	 ‘multiple	 win	 locations’	 or	 ‘activity	 hotspots’	 are	prioritised	through	the	deliberation	of	their	trade-offs	(Garnett,	Sayer	and	Toit,	2007;	Gimona	and	Van	der	Horst,	2007;	Opdam	et	al.,	2016).		In	the	areas	where	the	rural	poor	survive	on	a	small	asset	base	(and	granted	access	through	 social,	 political	 and	 institutional	 processes),	 such	 conservation	 strategies	have	focused	on	diversifying	livelihoods	away	from	protected	resources	to	those	that	improve	 household	 income,	 integrate	 community	 management	 and	 reward	environmental	stewardship	(Roche,	2007).	In	particular,	three	main	tools	have	been	used	 to	 motivate	 behavioural	 change:	 demonstrating	 alternatives,	 funding	compensation	and	providing	incentives	(Wright	et	al.	2015).		Under	the	alternatives	umbrella	one	can	a)	completely	substitute	the	resources	being	exploited,	 for	 example	 by	 encouraging	 local	 people	 to	 farm	 fish	 as	 an	 additional	source	of	protein,	b)	partially	substitute	resources,	 such	as	providing	energy	saving	cook	stoves	and/or	c)	promote	sustainable	income	generating	activities	that	are	not	detrimental	 to	 the	 environment	 e.g.	 bee-keeping	 (Roe	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 Typically	implemented	under	Integrated	Conservation	and	Development	Programmes	(ICDP’s),	these	interventions	became	popular	throughout	the	tropics	in	the	1990’s.		Functioning	under	the	same	principles,	and	in	some	cases	using	the	aforementioned	techniques,	 incentive	and	compensation	 tools	only	differ	 in	 the	 conditions	 in	which	they	 are	 offered	 (Wright	 et	 al.	 2015).	 Moving	 towards	 the	 economic	 valuation	 of	nature	 (thus	 appealing	 more	 to	 utilitarian	 values),	 these	 engagements	 see	participants	enter	a	more	formalised	agreement	where	they	are	paid	(cash	or	in-kind)	to	adopt	a	specific	activity	e.g.	planting	trees	that	sequester	carbon	(Mahanty,	Suich	and	Tacconi,	2013)	or	are	compensated	for	the	lack	of	access	to	natural	resources.			As	 the	 investments	 for	 incentive-based	 initiatives	 continue	 to	grow	 (predominantly	
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under	the	Reduced	Emissions	from	Deforestation	and	Forest	Degradation	policy),	the	evidence	 that	 the	 win-win	 goals	 of	 biodiversity	 and	 sustainable	 economic	development	are	materialising	remains	inconclusive	(Bauch,	Sills	&	Pattanayak	2014;	Brooks	 et	 al.	 2006;	Naughton-Treves,	 Holland	&	Bradon	 2005;	Wright	 et	 al.	 2015).	Within	 Tanzania	 surveyed	 communities	 neighbouring	 the	 Tarangire	 National	 Park	(Mcdowell,	2012)	vocalised	 that	 income	generating	programmes	generated	positive	conservation	perceptions,	encouraging	further	participation	and	a	greater	willingness	to	 co-operate	 with	 managing	 authorities.	 Comparable	 views	 were	 also	 quoted	 by	richer	 landowners	 partaking	 in	 Butterfly	 farming	 initiatives	 introduced	 across	 the	East	 Usambara	 Mountains	 (Morgan-Brown,	 Jacobson,	 Wald	 and	 Child,	 2010).	Residents	 near	 the	 Selous	 Game	Reserve	 (Gillingham	 and	 Phyllis,	 1999)	 and	Mnazi	Bay-Ruvuma	Estuary	Marine	Park	(Katikiro,	2016)	claimed	that	inadequate	inclusion,	insufficient	 substitutions	 and	 the	unequal	 sharing	have	 limited	 similar	 successes	 in	their	areas.		In	 practise,	 international	 development	 agencies	 rarely	 circulate	 documents	demonstrating	 rigorous	 empirical	 evaluations	 (Brooks	 et	 al.,	 2006)	 and	 peer	reviewed	 academic	 publications	 are	 few	 typically	 focusing	 on	 the	 state	 of	 species	deliverables	 or	 measuring	 a	 specific	 impact	 area.	 As	 Sommerville	 et	 al.	 (2010)	highlighted	 in	 Madagascar,	 documenting	 positive	 changes	 in	 attitudes	 does	 not	necessarily	demonstrate	that	participants	have	made	the	behavioural	changes	needed	to	 protect	 biodiversity.	 More	 emphasis	 needs	 to	 be	made	 on	 capturing	 livelihoods	adaptations	 (for	 example	 a	 43.1	%	 increase	 in	 the	 adoption	 of	 energy	 saving	 cook	stoves)	then	matching	these	changes	to	conservation	gains	(23.7%	reduction	in	fuel	wood	 felling)	 as	DeWan	et	 al.	 (2013)	 showed	with	 the	 Sichuan	Golden	Snub-Nosed	Monkey	Campaign	in	Yuje	Nature	Reserve	China.	The	lack	of	available	baseline	records	and	little	integration	of	counterfactuals	(i.e	an	unaffected	area)	have	made	these	relationships	hard	to	correlate	(Morgan-Brown	et	al.	 2010;	 Sainsbury	 et	 al.	 2015).	 Furthermore,	 when	 several	 external	 factors	 can	influence	project	outcomes	accounting	or	predicting	 their	specific	 influences	can	be	tricky.	 In	 an	 evaluation	 of	 a	 homestay	 project	 in	 Northern	 Guatemala	 the	 author	quantified	a	39%	decrease	in	detrimental	cultivation	activities	surrounding	the	Maya	Bioreserve,	quoting	that	two-thirds	of	participants	were	less	dependant	on	the	forest	
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since	the	onset	three	years	prior	(Langholz,	1999).	Heavily	reliant	on	visitor	numbers	and	 security	 (guerrilla	 activity),	 Langholz	 went	 on	 to	 warn	 that	 changes	 to	 these	factors	 could	 easy	 reverse	 these	 trends.	 Certainly	 a	 review	 of	 non-timber	 forest	product	 trade	 across	 Asia,	 Africa	 and	 Latin	 America	 demonstrates	 how	 conditions	practitioners	have	less	control	over	(secure	tenure,	market	access	etc),	drive	positive	conservation	 and	 development	 outcomes	 (Kusters,	 Achdiawan,	 Belcher	 and	 Pérez,	2006).		The	latest	systematic	map	of	reviewed	APL’s	found	nine	positive	conservation	stories,	nine	neutral	ones	and	two	negative	(Roe	et	al.	2014).	Consequently,	more	evidence	is	needed	to	assess	whether	APL’s	are	an	effective	conservation	tool	and	which	factors	lead	to	success	(Nilsson,	Baxter,	Butler	and	Mcalpine,	2016).		
Using	Participatory	Mapping	and	Visioning	Exercises	to	Evaluate	Changes	in	
Livelihood	Assets			With	this	deficit	 in	current	knowledge,	 four	communities	surrounding	the	Mt.	Elgon	National	 Park,	 Uganda	 were	 given	 the	 opportunity	 to	 provide	 self-reported	evaluations	 of	 how	 alternative	 livelihood	 projects	 have	 been	 shaping	 their	 cultural	and	 physical	 landscapes	 (Abunge,	 Coulthard	 and	 Daw,	 2013;	 Boedhihartono,	Endamana,	Ruiz-Perez	and	Sayer,	2015).	As	a	powerful	yet	simple	tool,	participatory	mapping	exercises	were	used	to	visualise	the	links	between	local	values	and	human	use	 of	 the	 natural	 environment	 (Plieninger,	 van	 der	 Horst,	 Schleyer	 and	 Bieling,	2014).	Here	interpretations	of	elements	such	as	content,	use	of	colour	and	clarity	in	the	 drawings	 (Bell	 and	 Morse,	 2013),	 were	 taken	 to	 represent	 the	 awareness,	attitudes	and	behavioural	changes	(Baird,	Leslie	and	McCabe,	2009).		As	one	of	the	most	widely	used	approaches	in	understanding	the	complexities	of	rural	livelihoods	in	developing	countries	(Adato	and	Meinzen-dick,	2002;	Schreckenberg	et	al.,	2010),	the	capital	asset	approach	(Fig.	14)	from	the	Chambers	and	Conway	(1992)	Sustainable	 Livelihood	 (SL)	 framework	 was	 then	 applied	 to	 see	 how	 the	 mapped	features	translated	into	livelihood	benefits	(Sayer	et	al.,	2007).		Whilst	not	aiming	to	directly	 quantify	 asset	 changes,	 by	 sampling	 members	 of	 community-based	organisations	 (the	stakeholders	often	 targeted	by	 implementing	agencies)	and	 their	
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non-member	 counterparts,	 the	 aim	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 provide	 an	 overview	 of	community	 experiences	 of	 the	 interventions	 from	 the	 past	 twenty-five	 years.	 It	reflects	major	 trends,	 provides	 a	 storyline	 of	 how	well	 the	 system	 is	 working	 and	having	been	given	the	opportunity	to	vision	their	desired	futures,	 to	gauge	whether	communities	 aspirations	 include	 elements	 of	 environmental	 sustainability	 or	 some	other	 development	 pathway.	 Pragmatically,	 it	 represents	 local	 stakeholder	 voices,	provides	a	platform	for	developing	an	 integrated	vision	of	 the	 future	and	opens	 the	doors	to	building	more	adaptive	co-management	relationships	in	the	future	(Brown,	2003)	.										
	
	
	
Study	Area		Bisecting	 the	Uganda/Kenya	border	 is	 the	extinct	Miocene	volcano	home	 to	 the	Mt.	Elgon	 Protected	 Area	 (PA).	 Rich	 in	 closed	 canopy	 tropical	 hardwood,	 bamboo	 and	heath	moorlands	high	in	endemic	flora;	this	forest	eco-system	hosts	some	seventy	six	threatened	species	of	global	conservation	value	(Nakakaawa	et	al.,	2015).	Protected	under	 a	 different	 jurisdiction	 in	 Uganda,	 a	 single	 1120	 km2	 National	 Park	 (N.P)	 is	administered	by	the	Uganda	Wildlife	Authority	(UWA)	(Sassen	et	al.,	2013).		
Fig.	2	The	Capital	Asset	Framework	based	on	Bebbington	(1999).		
Human Capital 
  Natural Capital 
Economic Capital 
Physical Capital  
Social		Capital			  
Human capital (i.e. the amount and quality of knowledge and labour)Natural capital (i.e. the quality and quantity of natural resources, ranging from Bisheries to air quality)Financial capital (i.e. savings and regular inBlows of money)Physical capital (i.e. the infrastructure, tools, and equipment used for increasing productivity)Social capital (i.e. social resources, including networks for cooperation, mutual trust, and support)
Figure	14.	The	capital	asset	framework	based	on	Bebbington	(1999)		
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Below	 these	 demarcated	 boundaries	 smallholder	 farmers	 have	 converted	 the	landscape	 into	 intensively	managed	 crop	 production	 sites	 intertwined	with	 animal	rearing	and	Eucalyptus	woodlots	(Hitimana,	Kiyiapi	and	Njunge,	2004;	LVBC,	2012).	The	abundant	rains,	fertile	soils	and	access	to	the	parks	environmental	incomes	and	services	 have	 made	 this	 one	 of	 most	 populous	 (1.6	 million	 people)	 and	 rapidly	growing	regions	(3.4%	per	year)	in	east	Africa	(Nakakaawa	et	al.,	2015).		
Inside	 a	 landscape	 where	 soil	 properties	 and	 layering	 are	 naturally	 prone	 to	landslides,	escalating	human	pressure	is	causing	severe	soil	degradation,	habitat	loss,	water	pollution	and	homelessness	(Claessens	et	al.,	2007).	In	a	bid	to	reconcile	such	unsustainable	 relationships	 and	 build	 alterative	 livelihood	 strategies,	 over	 the	 past	twenty	 years	 several	 conservation	 initiatives	 and	 resources	 agreements	 have	 been	put	into	place	(Oonyu,	2009).	Aided	by	international	funding,	their	main	agenda	has	been	 to	 reduce	 deforestation	 and	 promote	 habitat	 restoration	 through	 the	development	 of	 on-farm	 diversification.	 The	 techniques	 introduced	 include:	 soil	erosion	measures,	agroforestry,	tree	crops,	zero	grazing	and	the	introduction	of	mix-breed	 cattle	 and	 energy	 saving	 cook	 stoves	 (Muhweezi,	 Sikoyo	 and	 Chemonges,	2007).		
Working	with	 CBO’s	who	 have	 participated	 in	 at	 least	 one	 ICDP,	 four	 communities	bordering	the	N.P	were	selected	to	partake	in	this	study	(Appendix	I.	B).	Based	in	four	geographically	isolated	districts	of	the	mountain	(Fig.	15),	the	groups	varied	in	their	administrative	 extent	 (village,	 parish	 through	 to	 sub-county	 level)	 and	 the	 types	 of	projects	that	have	been	introduced	(Table.	12).		
Historically	practising	different	 livelihood	strategies,	 the	ethnic	majority	 in	 three	of	sites	was	the	Bagishu	and	in	one	Sebei.	Once	nomadic	pastoralists,	the	forest	dwelling	Sebei	 used	 to	 supplement	 their	 diet	 with	 herd	 and	 forage	 from	 within	 the	 forest	(Himmelfarb,	 2005),	whereas	 the	Bagishu	 cleared	 land	 for	 agriculture.	Having	both	faced	evictions	during	the	creation	of	the	National	Park	(Jeha	et	al.,	Chapter	2),	both	tribes	 continue	 to	 uphold	 longstanding	 cultural	 (burial	 and	 circumcision	 sites)	 and	use	 (wood,	medicine	 and	 food)	 values	 associated	with	 the	 park	 (Nakakaawa	 et	 al.,	2015).	Today,	the	main	cash	crop	for	all	the	sampled	communities	is	coffee,	however,	
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horticulture	is	a	rapidly	rising	alternative.	Planted	crops	vary	seasonally	but	trend	to	include	maize,	beans,	cassava	and	potatoes.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
								
Figure	15.	Map	of	Mt.	Elgon,	Uganda	and	Kenya.	For	anonymity,	exact	location	of	selected	study	sites	is	not	revealed.		
Adapted	using	data	on	Mt.	Elgon	boundaries	and	forests	from	Sassen	et	al	(2013).	Protected	Area	Boundaries	sourced	from	UN	EP-WCMC		
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Table	12.	Summary	of	CBO	Activities	
Community	 Ethnicity	
Main	
Cash	
Crop	
CBO	Activities	
CBO	
Membership	
	
Intervention	
Time	Line	
1	
	
Bagisu		 Coffee	
-Energy	saving	cook-stoves	-Horticulture	seedlings	-Tree	nursery	-Zero-grazing	-Trench	digging	-Napier	grass	planting	
2	sub-counties	17	Villages	146	members	
1994-	Mt.	Elgon	Conservation	and	Development	Project	(MECDP)	
2009-Mt.	Elgon	Regional	Eco-System	Conservation	Programme	(MERECP)	
2010-World	Wildlife	Fund	(WWF)	
2010-Territorial	Approach	to	Climate	Change	(TACC)		-MERECP-Cash	Revolving	Fund	
2011-	Eco-Trust	
Current-	International	Union	Conservation	of	Nature	(IUCN)	
2011-Uganda	Wildlife	Authority	(UWA)	Memorandum	of	Understanding	(M.O.U)		
2	 Bagisu	 Coffee	
-Horticulture	seedlings	-Zero-grazing	-Bee-keeping	-Tree	nursery	-Trench	digging	-Napier	grass	planting	-Bee-hives	
2	sub-counties	12	villages	500	members		
1992-	Mt.	Elgon	Conservation	and	Development	Project	(MECDP)	
2010-Mt.	Elgon	Regional	Eco-System	Conservation	Programme	(MERECP)	
2011-Territorial	Approach	to	Climate	Change	(TACC)	
2013-World	Wildlife	Fund	(WWF)	
3	 Sabei		 Coffee	
-Bamboo	demonstration	-Fish	pond	demonstration	-Trench	digging	-Bio-gas	-Woodlots	-Dairy	cows	-Bee-hives	-Tree	nursery	-Coffee	pulping	machine	-Infrastructure	-Napier	grass	planting	-Zero-grazing	
1	sub-county	7	villages	411	Members	
1996-Uganda	Wildlife	Authority	(UWA),	Memorandum	of	Understanding	(M.O.U)	2000-International	Union	Conservation	of	Nature	(IUCN)	
2009	-Mt.	Elgon	Regional	Eco-System	Conservation	Programme	(MERECP)		2011-	HIEFER	International	(co-funding	biogas	units).	
4	 Bagisu		 Coffee	
-Woodlots	-Dairy	Cows	-Apiary	-Coffee	nursery	-Trench	Digging	-Napier	grass	planting	
1	sub-county	One	village	25	Members	
2010-MERECP-Cash	Revolving	Funds	
2012-Uganda	Wildlife	Authority	(UWA),	Memorandum	of	Understanding	(M.O.U)		
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Methods		
Participatory	Rural	Appraisal	and	Mapping	Exercises			Recruited	 through	 existing	 connections	 with	 executive	 CBO	 members,	 a	 two-day	Participatory	 Rural	 Appraisal	 (PRA)	workshop	was	 held	 in	 each	 of	 the	 study	 sites.	Referred	to	as	a	‘matching	approach’	(Richards,	2012),	in	order	to	allow	for	statistical	comparison	between	the	principle	beneficiaries	of	interventions	to	those	that	are	co-located	 but	 not	 directly	 included	 	 (control),	 two	 separate	 groups	 of	 members	 and	non-members	were	assembled.	With	a	maximum	of	ten	people	in	each	group	(Table	12),	the	attendees	were	from	different	genders	and	ages,	also	varying	in	their	socio-economic	 backgrounds	 but	 represented	 a	 purposive	 sample	 in	 terms	 of	 their	relationship	to	local	interventions.		Fluent	 in	 local	 languages	 and	 fully	 briefed	 on	 the	 data	 collection	 protocol	 (see	Appendix	 II.	 A	 for	 complete	 guidelines),	 facilitators	 began	 the	 discussion	 by	 asking	attendees	to	describe	their	community,	how	they	use	the	resources	within	them	and	whether	any	environmental	NGO’s/Government	bodies	have	shaped	their	 livelihood	practises.	 In	other	words,	getting	local	stakeholders	to	frame	the	issue.	Using	a	geo-referenced,	community-centred	aerial	image	covered	in	acetate	(Lynam	et	al.,	2007),	the	group	were	then	invited	to	visualise	(through	a	mapping	framework)	how	these	interventions	 have	 shaped	 their	 current	 landscape.	 Offered	 different	 coloured	 pens	and	a	standardised	key	which	they	had	the	freedom	to	expand	upon,	facilitators	kick-started	 the	 drawing	 activities	 by	 helping	 attendees	 to	 locate	 the	 major	 landmark	features	 on	 the	 maps	 (rivers,	 footpaths,	 schools	 etc.)	 to	 promote	 orientation,	eventually	allowing	them	to	create	a	spatial	‘reflexive	comparison’	(Schreckenberg	et	al.,	 2010)	 of	 the	 landscape	 before-and-after	 the	 interventions	 (Ferraro	 and	Pattanayak,	2006).		In	 the	absence	of	baseline	data	 (previous	work	being	 lost	or	difficult	 to	 locate	with	changing	 staff	 (Boedhihartono	 and	 Barrow,	 2008)),	 on	 a	 new	 sheet	 of	 acetate,	 the	group	were	then	asked	to	repeat	the	exercise,	this	time	drawing	what	their	landscape	was	 like	 before	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 modern	 National	 Park	 or	 people-centred	interventions	 had	 begun	 operating	 in	 their	 area	 (approximately	 twenty	 five	 years	
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ago).	 Trying	 to	 grasp	 community	 aspirations,	 the	 mapping	 exercises	 were	 then	brought	 to	 a	 close	 by	 getting	 attendees	 to	 vision	 their	 desired	 future	 landscapes.	Having	 created	 a	 timeline	 of	 maps,	 past-present-and-future,	 amongst	 the	 two	different	 groups	 resulted	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 twenty-four	maps	 across	 all	 four	 study	sites.		In	the	final	stages	of	the	workshop	attendees	were	probed	to	‘interview’	their	maps.	Gathered	in	a	matrix	format,	through	a	trend	analysis,	more	detailed	explanations	and	ranking	 exercises	 were	 used	 to	 describe	 (and	 triangulate)	 some	 of	 the	 mapped	changes	(see	Appendix	II,	Tables	1-8	for	full	results).	The	open	nature	of	this	exercise	meant	 that	 each	 group	 generated	 their	 own	 unique	 set	 of	 indicators	 to	 evaluate	during	this	process	(Sayer	et	al.,	2007).	These	typically	 included	describing	changes	to	water	 quality,	 household	 size,	 landholdings	 and	 education	 over	 time.	 	 A	 general	discussion	 surrounding	 resource-use	 governance	 issues	 then	 summed	 up	 the	activities.		Throughout	 the	workshop,	 to	ensure	everyone	had	an	equal	opportunity	 to	engage,	special	attention	was	paid	to	the	social	relationships	ensuring	that	all	attendees	had	the	opportunity	to	participate	(Abunge,	Coulthard	and	Daw,	2013;	Boedhihartono	et	al.,	 2015;	 Sletto,	 2009).	 Furthermore,	 despite	 the	 uses	 of	 geo-referenced	 images,	attendants	 and	 their	 resultant	 drawings,	 were	 left	 relatively	 unguided	 generally	meaning	that	mapped	features	were	not	drawn	to	scale.	In	this	sense,	the	maps	were	closer	 to	 ‘rich	 pictures’	 where	 participants	 freely	 drew	 their	 perceptions	 of	 their	environment	 (Boedhihartono	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 The	 maps	 do	 not	 therefore,	 provide	 a	definitive	 assessment	 of	 landscape	 changes,	 but	 rather	 a	 community-inspired	narrative	of	how	interventions	are	shaping	them	(Cinderby	et	al.,	2011).		The	way	in	which	the	groups	engaged	in	the	exercises,	produced	the	maps	and	their	content	will	all	 be	 used	 as	 a	 reflection	 of	 their	 attitudes	 and	 experiences	 of	 conservation	interventions.	
Household	Interviews			Without	 directly	 measuring	 intervention	 impacts	 (e.g.	 increase	 in	 key	 number	 of	indicator	species	or	actual	changes	in	household	income),	additional	household	data	(Table	 13)	were	 used	 to	 triangulate	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 PRA	 activities.	 Collected	
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during	 a	 single	 research	 period	 (Jeha	 et	 al.,	 Chapter	 3),	 information	 on	 adopted	technologies	and	perceptions	of	livelihood	benefits	amongst	both	CBO	members	and	non-members	 were	 collated	 to	 allow	 for	 further	 comparison.	 Such	 triangulation	between	information	sources	is	an	important	part	of	this	research,	allowing	data	to	be	confirmed,	refuted	and	probed	(Schreckenberg	et	al.,	2010).		
	
Quantifying	Livelihood	Assets				The	 maps	 were	 converted	 into	 GIS	 data	 using	 2.12.1-	 Lyon	 QGIS.	 Physical	 and	administrative	 features	 were	 digitised	 into	 separate	 shapefiles	 and	 livelihood	activities	 into	 coded	 point	 data.	 For	 this	 research	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 the	 mapped	features	are	outcome	 indicators,	 i.e.	 short-to-medium	 term	behaviour	or	 systematic	effects	 of	 an	 intervention	 (Schreckenberg	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 In	 trying	 to	 measure	 the	potential	 livelihood	benefits	 that	 flow	 from	these	outcomes,	 for	each	of	 the	 twenty-four	mapped	activities,	a	set	of	capital	assets	that	rural	farmers	could	enjoy	from	each	activity	 was	 inferred	 (Table	 14).	 The	 frequency	 of	 the	 drawn	 activities	 was	 then	multiplied	by	these	assets	to	track	changes	in	livelihood	benefits	over	time	(Fig	16).		Whilst	a	broad	range	of	assets	were	considered	in	this	analysis,	given	the	landscape	approach	 that	 focuses	 on	 biophysical	 changes,	 it	 fails	 to	 capture	 more	 intangible	cultural	and	social	benefits.	Likewise,	due	to	the	scale	of	the	National	Park,	which	is	measured	as	an	area	not	in	terms	of	frequency,	directly	quantifying	the	benefits	that	could	be	enjoyed	from	them	was	problematic.	Instead,	changes	of	park	boundaries	(if	drawn)	 and	 information	 from	 other	 data	 sources	 were	 used	 as	 a	 reference	 point.	Finally,	 the	analysis	makes	no	direct	attempt	 to	measure	 livelihood	costs	 (e.g.	 loses	
Table	13.	Summary	of	Research	Participants	
	 Household	
Interviews	
Participatory	Mapping	
Study	Site	 No	of	
Interviewees	
Member	 Non-Members	
1	 47	 10	 8	
2	 35	 8	 8	
3	 34	 6	 10	
4	 16	 9	 8	
Total	 135	 33	 34	
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from	denied	access	to	the	park),	however,	 to	a	certain	extent	net	 loses	 in	particular	benefits	can	be	used	to	infer	them.		
													
PRA	Activities	
Fig.	3	Overview	of	research	methods.					
Participatory	Mapping			
HH	Interviews		
Past		 Future		Present		
Capital	Asset	Framework	
Livelihood	BeneAits	
Triangu
lation		 Triangulation		
Figure	16.	Overview	of	research	methods			
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Table	14.	Asset	benefits	associated	with	mapped	livelihood	features		
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Traditional	Farming/Holticulture	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Agro-forestry	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Cattle		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Native	Trees	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Fruit	Trees		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Exotic	Planted	Trees		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Protected	Water	Source		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Biogas	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
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Tree	Nursery		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Terraces	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Zero	Grazing		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Energy	Saving	Cook	Stove		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Bamboo	Growing		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Fish	Farming	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Poultry	Farming		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Piggery		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Elephant	grass		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Bee-Keeping		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
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Results			Presented	 in	 Fig	 17a	 to	 20f,	 the	 digitised	 maps	 provide	 a	 spatial	 overview	 of	 the	varied	 livelihood	strategies	and	dynamic	conservation	perceptions	 found	across	Mt.	Elgon.	Apart	 from	 the	biophysical	 features	used	 to	orientate	 the	map,	 trees,	houses	and	park	boundaries	figured	in	all	of	the	landscapes.	Given	that	coffee	is	considered	the	main	cash	crop	amongst	all	 the	studied	communities,	 in	general	more	emphasis	was	placed	on	representing	horticulture	suggesting	that	a)	 it	 is	overtaking	coffee	 in	importance	as	source	of	household	income	and/or	b)	that	conservation	interventions	have	helped	develop	these	farming	techniques.	On	some	occasions,	rivers,	roads	and	other	landmark	features	were	placed	in	different	locations	within	and	between	group	drawings	(see	Fig	19a-19f	for	the	most	prominent	examples).	The	poor	resolution	of	some	 of	 the	 base-maps	 may	 have	 contributed	 to	 these	 differences;	 however,	 in	certain	 circumstances	 they	 have	 been	 taken	 as	 valuing	 different	 assets	 at	 different	points	of	time.		For	instance,	as	confirmed	by	the	trend	analysis,	the	consistent	lack	of	rivers	featured	in	the	present	was	taken	to	signify	poor	water	quality	and	quantity.		With	the	exception	of	study	site	one,	generally	members	drew	more	coherent	stories.	Attention	to	details	such	as	creating	riparian	zones	around	rivers,	sectioning	off	parts	of	 the	park	where	 enrichment	planting	 occurred	 and	 the	 clustering	 of	 technologies	around	 individual	 households	 advocates	 that	 members	 made	 a	 greater	 effort	 in	‘thinking	through’	the	exercises	(Bell	and	Morse,	2013).	This	was	also	mirrored	in	the	clarity	 of	 the	 drawings,	 where	 more	 colour,	 shading	 and	 attention	 to	 ensuring	realistic	connectivity	(e.g.	paths)	and	scale	were	made.			When	 considering	 the	 most	 pro-active	 groups,	 such	 details	 become	 even	 more	pronounced.	 The	 CBO	 in	 community	 three	 adopted	 the	 broadest	 range	 of	conservation	 technologies	(Table	15)	 that	correlated	with	high	 levels	of	community	cohesion	and	forming	cross-scale	links	(Jeha	et	al.	Chapter	3).	A	similar	narrative	has	emerged	from	the	mapping,	seeing	members	sketch	the	greatest	diversity	of	features	and	 numerous	 conservation	 induced	 landscape	 changes.	 Likewise,	 household	 data	from	 community	 one	 had	 the	 greatest	 level	 of	 non-member	 information	 sharing,	exhibiting	 the	highest	 overall	 conservation	 technology	 adoption.	As	 the	only	 study-
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site	where	 non-members	 depicted	 superior	 amount	 of	 livelihood	 activities	 to	 their	members	 (particularly	 in	 the	 future),	 the	 PRA	 activities	 compliment	 the	 household	findings.	
Table	15.	Descriptive	summary	of	mapped	features	and	technology	adoption		
Study	Site	 Participatory	
Mapping	
HH	Interviews	
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1	 441	 19	 0.46	 5	
2	 360	 21	 0.41	 6	
3	 432	 23	 0.36	 12	
4	 175	 20	 0.41	 6		In	 keeping	 with	 the	 small	 network	 size	 and	 lack	 of	 information	 sharing	 amongst	neighbours	and	with	external	bodies,	the	participatory	mapping	outputs	in	study-site	four	were	basic,	with	the	least	amount	intervention	induced	changes.		Taking	a	closer	look	 at	 study-site	 two,	 again	 triangulation	 between	 data	 sources	 can	 be	made.	 The	social	network	analysis	(Jeha	et	al.	Chapter	three)	revealed	that	information	sharing	and	knowledge	surrounding	conservation	agriculture	was	comparatively	high	to	the	uptake	 of	 technology	 for	 this	 case	 study.	 A	 development	 that	 can	 also	 be	 inferred	from	the	diversity	of	activities	despite	their	low	frequency.		From	past	landscapes	to	the	present,	both	members	and	non-members	cited	a	drop	in	the	 number	 of	 cattle,	 semi-permanent	 houses	 and	 native	 trees	 and	 a	 general	increases	in	exotic	trees	and	permanent	structures	(Fig	21).	Forest	boundaries	were	almost	always	included	in	maps,	except	for	study-site	two	where	communities	were	based	 too	 far	 away	 to	 include	 them.	 On	 average	 non-members	 did	 not	 include	 as	many	features	 in	 their	drawings	(even	for	baseline	maps),	 focusing	on	representing	traditional	 farming	 methods	 and	 growth	 on	 infrastructure.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	members	 portrayed	 greater	 diversification	 in	 their	 livelihood	 activities,	 with	 the	
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incidence	 of	 green	 technologies	 such	 field	 terraces	 and	 zero-grazing	 mirroring	household	trends.		
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Legend		
Figure	17.	PGIS	maps	showing	intervention	induced	livelihood	changes	and	future	aspirations	in	community	one	
Images	sourced	from	Integration	and	Application	Network	http://ian.umces.edu/pdfs/ian_symbol_library_catalog.pdf				
Fig.	1a	The	landscape	in	community	one	twenty	3ive	years	ago	(baseline)	
A	Members	Perspective		
Fig.	2a	Community	one’s	landscape	through	a	conservation	intervention	lens	(Present)	
A	Members	Perspective		
Fig.	3a	Future	vision	of	community	one’s	landscape			
A	Members	Perspective		
CBO	Members	
a)	 b)	 c)	
Fig.	1b	The	landscape	in	community	one	twenty	3ive	years	ago	(baseline)	
A	Non-Members	Perspective		
Fig.	2b	Community	one’s	landscape	through	a	conservation	intervention	lens	(Present)	
A	Non-Members	Perspective		
																								Baseline	(25	years	ago)																																																																						Present																																																																																														Future										
d)	 e)	
Fig.	3b	Future	vision	of	community	one’s	landscape			
A	Non-Members	Perspective		f)	
Non-Members	
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Fig.	4a	The	landscape	in	community	two	twenty	3ive	years	ago	(baseline)	
A	Members	Perspective		
Legend		
Figure	18.	PGIS	maps	showing	intervention	induced	livelihood	changes	and	future	aspirations	in	community	two	
Images	sourced	from	Integration	and	Application	Network	http://ian.umces.edu/pdfs/ian_symbol_library_catalog.pdf				
a)	
																								Baseline	(25	years	ago)																																																																						Present																																																																																														Future										
Fig.	5a	Community	two’s	landscape	through	a	conservation	intervention	lens	(Present)	
A	Members	Perspective		b)	
Fig.	6a	Future	vision	of	community	two’s	landscape			
A	Members	Perspective		c)	
Fig.	4b	The	landscape	in	community	two	twenty	3ive	years	ago	(baseline)	
A	Non-Members	Perspective		d)	
Fig.	6b	Future	vision	of	community	two’s	landscape			
A	Non-Members	Perspective		f)	
CBO	Members	
Fig.	5b	Community	one’s	landscape	through	a	conservation	intervention	lens	(Present)	
A	Non-Members	Perspective		
Non-Members	
e)	
																								Baseline	(25	years	ago)																																																																						Present																																																																																														Future										
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													 Legend		
Figure	19.	PGIS	maps	showing	intervention	induced	livelihood	changes	and	future	aspirations	in	community	three	
																								Baseline	(25	years	ago)																																																																						Present																																																																																														Future										
Fig.	7a	The	landscape	in	community	three	twenty	4ive	years	ago	(baseline)	
A	Members	Perspective		a)	
Fig.	8a	Community	three’s	landscape	through	a	conservation	intervention	lens	(Present)	
A	Members	Perspective		
CBO	Members	
b)	
Fig.	9a	Future	vision	of	community	three’s	landscape			
A	Members	Perspective		c)	
Fig.	7b	The	landscape	in	community	three	twenty	4ive	years	ago	(baseline)	
A	Non-Members	Perspective		d)	
Fig.	8b	Community	three’s	landscape	through	a	conservation	intervention	lens	(Present)	
A	Non-Members	Perspective		
	
	
Non-Members	
e)	
Fig.	9b	Future	vision	of	community	three’s	landscape			
A	Non-Members	Perspective		f)	
Images	sourced	from	Integration	and	Application	Network	http://ian.umces.edu/pdfs/ian_symbol_library_catalog.pdf				
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Legend		
Figure	20.	PGIS	maps	showing	intervention	induced	livelihood	changes	and	future	aspirations	in	community	four	
																								Baseline	(25	years	ago)																																																																						Present																																																																																														Future										
Images	sourced	from	Integration	and	Application	Network	http://ian.umces.edu/pdfs/ian_symbol_library_catalog.pdf				
Fig.	10a	The	landscape	in	community	four	twenty	5ive	years	ago	(baseline)	
A	Members	Perspective		a)	
Fig.	11a	Community	four’s	landscape	through	a	conservation	intervention	lens	(Present)	
A	Members	Perspective		
CBO	Members	
b)	
Fig.	12a	Future	vision	of	community	four’s	landscape			
A	Members	Perspective		c)	
Fig.	10b	The	landscape	in	community	four	twenty	5ive	years	ago	(baseline)	
A	Non-Members	Perspective		d)	
Fig.	11b	Community	four’s	landscape	through	a	conservation	intervention	lens	(Present)	
A	Non-Members	Perspective		
Non-Members	
)
Fig.	12b	Future	vision	of	community	four’s	landscape			
A	Non-Members	Perspective		f)	
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											Regardless	 of	 quoting	 fewer	 livelihood-induced	 changes	 due	 to	 conservation	interventions,	 together	 non-members	 and	members	 converged	 in	 their	 aspirations	for	 a	 greener	 future.	 Reinforced	 by	 ranking	 activities,	 protected	water	 sources	 and	further	integration	of	field	terraces	supported	goals	of	wanting	to	achieve	better	soil	and	 water	 quality.	 Most	 communities	 continued	 to	 value	 the	 protection	 of	 the	National	 Park,	 often	 delineating	 the	 same	 boundaries	 as	 the	 present	 and	 accepting	that	 landholdings	 were	 likely	 to	 decrease	 into	 the	 future	 (refer	 to	 trend	 analysis	results	 in	 Appendix	 II,	 Tables	 1-8).	 Whilst	 native	 trees	 did	 not	 feature	 in	 future	landscapes,	aspirations	for	exotic	and	fruit	trees	increased.	With	these	strong	desires	to	 improve	 natural	 assets,	 communities	 also	 sought	 to	 develop	 built	 infrastructure,	drawing	 tarmac	 roads	 and	 more	 permanent	 houses,	 schools,	 churches	 and	 better	health	 facilities.	 As	 smallholder	 farmers,	 agriculture	 remained	 important	 with	 the	representation	of	agro-forestry	and	horticulture	techniques	increasing	in	the	future,	more	 so	 for	non-members,	 reflecting	 further	aspirations	 to	engage	with	 the	market	economy.		Calculations	of	livelihood	benefits	from	the	PGIS	activities	are	summarised	according	to	membership	 and	 time	 in	 figures	 22	 and	 23.	 Benefits	 cited	 during	 the	 household	
Figure	21.	Combined	changes	across	all	four	study	sites	in	mapped	features	from	the	past	to	the	present.		
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101		
interviews	verify	those	computed	from	the	point	data,	both	confirming	that	members	are	enjoying	significantly	more	intervention	induced	livelihood	benefits	(two	sample	t-test,	p	<	0.05),	with	double	the	proportion	of	non-members	(60%	of	respondents)	having	quoted	no	observed	changes	at	present.		Across	 different	 communities,	 in	 line	 with	 their	 aims	 and	 objectives,	 interventions	had	the	biggest	impact	on	house	income,	energy	security,	animal	production	and	the	conservation	 of	 natural	 assets.	 Nevertheless,	 apart	 from	 study-site	 three,	 overall	members	depicted	that	their	habitats	continued	to	be	degraded,	drawing	fewer	trees,	shifts	 in	park	boundaries	and	ranking	a	decrease	 in	soil	and	water	quality	 (Fig	22).	For	participating	households,	the	introduction	of	alternative	activities	has,	therefore,	provided	 additional	 financial	 and	 physical	 benefits,	 however,	 this	 has	 not	materialised	into	overall	habitat	conservation.	For	example,	despite	the	construction	of	some	permanent	houses	(made	from	bricks)	this	has	not	substituted	the	broader	housing	 benefits	 farmers	 would	 be	 enjoying	 in	 a	 landscape	 richer	 in	 trees.	Consequently,	without	as	much	access	to	construction	materials	on	their	farms,	there	is	an	increased	likelihood	they	are	accessing	these	materials	from	within	the	National	Park,	which	could	be	detrimental	 to	conservation	goals	depending	on	how	they	are	extracted.	One	 of	 the	 major	 differences	 in	 benefits	 quoted	 at	 the	 household	 level	 was	 in	education	where	 interviewees	 inferred	 that	 conservation	 capital	was	 being	 used	 to	send	 individuals	 to	 better	 schools	 further	 afield	 and	 hence	 this	 benefit	 not	 being	captured	through	the	mapping	exercises	(Fig	24).	With	the	reality	that	non-members	displayed	 quite	 different	 relationships	 with	 their	 landscapes,	 referencing	 fewer	features	 (particularly	 native	 trees)	 and	 uses	 of	 their	 environment	 at	 the	 baseline	level,	 this	 analysis	 infers	 that	 they	 are	 experiencing	 greater	 benefits	 from	 their	environment	today	than	they	did	25	years	ago.	To	a	certain	extent,	this	suggests	that	conservation	 perceptions/	 acknowledgements	 of	 their	 benefits	 are	 reaching	 the	broader	community.					
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Figure	 23.	 The	 collective	 livelihood	 changes	 by	 non-members.	 Values	 were	calculated	 by	 allocating	 the	 relevant	 bene9its	 associated	with	 each	 of	 the	 point	features	drawn	during	participatory	GIS	workshops	(refer	to	Table.	13)	
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Figure	 22.	 The	 collective	 livelihood	 changes	 by	 CBO	 members.	 Values	 were	calculated	 by	 allocating	 the	 relevant	 bene;its	 associated	 with	 each	 of	 the	 point	features	drawn	during	participatory	GIS	workshops	(refer	to	Table.	13).		
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Discussion			Similar	 to	 the	 self	 assessments	 guided	by	 Sainsbury	 et	 al	 (2015),	 the	 findings	 from	this	 analysis	 have	 revealed	 how	 communities,	 and	 the	 people	 within	 them,	 have	varied	 environment	 perceptions	 and	 experiences	 of	 project	 outcomes.	 Factors	 the	discussion	will	 now	 put	 into	 context	 and	 contrast	with	 similar	 case	 studies.	 It	will	then	 go	 on	 to	 review	 methodological	 adaptations	 and	 the	 scope	 of	 using	 further	participatory	methods	in	meeting	sustainable	landscape	approaches.	
Understanding	Livelihood	Choices			Reflected	 in	 this	 study	 through	 the	 variety	 of	 mapped	 practises,	 the	 body	 of	sustainable	 livelihood	work	 produced	 in	 the	 1990’s	 shows	 that	 the	 rural	 poor	 are	likely	to	engage	in	a	broad	range	of	livelihood	activities	(Carney,	1998).	With	one	of	the	best	poverty	reduction	performances	seen	since	1992,	diversification	away	from	subsistence	agriculture	has	lead	to	significant	 increases	in	household	income	within	Uganda	(World	Bank	2012).	Often	used	as	a	risk	mitigation	strategy,	scholars	such	as	Brown	 (2003)	 have	 advocated	 that	 alternatives	 introduced	 through	 conservation	
Figure	24.	Livelihood	bene,its	quoted	during	household	interviews.		
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interventions	 are	 seen	 in	 the	 same	 capacity.	 An	 evaluation	 of	 the	 Amani	 butterfly	project	 in	the	Eastern	Arc	Mountains,	Tanzania	found	that	regardless	of	 its	financial	success	 (annual	 earnings	 increasing	 each	 year),	without	 being	 a	 primary	 source	 of	income,	 butterfly	 farming	 did	 not	 stop	 participants	 from	 engaging	 in	 other	detrimental	practises	(Morgan-Brown	et	al.,	2010).		Similarly,	the	increase	in	mapped	alternatives	did	not	prevent	members	from	depicting	the	degradation	of	their	habitat	over	 time.	 Mirroring	 the	 national	 trends	 in	 Uganda,	 it	 would	 therefore	 seem	 that	alternative	 sources	 of	 income	 are	 being	 reinvested	 as	 farm	 capital,	 improving	household	income	rather	than	substituting	it	(Bank	World,	2012).		Amongst	a	mix	of	factors	that	drive	land-use	practises,	confirming	such	a	relationship	is	difficult.	In	a	landscape	that	is	experiencing	rapid	population	growth	which	Sassen	et	al	 (2013)	has	correlated	to	 forest	cover	decline	across	Mt.	Elgon,	 the	widespread	uptake	of	sustainable	alternatives	may	not	be	strong	enough	to	support	this	pressure	(Garnett,	Sayer	and	Toit,	2007).	A	trend	that	was	also	noticed	in	the	Danajon	Bank	of	central	Philippines	where	fisherman	numbers	increased	despite	declining	stocks	and	the	 introduction	 of	 alternative	 seaweed	 farming	 (Hill,	 Rowcliffe,	 Koldewey	 and	Milner-Gulland,	2012).		Consideration	 of	 external	 drivers	 is	 also	 important	 in	 this	 context.	 	 In	 Indonesia	Linkie	 et	 al	 (2008)	 found	 no	 difference	 in	 forest	 cover	 between	 areas	 in	 which	intervention	 functioned	 because	 the	 projects	 failed	 to	 target	 growing	 logging	pressures.	In	Mt.	Elgon,	easy	access	to	Kenyan	markets	and	the	continued	weighting	placed	 on	 horticulture	 and	 exotic	 trees	 validates	 the	 significance	 of	 markets	 in	motivating	 livelihood	 strategies,	 particularly	 when	 temporal	 dynamics	 come	 into	play.	Whilst	coffee	prices	are	no	longer	associated	with	encroachment	of	the	National	Park	(Sassen	et	al.,	2013),	income	from	horticulture	techniques	manifest	quicker	than	those	of	increased	productivity	and	carbon	sequestration	associated	with	agricultural	conservation	making	it	a	safer	farming	choice	from	an	incomes	standpoint	(Lescuyer,	2013;	Salvini	et	al.,	2016).	Living	in	relative	poverty,	farmers	are	more	likely	to	invest	in	health,	education	and	housing	than	unknown	alternatives	(Garnett,	Sayer	and	Toit,	2007).	 Furthermore,	 ‘islandised’	 protected	 areas	 have	 been	 linked	 to	 feelings	 of	insecurity	 which	 have	 triggered	 pre-emptive	 farming	 (Baird,	 Leslie	 and	 McCabe,	2009).	 In	 fear	 of	 losing	 land,	 households	 living	 in	 close	 proximity	 to	 the	 Tarangire	
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National	Park	in	Tanzania,	encroached	on	valuable	habitat	corridors	(Sainsbury	et	al.,	2015).	 Since	 a	 link	 between	 participating	 in	 environmental	 projects	 (Jeha	 et	 al.	Chapter	5)	and	behavioural	change	has	been	proven	by	other	authors	(Blomley	et	al.,	2008),	 improved	 environmental	 awareness	 may	 be	 key	 in	 changing	 attitudes	(Morgan-Brown	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Salafsky	 et	 al.,	 2001;	 Sommerville	 et	 al.,	 2010),	particularly	for	non-members	who	have	access	to	fewer	benefits.		Paradoxically,	 regardless	 of	 these	 differing	 experiences,	 communities	 are	 unified	 in	their	aspirations	for	ambitious	and	greener	futures.		Akin	to	the	Pygmie	tribes	in	the	Sangha	Tri-National	landscape	(Boedhihartono	et	al.,	2015),	there	was	a	strong	desire	to	retain	forest	diversity	and	improve	 ‘modern’	 infrastructure	(concrete	roads,	solid	buildings,	 sources	 of	 power	 etc).	Often	 a	measure	 of	 development	 success,	 it	 is	 not	uncommon	 for	communities	 to	aspire	 to	 these	built	assets	 (Garnett,	Sayer	and	Toit,	2007),	 nevertheless	 investment	 in	 them	 can	 act	 as	 a	 double	 edge	 sword.	 Their	improvement	 can	 enhance	 communication	 pathways,	 access	 to	 alternative	markets	and	 mobilise	 citizens	 that	 would	 considerably	 improve	 sustainability	 practises.	Equally	 they	 can	 create	 logging	 routes,	 encourage	 urban	 migration	 and	 open	 the	doors	 to	 the	 carbon	 rich	 lifestyles	 typical	 of	 the	 west	 (Cinner,	 2005).	 The	establishment	 of	 the	 ‘Posada	 Amazonas’	 eco-lodge	 on	 the	 buffer	 zone	 of	 Peru’s	Buhaja-Sonene	National	Park	 increased	employment,	 reducing	 farming	and	hunting	activities	 yet	 enabled	 greater	 production	 as	 individuals	 invested	 in	 chainsaws,	motorboats	and	other	equipment	(Stronza,	2007).		Taking	a	closer	 look	at	choices,	 like	 the	 ‘ranked	outcomes’	method	used	to	evaluate	technologies	 used	 near	 the	 Uzungwa	 Scap	 proposed	 Nature	 Reserve	 in	 Tanzania	(Sainsbury	et	al.,	2015),	communities	favoured	tree-planting	activities.	In	this	study,	water-demanding,	fast-growing,	exotic	tree	species	that	lack	conservation	value	were	prioritised	 above	 all	 others	 (Huettner,	 2012).	 Emphasising	 the	 importance	 of	 co-benefits,	 conversely	 it	 shows	 little	desirability	 to	 join	carbon	sequestration	projects	like	 Trees	 for	 Global	 Benefit	 that	 focus	 on	 planting	 native	 trees.	 According	 to	 local	information,	 under	 the	 rapidly	 growing	 population,	 land	 is	 becoming	 increasing	fragmented	leaving	only	richer	farmers	the	ability	to	join	such	tree-planting	schemes.	As	 the	 members	 of	 society	 most	 known	 to	 consume	 (Scott,	 1994)	 and	 encroach	(Sassen	 et	 al.,	 2013)	 on	 forests	 within	 the	 Mt.	 Elgon	 National	 Park,	 pragmatically,	
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targeting	 the	 rich	 may	 lead	 to	 the	 most	 ecologically	 gains.	 Nevertheless,	 the	cumulative	 impact	 of	 poorer	 households	 on	 habitat	 degradation,	 (known	 to	 be	between	 94-80%	 of	 the	 population	 (Appendix	 I,	 Table	 A.1)),	 may	 be	 higher	 at	 the	landscape	 level.	 In	 the	 future,	 development	 agencies	 need	 to	 consider	 the	 asset	profiles	 of	 their	 users	 to	 deduce	 where	 efficiency	 gains	 can	 be	 made,	 then	differentiate	strategies	according	to	the	households	capabilities	be	it	land,	knowledge,	gender,	willingness	or	access	(Wright	et	al.	2015).	Thereafter,	more	spatially	explicit	planning	 can	 be	 used	 to	 negotiate	 the	 specific	 location	 of	 activities	 (Opdam	 et	 al.,	2016),	which	can	expand	to	 include	elements	such	habitat	corridors,	planting	along	farm	boundaries	and	field	terraces	in	erosion	prone	areas.		Better	knowledge	of	the	socio-economic,	environmental	and	risk	trade-offs,	as	seen	in	role	playing	games	associated	with	Participatory	Land-Use	Planning	in	Lao	(Bourgoin	and	 Castella,	 2011),	would	 help	 farmers	 reach	 these	more	 informed	 decisions.	 The	scope	 to	 develop	 and	 incorporate	 more	 versatile	 land-use	 practises	 into	 service	markets	remains	a	key	part	of	this	sustainable	landscape	discourse	and	could	provide	key	financial	incentives	(Salvini	et	al.,	2016).	One	such	example	could	be	the	potential	to	 gain	 carbon	 credits	 from	 bamboo.	 Across	 Mt.	 Elgon	 bamboo	 has	 great	 cultural	(ceremonial	 purposes),	 social	 (vegetable)	 and	 economic	 (furniture)	 significance.	Farmers	 travel	 big	 distances,	 taking	 substantial	 risks	 to	 retrieve	 it	 from	 the	 upper	regions	of	the	Park	(Ditiro,	Vedeld	and	Gombya-Ssembajjwe,	2008).	Difficult	to	grow	at	lower	elevations,	with	some	careful	planning,	community	three	has	demonstrated	its	 feasibility.	Other	 than	 its	potential	 to	provide	domestic	and	commercial	uses,	 its	vigorous	growth	rate,	high	biomass	accumulation	and	effective	fixation	of	CO2	make	it	a	sound	option	for	carbon	trading	(Nath,	Lal	and	Das,	2015).		
Methodological	Considerations	on	Framed	Observations			When	environmental	agencies	target	CBO	members,	it	gives	them	the	opportunity	to	partake	 in	 more	 training,	 workshops	 and	 face-to-face	 interactions	 (Opdam	 et	 al.,	2016)	which	 improves	 their	 agrarian	 knowledge,	 sensitises	 them	 to	 environmental	problems	 and	 fosters	 greater	 group	 pride	 (Sommerville	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 Attention	 to	detail	 and	portrayal	of	alternative	 livelihood	strategies	could	reflect	 their	 improved	understanding/support	 of	 conservation-related	 activities	 i.e.	 improvements	 in	 local	
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attitudes.	Given	 the	hostile	 relationship	between	park	authorities	and	communities,	this	is	an	essential	first	step	in	motivating	the	behavioural	changes	that	will	advance	the	conservation	agenda.	If	nothing	else,	as	Blomley	et	al.	(2010)	highlighted	with	his	evaluation	 of	 ICDP’s	 in	 Uganda’s	 Bwindi	 Impenetrable	 National	 Park,	 it	 will	 ease	antagonistic	 pressures.	 One	 cannot,	 however,	 omit	 the	 bias	 of	 members	 depicting	what	 they	 feel	 researchers	would	 like	 to	 see	 as	 oppose	 to	portraying	 their	 genuine	sentiments.	 	 With	 regards	 to	 technology	 adoption,	 without	 direct	 measurements,	general	 observations	 of	 farms	 during	 household	 interviews	 would	 suggest	 lower	frequencies	then	quoted	(Personal	observation,	2013-2014).	The	most	obvious	being	terraces.	In	comparison	to	Southwestern	Uganda,	there	was	little	visible	evidence	of	their	implementation	on	the	broader	landscape	level.		Another	issue	to	consider	is	the	bias	created	by	the	facilitator’s	guidance,	translations	and	 the	personalities	of	 attendees	who	may	vary	 in	 their	 confidence,	 creativity	and	participation.	Equally,	 using	 recall	 techniques	 is	 known	 to	be	prone	 to	 inaccuracies	(Papworth,	Rist,	Coad	and	Milner-Gulland,	2009).	With	few	academic	and	practitioner	partnerships,	accessing	official	data	to	triangulate	these	community	perceptions	was	challenging.	 Collaborations,	 like	 the	 monitoring	 of	 the	 Tri-National	 de	 la	 Sangha	landscape	 across	 Congo,	 Cameroon	 and	 Central	 African	 Republic	 by	 several	independent	 NGO’s	 (de	 Lange,	 Woodhouse	 and	 Milner-Gulland,	 2015)	 would	 be	constructive	across	Mt.	Elgon.		In	 other	 ways,	 the	 study	 design	 fails	 to	 accurately	 quantify	 key	 assets,	 especially	changes	 in	 forest	quality	and	use	 from	within	 the	National	Park	(in	both	 target	and	untargeted	 area).	 Building	 from	 Scott	 (1994),	 future	 work	 should	 look	 towards	quantifying	 household	 use	 of	 forests,	 adding	 the	 aspect	 of	 how	 resource-use	 has	changed	 over	 time.	 In	 the	 same	 way	 as	 Wagner	 and	 Gobster	 (2007)	 socio	perspectives	could	then	be	integrated	with	quantitative	changes,	selecting	indicators	that	can	give	more	concrete	evidence	on	the	health	of	eco-system	services	and	how	these	are	being	impacted.		Another	 is	 its	 inability	 to	 capture	 the	 underpinning	 social,	 cultural	 and	 political	assets	 that	 drive	 resource-use,	 adoption	 outcomes	 and	 future	 aspirations.	 Drawing	from	 the	broader	 literature	and	visual	observations,	 communities	 that	had	updated	
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resource	agreements,	in	this	case	community	three	in	the	north,	tended	to	have	better	forest	recovery	(Nakakaawa	et	al.,	2015;	Sassen	et	al.,	2013).	In	other	cases,	concern	over	implementing	agencies	motivations	persisted	where	language	such	as	‘cheating’	and	‘stealing’	were	used	during	the	PRA	workshops.	Likewise,	in	some	of	the	mapping	exercises	 there	was	 a	 long	deliberation	as	 to	where	 the	park	boundaries	 should	be	drawn.	In	one	case,	an	elders	interpretation	was	overridden	by	younger	member	who	argued	 that	 the	 researcher	 should	 be	 under	 the	 impression	 that	 communities	 had	more	 land.	Unresolved	until	 today,	 continuous	contests	over	ownership	continue	 to	hamper	conservation	efforts.		Often	 forgotten	 in	project	design,	participation	and	 the	distribution	of	benefits	 also	act	 as	 significant	 factors	 in	determining	 efficiency.	 In	 the	most	 centralised	network	where	non-members	aspired	 to	greener	 futures	 (Jeha	et	al.	Chapter	3),	 an	attendee	highlighted	that,	“	Leaders	do	not	have	enough	facilitation	and	sometimes	are	not	
capable	 of	 supporting	 farmers	 the	 way	 they	 need	 to	 be.	 Empowerment,	
accountability	 and	 transparency	 are	 big	 issues	 that	 need	 to	 be	 overcome.”	 In	community	 three,	where	 the	CBO	has	no	 local	council	 leaders	 in	positions	of	power	(Jeha	 et	 al.,	 Chapter	 5),	 it	 was	 stated	 that,	 “benefits	 are	 causing	 jealousy	 in	 the	
community,	especially	politicians	who	want	to	oversee	or	take	some	of	the	them.”	Like	 a	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 136	 (Brooks,	 2016),	 the	 success	 in	 some	 study	 sites	illustrates	that	economic	and	ecology	win-wins	are	feasible	outcomes	of	conservation	interventions,	 however,	 typically	 come	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 social	 ones	 (Jeha	 et	 al.,	Chapter	 5).	 Be	 it	 moral	 (poverty	 alleviation),	 legal	 (through	 the	 social	 safeguards	written	 in	 international	 policy)	 or	 for	 pragmatic	 reasons	 (willingness),	 current	designs	need	to	pay	greater	attention	to	issues	of	equity	(Corbera,	Brown	and	Adger,	2007;	McDermott,	Mahanty	and	Schreckenberg,	2013;	Pascual	et	al.,	2010)	and	utilise	the	appetite	for	collective	action	and	improved	environmental	management.	To	avoid	being	 rejected,	 implementing	 agencies	 also	 need	 to	 give	 farmers	 the	 freedom	 of	choice	 to	 select	 the	 activities	 they	 desire	 the	 most	 (Abunge,	 Coulthard	 and	 Daw,	2013).				
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Conclusion			In	 the	 vacuum	 of	 published	 evaluations,	 this	 study	 has	 successfully	 demonstrated	some	 of	 the	 multi-faceted	 impacts	 of	 conservation	 interventions	 on	 cultural	landscapes.	 It	 has	 given	 primacy	 to	 those	most	 affected	 (Woodhouse	 et	 al.,	 2015),	allowing	 them	to	map	 the	processes,	define	 the	 indicators	and	observe	 the	changes	occurring	in	their	lifetime	(Gillson,	2015).	Using	 a	 setting	 that	 has	 seen	 and	 continues	 to	 host	 a	 plethora	 of	 development	agencies,	its	strength	lies	in	its	focus	upon	mapping	the	cumulative	outcomes	rather	than	disentangling	sometime	indistinguishable	project	impacts.	With	the	emphasis	of	creating	 value	 to	 the	 landscapes	 outside	 the	 park,	 it	 has	 paid	 greater	 attention	 to	measuring	on-farm	changes,	sufficiently	demonstrating	that	despite	improvements	to	household	 income,	 by	 and	 large	 policy	 interventions	 have	 failed	 halt	 habitat	degradation	 in	 an	 area	 facing	 rapidly	 growing	 population	 pressure.	 Without	quantifying	 forest	 use,	 few	 conclusions	 on	 whether	 livelihood	 diversification	 is	reducing	 pressure	 on	 the	 National	 Park	 or	 sufficiently	 substituting	 the	 benefits	provided	 can	 be	 drawn.	 Nonetheless,	 having	 pieced	 together	 external	 information	and	 coupled	 this	 with	 drawn	 features,	 such	 as	 park	 boundaries	 and	 attention	 to	details	 such	 as	 enrichment	 planting,	 correlations	 between	 positive	 environmental	attitudes	and	conservation	can	be	inferred.		Typically	 differentiated	 according	 to	 gender,	 separating	 groups	 according	 to	 CBO	membership	 has	 provided	 valuable	 insights	 as	 to	 who	 has	 access	 and	 control	 of	benefits	 in	 this	setup.	As	proactive	members	of	 their	society,	 from	an	 implementers	perspective,	working	through	these	groups	ensures	some	level	of	efficiency,	however,	more	 emphasis	 to	 target	 different	 people	 may	 be	 a	 crucial	 factor	 in	 up-scaling	activities.	 Including	 these	 different	 perspectives	 in	 the	 sustainability	 discourse	 is	 a	vital	first	step.	With	the	aspirations	of	a	green	future,	further	use	of	spatially	explicit	land-use	 planning	 can	 provide	 an	 open	 environment	 to	 negotiate	 trade-offs,	whilst	clarifying	the	rights	and	responsibilities	of	each	citizen	which	is	still	needed	in	the	Mt.	Elgon	context	(Sayer	et	al.,	2013).		Above	all,	it	can	be	used	as	a	tool	that	promotes	the	continual	learning	and	the	adaptive	co-management	relationships	required	for	sound	environmental	management.		
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Abstract		As	 incentive-based	 conservation	 programmes	 become	 common,	 and	 in	some	circles	seen	as	a	way	to	harmonise	development	and	conservation	agendas,	the	‘eligibility,	 ability	 and	 willingness’	 of	 stakeholders	 to	 actively	 engage	 in	 these	interventions	 is	 a	 crucial	 feature	 of	 their	 success.	 In	 practice,	 contextual	 realities,	predetermined	policy	conditions	and	social	 structures	all	affect	broader	community	participation.		Using	 network	 theory,	 the	 Mount	 Elgon	 Regional	 Ecosystem	 Conservation	Programme	(MERECP)	is	used	as	a	case	study	to	examine	how	different	socio-political	dynamics	affect	the	implementation	and	use	of	conservation	funding	under	devolved	ownership.	By	mapping	four	community-based	networks	(including	the	position	and	well‑being	 of	 their	 actors,	 their	 social	 ties	 and	 the	 overall	 structure	 of	 these	networks),	 the	study	 investigates	how	the	capability	of	heterogeneous	smallholders	influences	their	access	to	MERECP	credit.	The	 analysis	 reveals	 that	 in	 all	 cases	 richer	 landowners	 occupied	 core	 network	positions	 and	 in	 turn	 possessed	 a	 higher	 likelihood	 of	 receiving	 cash.	 In	 the	 most	centralised	 network	 (where	 a	 few	 dominant	 individuals	 took	 control)	 such	 equity	gains	 were	 further	 hampered.	 Conversely,	 in	 the	 Community-Based	 Organisation	network	devoid	of	actors	from	political	positions	with	the	greatest	access	to	external	support	created	the	highest	level	of	MERECP	information	exchanges,	quoted	the	most	beneficiaries	 and	 adopted	 the	 most	 diverse	 number	 of	 conservation	 technologies.	These	 findings	 signify	 that	more	 successful	 forms	 of	 decentralisation	 emerge	when	communities	 have	 built	 a	 high	 level	 of	 trust	 both	 amongst	 one	 another	 and	 with	supporting	organisations.	Subsequently,	this	research	argues	that	‘co-management’	is	central	to	participation	at	the	grass-roots	level	as	communities	still	require	external	
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guidance	 to:	a)	build	positive	conservation	attitudes;	b)	 install	a	 level	of	downward	accountability;	 c)	 transfer	 technical	 knowledge;	 and	 d)	 act	 as	 a	 safety	 net	 of	information	sharing	when	internal	members	fail	to	do	so.		
Introduction			At	 the	 heart	 of	 modern	 day	 conservation	 strategies	 is	 the	 ‘subsidiary	 principle’	 in	which	 decentralised	 forest	 management	 is	 being	 promoted	 through	 increased	citizenship	and	community	participation	(Fontana	and	Grugel,	2016;	McDougall	and	Banjade,	 2015).	 Stemming	 from	 the	 1992	 Rio	 Convention	 Biological	 Diversity,	 the	international	 policy-making	 arena	 has	 prioritised	 such	 devolution	 through	 eco-system	based	approaches	(Second	Malawi	Principle)2.	The	main	argument	being	that	(if)	 engaged	 adequately,	 local	 people	 foster	 the	 knowledge	 systems	 and	 collective	action	 (Putnam,	1993,	2000)	 required	 to	 reduce	stress	and	even	halt	unsustainable	resource	 extraction	 (Ostrom,	 1990).	 From	a	 legal	 perspective	 this	 shift	 is	 endorsed	through	transparency,	 legitimacy	and	accountability	(Dong	and	Olsen,	2015;	Parker,	Thapa	and	Jacob,	2015),	yet	pragmatically	is	founded	on	ascertaining	more	equitable	outcomes	 for	 the	marginalised	 communities	 that	 typically	 characterise	 these	 areas	(Oyono	2004;	Plummer		Armitage	2007;	Ribot	2002).				In	 reality,	 contextual	 realities	 and	 predetermined	 policy	 conditions	 all	 shape	 the	participation	levels	required	in	making	meaningful	ecological	gains	(Macfarquhar	and	Goodman,	 2015).	 Local	 people	 are	 not	 homogenous	 entities	 (Agrawal	 and	 Gibson,	1999;	Namara,	2015;	Ribot,	2002).	They	differ	in	their	histories,	social	structures	and	belief	 systems	 that	 not	 only	 affect	 their	 ability	 to	 actively	 partake	 in	 conservation-related	 activities	 but	 their	 desire	 to	 do	 so	 (Kolinjivadi,	 Gamboa,	 Adamowski	 and	Kosoy,	2015;	Robinson	and	Berkes,	2011).	Whilst	it	is	almost	impossible	to	design	a	one-size-fits	 all	 policy	 intervention,	 it	would	be	misguided	 to	 believe	 that	 devolved	ownership	 automatically	 equates	 to	 greater	 results	 for	 conservation	 and	 equality.	Decentralised	governance	systems	are	susceptible	to	the	same	power	asymmetries	as	their	higher	order	counterparts	where	those	who	are	in	a	better	position	to	articulate	
																																								 																					2	Malawi Principle 2: Management should be decentralized to the lowest appropriate level (1998) 
Fourth Meeting of Conferences of Parties. 	
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themselves	wield	the	most	influence	and	in	turn	derive	the	most	benefits	(Anderson,	Mehta,	Epelu	and	Cohen,	2015;	Chomba,	Nathan,	Minang	and	Sinclair,	2015).	A	factor	amplified	when	policy	designs	are	complex,	 target	specific	 institutions	 (both	 formal	and	informal)	and	contain	rigid	eligibility	requirements	(Kosoy,	Corbera	and	Brown,	2008;	Nakakaawa	et	al.,	2015).				With	 the	 scale,	 complexity	 and	 dynamic	 nature	 of	 communities,	 collating	 and	understanding	these	socio-political	features	can	be	difficult.	Nevertheless,	systematic	reviews	 of	 existing	 interventions	 can	 help	 identify	 efficiency	 and	 equity	 trade-offs	whilst	 avoiding	 common	 pitfalls	 (Angelsen,	 2008).	 Considering	 the	 growing	popularity	 of	 incentive-based	 conservation	 schemes,	 including	 the	 development	 of	Reduced	 Emissions	 from	Deforestation	 and	 Degradation	 Programme	 (REDD+),	 this	chapter	evaluates	the	adaptive	capacity	of	Community-Based	Organisations	(CBOs)	in	executing	 the	 Mt.	 Elgon	 Regional	 Conservation	 Programme	 (MERECP)	 revenue-sharing	 scheme.	 Applying	 social	 network	 theory,	 information	 networks	 (and	 the	characteristics	 of	 their	 components)	 are	 reconstructed	 at	 the	 local	 level.	 This	uncovers	 who	 holds	 the	 most	 power	 under	 decentralisation	 and	 which	 network	structures	 result	 in	 greater	 dispersal	 of	 knowledge	 and	 overall	 participation	 levels.	The	chapter	begins	with	a	short	description	of	the	MERECP	case	study,	followed	with	the	 rational	 of	 using	 Social	 Network	 Analysis	 (SNA)	 as	 an	 analytical	 tool.	 The	discussion	 then	 presents	 a	 critical	 evaluation	 of	 how	MERECP	 network	 properties	influence	 resource	 governance,	 before	 placing	 these	 findings	 into	 the	 broader	 Mt.	Elgon	context.		
Mount	Elgon:	A	Ugandan	Perspective		Bisecting	 the	Uganda/Kenya	border	 is	 the	extinct	Miocene	volcano	home	 to	 the	Mt.	Elgon	 Protected	 Area	 (PA).	 Rich	 in	 closed	 canopy	 tropical	 hardwood,	 bamboo	 and	heath	moorlands	high	in	endemic	flora;	this	forest	eco-system	hosts	some	seventy	six	threatened	species	of	global	conservation	value	(Nakakaawa	et	al.,	2015).	Protected	under	 different	 jurisdictions	 (Fig	 25),	 in	 Uganda,	 a	 single	 1120	 km2	 National	 Park	(NP)	is	administered	by	the	Uganda	Wildlife	Authority	(UWA)	(Sassen	et	al.,	2013).		
Below	 these	 demarcated	 boundaries	 smallholder	 farmers	 have	 converted	 the	landscape	into	intensively	managed	crop	production	sites	intertwined	with	animal		
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rearing	and	Eucalyptus	woodlots	(Hitimana,	Kiyiapi	and	Njunge,	2004;	LVBC,	2012).	The	abundant	 rains,	 fertile	 soils	and	access	 to	 the	parks	environmental	 income	and	services	 have	 made	 this	 one	 of	 most	 populous	 (1.6	 million	 people)	 and	 rapidly	growing	regions	(3.4%	per	year)	in	east	Africa	(Nakakaawa	et	al.,	2015).	
Inhabiting	the	Ugandan	side	are	two	distinct	ethnic	tribes:	the	nilo-cushitic	Sebei	and	the	 Bagisu	 of	 Bantu	 decent.	 Once	 in	 direct	 conflict	 over	 land,	 the	 occupying	 Sebei	
Figure		25.	Map	of	Mt.	Elgon,	Uganda	and	Kenya.	For	anonymity,	exact	location	of	selected	study	sites	is	not	revealed.	 
Adapted	using	data	on	Mt.	Elgon	boundaries	and	forests	from	Sassen	et	al	(2013).	Protected	Area	Boundaries	sourced	from	UN	EP-WCMC	 
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maintained	their	territories	in	the	north	of	the	mountain	whilst	the	Bagisu	retreated	to	the	south	(Pétursson,	Vedeld	and	Sassen,	2013).	Historically,	the	Sebei	and	Bagisu	practised	very	different	livelihood	strategies.	The	forest	dwelling	Sebei	were	nomadic	pastoralist,	 supplementing	 their	 diet	 with	 herd	 and	 forage	 from	 within	 the	 forest	(Himmelfarb,	 2005);	whereas	 the	 Bagisu	 cleared	 land	 for	 agriculture.	 Despite	 their	differences,	both	tribes	have	longstanding	cultural	(burial	and	circumcision	sites)	and	use	 (wood,	medicine	 and	 food)	 values	 associated	with	 the	 park	 (Nakakaawa	 et	 al.,	2015).	 They	 have	 both	 faced	 harsh	 evictions	 creating	 resentment	 towards	 park	authorities	 and	 negative	 conservation	 attitudes	 (Oonyu,	 2009).	Most	 notable	 is	 the	case	 of	 the	 Sebei,	 who	 were	 displaced	 from	 the	 elevated	 heath	 moorlands	 to	 the	peripheries	 of	 the	 protected	 area	 in	 1983	 (Himmelfarb,	 2005;	 Sassen	 et	 al.,	 2013).	This	 denied	 access,	 especially	 to	 the	 grazing	 of	 their	 livestock,	 soon	 made	 these	hunter-gatherers	alter	their	 livelihood	practices	towards	the	 intensive	cultivation	of	maize,	potatoes,	beans,	coffee	and	bananas.	
Inside	 a	 landscape	with	 soil	 properties	 and	 topography	 that	 are	 naturally	 prone	 to	landslides,	escalating	human	pressure	and	conflict	on	Mt.	Elgon	is	causing	severe	soil	degradation,	habitat	 loss,	water	pollution	and	homelessness	(Claessens	et	al.,	2007).	In	 a	 bid	 to	 reconcile	 such	 hostile	 relationships	 and	 build	 sustainable	 livelihood	strategies,	 over	 the	 past	 twenty	 years	 conservation	 initiatives	 and	 resources	agreements	have	been	put	into	place	(Oonyu,	2009).	Aided	by	international	funding,	their	main	agenda	has	been	to	reduce	deforestation	and	promote	habitat	restoration	through	 the	 development	 of	 on-farm	 diversification.	 The	 techniques	 introduced	include:	 soil	 erosion	 measures,	 agroforestry,	 tree	 crops,	 zero	 grazing	 and	 the	introduction	 of	mix-breed	 cattle	 and	 energy	 saving	 cook	 stoves	 (Muhweezi,	 Sikoyo	and	Chemonges,	2007).		
MERECP			Jointly	 funded	 by	 the	 governments	 of	 Norway	 and	 Sweden,	 MERECP	 is	 one	 of	 the	latest	 International	 Conservation	 and	 Development	 Projects	 (ICDP)	 to	 be	 launched	across	Mt.	Elgon.	Initiated	in	2006	by	the	International	Union	for	the	Conservation	of	Nature	 East	 African	 Community,	 with	 the	 support	 of	 the	 Lake	 Victoria	 Basin	Commission	 (LVBC),	 the	 programme	 was	 re-designed	 in	 2008.	 Unlike	 its	
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predecessors,	MERECP	developed	a	novel	trans-boundary	ICDP	founded	between	the	countries	 of	 Uganda	 and	 Kenya	 (Mwayafu,	 Kimbowa	 and	 Graham,	 2012).	 Placing	 a	greater	 emphasis	 on	 the	 role	 of	 decentralised	 governance,	 MERECP	 focused	 on	bridging	 and	 strengthening	 the	 capacity	 of	 different	 institutional	 bodies	 from	 both	countries.	 Thereafter	 funds	 were	 channelled	 towards	 National	 Governments,	Protected	 Area	Management	 Institutions	 (PAMI),	 Focal	 Point	 Ministries	 (FPM)	 and	local	 communities	 to	 help	 support	 this	 procedure	 (Hoefsloot,	 Kahata	 and	 Nsita,	2011).	With	 the	principal	 objective	of	 incentivising	 environmental	 stewardship,	 the	programme	 primarily	 linked	 livelihood	 improvement	 and	 adaptation	 through	 the	implementation	 of	 different	 participatory	 benefit-sharing	 models	 (Larsen,	Kamugasha	and	Karani,	2008).		
The	Community	Revolving	Fund	(CRF)	
Having	been	used	 in	other	rural	development	settings	around	the	world,	one	of	 the	benefit-sharing	 schemes	 introduced	 by	MERECP	was	 a	 Cash	Revolving	 Fund	 (CRF).	Based	 around	 the	 concept	 of	 micro-finance,	 the	 purpose	 of	 CRF	 was	 to	 offer	households	at	the	periphery	of	the	National	Park	(NP)	the	economic	freedom	to	invest	in	 sustainable	 Income	 Generating	 Activities	 (IGA).	 It	 is	 hoped	 that	 the	 scheme	will	secure	 greater	 longevity	 in	 payment	 dispersal	 as	 (unlike	 most	 incentive-based	payments);	participants	of	the	CRF	scheme	were	expected	to	repay	loans	with	a	small	interest	 component.	 This	 feature	 makes	 it	 a	 ‘revolving’	 rather	 than	 a	 sinking	 fund	(Mwayafu,	Kimbowa	and	Graham,	2012).			Partaking	 in	 technical	micro-credit	 training	and	accepting	a	start-up	 fund	of	10,000	USD,	 twenty	Community-Based	Organisations	(CBO’s)	established	their	own	criteria	for	lending	along	with	unique	terms	and	conditions	for	repayment.	Built	on	existing	constitutions,	ownership	and	control	of	 these	funds	was	completely	devolved	to	the	grass-roots	 level	 and	 based	 on	 a	 ‘learn-by-doing’	 management	 approach.	 It	 is	important	 to	 note	 that	 selected	 CBO’s	 were	 already	 in	 existence	 before	 external	sponsorship	 was	 offered.	 Capitalising	 on	 pre-existing	 conservation	 networks,	communities	 were	 purposely	 selected	 on	 their	 good	 reputations	 via	 consultations	with	 extension	 staff	 and	 community	 informants.	 District	 governments	 were	subsidised	 to	monitor	and	evaluate	 these	 interventions	which	means	an	element	of	
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‘adaptive	co-management’	was	envisaged	in	MERECP’s	design;	in	particular,	their	role	in	 providing	 technical	 knowledge	 and	managerial	 support.	Despite	 some	 aspects	 of	devolved	ownership,	this	overall	approach	remains	top	down	as	centralised	decisions	determined	which	communities	 the	project	engaged	with,	 the	manner	 in	which	 this	was	done	and	the	benefit-sharing	model	introduced	(Chow,	2015)	.		
Devolution	Successes:	The	role	of	Social	Capital,	Common	Knowledge	and	
Collective	Action		Governance,	 “the	 structures	 and	 processes	 by	 which	 people	 in	 societies	 make	decisions	and	share	power	(Folke	et	al.	2005),”	is	central	to	the	CRF	decentralisation	process.	 	 In	 turn,	 the	 capability	 of	 community	 members	 to	 actively	 engage	 in	governance,	is	heavily	dependent	on	localised	social	capital	such	as	the	willingness	of	stakeholders	to	participate	(Knight,	Cowling,	Difford	and	Campbell,	2010).	Defined	as	‘the	norms	and	networks	facilitating	collective	action	for	mutual	benefit’	(Woolcock,	1998);	 social	 capital	 is	 inclusive	 of	 	 relations	 of	 trust,	 reciprocity	 and	 exchanges,	common	 rules	 and	 connectedness	 (García-Amado	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 In	 this	 context,	collective	 action	 is	 ‘the	 action	 taken	 by	 a	 group	 (either	 directly	 or	 on	 its	 behalf	through	an	organisation)	in	pursuit	of	members	perceived	shared	interests	(Marshall,	1988).	 Common	 knowledge,	 the	 ‘set	 of	 understandings	 embedded	 in	 a	 given	 social	structure	which	 enables	 putting	 resources	 to	 a	 particular	 use	 (García-Amado	 et	 al.,	2012)’,	 is	what	 specifically	 transforms	 social	 capital	 into	 collection	 action	 (Ishihara	and	Pascual,	2009).	Appreciating	and	optimising	 the	 interplay	among	social	 capital,	common	 knowledge	 and	 collective	 action	 is	 therefore	 critical	 when	 assessing	 co-management	 relationships	 between	 agencies	 promoting	 conservation	 and	 the	individual	action	taken	by	farmers	(Pretty	and	Smith,	2004).	
Network Analysis as a Proxy of Participation  	When	the	twenty	CBO’s	came	together	and	agreed	to	implement	a	CRF,	they	engaged	in	 co-ordination,	 trade-off	 sharing,	 information	 building	 and	 exchange	 of	 common	knowledge	 (Bodin	 and	 Crona,	 2009).	 Empirically	 mapping	 the	 actors	 (nodes)	 and	relationships	 (ties)	 established	 during	 this	 process	 (a	 technique	 known	 as	 Social	Network	Analysis	(SNA))	who	and	what	types	of	knowledge	are	driving	participation	on	 the	 ground	 will	 be	 investigated	 (Stein,	 Ernstson	 and	 Barron,	 2011).	 In	 the	
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conservation	context,	 interventions	may	be	unsuccessful	 if	 the	readiness	and	ability	of	 stakeholders	 to	 work	 together	 is	 low.	 Given	 that	 Mt.	 Elgon’s	 socio-ecological	system	 has	 suffered	 conflict,	 poor	 management	 and	 still	 has	 unresolved	 boundary	disputes,	 rural	 farmers	may	 be	 unwilling	 to	 co-ordinate	 actions	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	trust.	Nonetheless,	mapping	social	networks	to	understand	participation	can	lead	to	a	more	 strategic	 implementation	 (Ajani	 and	Tijani,	 2009).	 For	 example	working	with	members	of	the	community	that	have	acquired	trust	and	respect	amongst	their	peers	(Corbera	and	Schroeder,	2011).			Social	networks	can	also	be	used	to	indicate	whether	stakeholders	are	clear	and	agree	on	 the	 purpose,	 goals	 and	 impacts	 of	 the	 CRF,	 i.e.	 is	 the	 programme	 being	implemented	 in	a	 transparent	manner?	Early	narratives	 from	existing	 interventions	reveal	that	acceptability	and	what	communities	deem	fair,	 is	not	 just	based	on	their	direct	involvement	in	a	project,	or	the	material	assets	they	stand	to	obtain,	but	being	able	 to	 voice	 their	 personal	 opinions	 and	 question	 the	 decision-making	 process	(Macfarquhar	and	Goodman,	2015;	Oonyu,	2009).	Especially,	as	Robinson	and	Berkes	(2011)	 highlight,	when	 people	 have	 the	 freedom	 to	 deliberate,	 i.e.	 “confer,	 ponder,	exchange	 views,	 consider	 evidence,	 reflect	 on	matters	 of	mutual	 interest,	 negotiate	and	attempt	to	persuade	each	other’’	(National	Research	Council,	1996).			Structural	 aspects	 of	 social	 networks,	 such	 as	 their	 level	 of	 cohesion,	 can	 either	impede	 or	 promote	 such	 activities	 (Isaac	 and	 Dawoe,	 2011;	 Stein,	 Ernstson	 and	Barron,	2011).	Particularly	whether	those	who	hold	power	allow	project	training	and	education	 to	 penetrate	 to	 the	 grassroots	 level.	 Examining	 information	 flows	 can	uncover	whether	people	are	aware	of	impacts	of	Climate	Change	(CC),	deforestation	and	 degradation	 on	 their	 ecosystems	 and	 consequently	 the	 purpose	 of	 MERECP’s	intervention.	Do	they	appreciate	the	technical	terms	and	conditions	set	for	accessing	and	 repaying	 loans	 or	more	 importantly	 that	 the	money	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 hand	 out.	With	 the	 accounts	 of	 poor	 downward	 accountability	 in	 Uganda,	 elite	 capture,	nepotism,	 corruption	 and	politicisation	 are	 realistic	 risks	 for	 the	project	 (Cooper	&	Wheeler	 2015).	 Such	 poor	 implementation	 not	 only	 limits	 access	 to	 such	 pertinent	information	but	also	erodes	trust,	making	communities	less	likely	to	adapt	to	change	in	the	future	(Cooper	and	Wheeler,	2015;	Macfarquhar	and	Goodman,	2015).		
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	MERECP’s	 approach	 of	 targeting	 CBO’s	 is	 certainly	 a	 cost-effective	 and	 operational	way	of	fostering	the	collective	action	required	to	implement	the	CRF	as	these	groups	have	 already	 established	 the	 agency	 and	 level	 of	mutual	 understanding	 needed	 for	effective	information	exchanges	(Prell,	Reed,	Racin	and	Hubacek,	2010).	Such	groups,	however,	 assemble	 amidst	 a	 heterogenic	 population	 through	 their	 shared	 interests	and	 similarities,	 be	 it	 wealth,	 education,	 language	 capabilities,	 ethnicity	 etc.	(Grannovetter,	 1973;	 Newman	 and	 Dale,	 2007).	 Whilst,	 like-minded	 people	 are	predicted	 to	 interact	 more,	 known	 as	 homophily	 in	 SNA,	 others	 are	 often	 ignored	creating	fragmented	networks	(Yuan	and	Gay,	2006).	This	may	limit	benefit-sharing	and	create	further	resentment	in	communities.		With	 these	 factors	 in	mind,	 the	 following	 research	will	 explore	participation	within	the	 broader	 concept	 of	 social	 capital.	 It	 will	 focus	 on	 relationships	 of	 trust,	communication	and	co-operation	(Baynes	et	al.,	2015).		
Methods		
Study	Site	Selection		Following	 several	 focus	 group	 discussions	 with	 participating	 MERECP	 CBO’s,	 four	study-sites,	 from	 four	 different	 districts	 in	Mt.	 Elgon	 Uganda	were	 sampled	 (Table	16).	 	 Working	 across	 Manafwa,	 Bududa,	 Sironko	 and	 Mable,	 CBO’s	 were	 selected	according	to	their	willingness	to	participate	in	the	research,	ethnic	diversity	and	the	differences	 in	 CRF	 criteria	 and	 implementation.	 Membership,	 and	 the	 subsequent	number	of	villages	they	came	from,	varied	for	each	CBO,	as	did	their	access	to	roads	and	 markets.	 In	 these	 circumstances,	 standardisation	 was	 difficult	 however,	 this	variety	will	be	used	as	a	point	to	compare	and	contrast	qualitative	differences	seen	in		participation	levels	(Berman,	Quinn	and	Paavola,	2014;	Crowe,	2007).							
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	 Table	16.		Summary	of	CBO	Activities.		
CBO	 Majority	Ethnicity	
Membership	
Composition	and	
Fees	
Loan	Terms	and	
Conditions	 Group	Activities	
1	 Bagishu	
-	120	Members	-Membership	from	three	sub-counties	-TACC	funding	received	-Membership	fee	UGX	5000	-Registration	fee	UGX5000	-CRF	UGX	20	million	
-Repayment	4-12	months	-Interest	rate	3%	-All	loans	have	to	authorised	from	the	LC1	-Membership	required	to	access	loan	-Guarantors	that	are	existing	members	of	CBO	required	to	access	loan	
-Energy	saving	cook-stoves	-Horticulture	seedlings	-Tree	nursery	-Zero-grazing	-Trench	digging	-Napier	grass	Planting	
2	 Bagishu	
-	83	Members	-Membership	UGX	20,000	-UGX	23	Million	from	WWF	-UGX	3.7	Million	from	UWA	-TACC	funding	received		
-Interest	Rate	2%	-Loans	up	to	UGX	400000	-Repayment	after	three	months	-Membership	required	to	access	loan		
-Horticulture	seedlings	-Zero-grazing	-Bee-keeping	-Tree	nursery	(especially	fruit)	-Trench	digging	-Napier	grass	planting	-Bee-hives	
3	 Sabiny	
-	411	Members	-Registration	fees	UGX	10,000	-Annual	Subscription	UGX	20,000	-8	sub-groups	-Membership	from	one	sub-county	-UG	X	15	Million	Received	from	Deforestation	Avoidance	Fund	-UGX	650	000	from	HIEFER	International		
-Interest	rate	10%	-Repayment	period	depends	on	activity	-Membership	required	to	access	loan	-Loans	range	from	UGX500,000-	1	million	-Loans	giving	to	sub-groups	-Money		invested	in	group	activities	
-Bamboo	demonstration	-Fish	pond	demonstration	-Trench	digging	-Bio-gas	-Woodlots	-Dairy	cows	-Bee-hives	-Tree	nursery	-Coffee	pulping	machine	-Infrastructure	-Napier	grass	planting	-Zero-grazing	
4	 Bagishu	
-36	Members	-Membership	UGX	5000	-Subscription	UG	10000	-Membership	from	one	village	-CBO	received	no	other	funding	-Group	Savings	
-Interest	Rate	10%	-Repayment	after	a	year	-Money	invested	in	group	activities	
-Woodlots	-Dairy	Cows	-Apiary	-Coffee	nursery	-Trench	Digging	-Napier	grass	planting	
Note:	In	the	absence	of	clear	record	keeping,	and	with	conflicting	data	published	online,	
information	cited	here	is	from	focus	group	discussions	with	executive	CBO	members.			
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Study	Design		A	 single	 data	 collection	 period	 was	 conducted	 between	 September	 2013	 to	 March	2014.	 In	 each	 of	 the	 respective	 sites,	 this	 began	with	 a	 ten	 to	 fifteen	 person	 focus	group	 discussion	 introducing	 the	 community	 to	 the	 research	 team	 and	 objectives.	Comprised	 of	 men	 and	 woman	 of	 different	 ages,	 socio-economic	 backgrounds	 and	affiliated	to	different	organisations,	a	wealth-ranking	exercise	based	on	community-specific	 criteria	 followed	 (Appendix	 1.C	 Table	 1).	 Here	 participants	 were	 asked	 to	define	four	different	wealth	categories	based	on	common	(material	and	non-material)	indicators	 (see	 Appendix	 1,	 Table	 A.1	 for	 full	 results).	 Starting	 with	 a	 randomly	selected	household	from	a	list	of	CBO	members,	a	total	of	one	hundred	and	thirty	two	in-depth,	 semi-structured	 interviews	at	 the	house	 level	and	 thirty-one	at	 the	expert	were	then	conducted	(see	Appendix	1	for	survey	guidelines).	With	permission	of	the	survey	 respondent,	 interviews	 were	 tape	 recorded,	 transcribed	 verbatim	 and	thematically	coded	following	a	discourse	analysis	approach	(Weiss	et	al.,	2012).			Using	one	set	of	interviews,	two	separate	network	questions	were	asked.	With	some	of	 the	 same	 actors	 listed	 in	 both,	 this	 chapter	 only	 focuses	 on	 MERECP	 networks.		Following	an	egocentric	design,	i.e.	one	in	which	an	ego	and	their	alters	are	mapped	as	 opposed	 to	 a	 complete	 network	 (Prell,	 2012),	 a	 five	 actor	 free	 recall	 name	generator	 technique	was	used	 in	 the	household	 interviews	 to	 identify	 “From	whom	did	 you	 receive	 information	 about	 the	 MERECP	 intervention?”	 The	 farmers	 listed	within	 the	 community	 became	 the	 further	 study	 participants,	 also	 referred	 to	 as	snowball	sampling	(Prell,	2012).	The	fact	that	“A”	mentioned	“B”	does	not	necessarily	imply	that	“B’	mentioned	“A”	therefore	a	directional,	binary,	actor-by-actor	matrix	is	derived	(García-Amado	et	al.,	2012).			Without	a	natural	 frontier,	a	combination	of	relational	and	positional	approach	was	taken	 in	 defining	 the	 network	 boundary.	 Executive	members	 of	 the	 CBO	 and	 local	leaders	 (culturally	 important)	were	 purposively	 sampled	 (positional),	 however,	 the	sampling	 in	 each	 study	 site	 finished	 when	 the	 same	 names	 were	 continuously	repeated	 (relational).	With	 the	 interest	 of	 appreciating	 participation	 of	 community	members,	 information	 networks	 at	 higher	management	 level	were	 not	 tracked	 and	
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were	 simply	 crossed-checked	 as	 a	 form	 of	 triangulation.	 The	 ties	 that	 respondents	mention	beyond	 the	 community	 (31	 expert	 interviews)	were	 simply	 used	 to	 cross-check	 information	 given	 by	 communities	 and	 used	 to	 explain	 contextual	 realities	(García-Amado	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 Consequently	 the	 size	 of	 networks	 sampled	 varied	between	the	different	study	sites	and	no	statistical	analyses	between	villages	can	be	made,	however,	a	qualitative	comparative	interpretation	of	what	network	structures	result	 in	better	adoption	of	technologies	will	be	(Berman,	Quinn	and	Paavola,	2014;	Crowe,	2007).	In	addition	to	sources	of	MERECP,	participants	were	asked	to	identify	which	 types	 of	 information	 they	 received	 from	 each	 actor	 (common	 knowledge),	whether	they	participated	in	the	CRF,	their	perceptions	of	the	programme	and	what	they	 believed	 future	 benefit-sharing	 schemes	 should	 look	 like.	 Combing	 indicators	outlined	during	the	well-being	ranking	(Appendix	1,	Table	A.1)	and	those	identified	in	the	 national	 survey	 report	 (Ministry	 of	 Finance	 2001),	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 interview	each	household	was	then	placed	into	a	corresponding	wealth	category.		It	 is	 important	 to	 highlight	 that	 as	 an	 outsider,	 obtaining	 accurate	 membership	information,	clarity	on	recipients	of	loans	and	proof	of	repayments	was	problematic-	a	procedure	made	worse	by	the	lack	of	trust,	conflicting	narratives	and	being	unable	to	differentiate	the	effects	of	the	CRF	with	other	similar	interventions.	Bearing	these	issues	 in	 mind,	 these	 results	 will	 report	 participation	 cited	 during	 interviews	regardless	 of	 their	 inconsistencies	 with	 other	 data	 sources.	 Here,	 participation	 is	taken	 as	 either	 having	 had	 or	 being	 offered	 a	 CRF	 loan	 from	MERECP	 cash	 inputs	(distributional	outcomes).	Despite	some	descriptions	that	clearly	resembled	those	of	other	conservation	programmes	(WWF/IUCN/TACC),	access	to	MERECP	information	and	 membership	 statistics	 are	 used	 as	 an	 indication	 of	 the	 underlying	 procedural	processes.	 Keeping	 a	 fieldwork	 diary	 during	 the	 research	 period,	 which	was	 spent	living	near	study	sites	and	observing	current	 interventions,	 the	discussion	will	 then	be	used	as	an	arena	to	explore	the	context	of	these	findings,	piecing	together	different	narratives.		
Network	Analysis			Descriptive	 statistics	 and	 structural	 characteristics	 of	 knowledge	 networks	 were	analysed	 using	 the	 UCINET	 Programme	 (Borgatti,	 Everett	 and	 Freeman,	 2002).	 All	
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visualisations	 were	 created	 using	 NetDraw	 (Borgatti,	 2002)	 where	 a	multidimensional	algorithm	was	used	 to	 lay	out	actors	 	based	on	 their	 similarity	 in	geodesic	 distances	 (shortest	 path	 lengths)	 to	 other	 actors	 (Weiss	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 The	size	 of	 the	 nodes	 signals	 an	 actor’s	 eigenvector	 centrality	 (see	 below	 for	 more	information),	 the	 symbol	 the	 type	 of	 actor	 they	 were	 (based	 on	 the	 highest	governance	 level	 they	 belonged	 to)	 and	 the	 thickness	 of	 ties	 the	 relative	 degree	 of	information	exchange.		Respondents	who	failed	to	list	actors	and	were	not	mentioned	by	any	other	(i.e.	had	no	ties)	were	represented	 in	network	visualisations	however,	had	 to	removed	 from	some	statistical	analyses	 for	 them	to	be	valid.	Features	of	 the	network	were	measured	at	two	scales:	the	entire	network	and	at	the	individual	level.		
Network Cohesion and Composition: Characterising the Whole Network   	To	measure	the	overall	structural	cohesion	 found	 in	a	network,	an	 indication	of	 the	level	of	common	knowledge,	trust,	reciprocity	found	in	a	network	(Bodin	and	Crona,	2009),	 density	 and	 two	 centralisation	 statistics	 were	 used	 in	 this	 study	 (Stein,	Ernstson	and	Barron,	2011).	Calculated	by	quantifying	the	proportion	of	all	existing	ties	 to	 the	 number	 of	 all	 possible	 ties,	 density	 shows	 whether	 all	 members	 in	 the	network	are	receiving	or	providing	information	(Weiss	et	al.,	2012).	1	indicates	that	all	actors	are	connected	and	0	that	the	whole	network	is	disconnected	(Prell,	Hubacek	and	 Reed,	 2009;	 Vignola,	 Mcdaniels,	 Scholz	 and	 Rica,	 2013).	 In	 accompaniment	 to	network	 density,	 centralisation	 statistics	 were	 used	 to	 depict	 the	 degree	 to	 which	overall	networks	are	organised	around	focal	actors.	In	a	highly	centralised	network,	only	one	or	two	powerful	actors	exist.	In	a	decentralised	network	there	are	a	higher	number	of	relational	ties	among	different	actors	in	the	network.	The	degree	statistic	applied	here	quantifies	to	what	extent	ties	are	connected	to	a	vocal	actor	in	an	ideal	‘star’	configuration	(100	%	centralisation)	(Hanneman	and	Riddle,	2005;	Weiss	et	al.,	2012).	To	track	the	directional	flow	of	information,	especially	whether	those	who	are	receiving	 information	 were	 also	 giving	 information,	 the	 data	 are	 not	 symmetrised	(which	 is	 sometimes	 necessary	 to	 run	 certain	 statistics).	 This	 gives	 an	 outdegree	value	 (%	 of	 outward	 going	 ties)	 and	 indegree	 (%	 of	 inward	 going	 ties)	 (Barnes-Mauthe	et	al.,	2013).		
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Actors	 not	 only	 shape	 a	 network	 by	 the	 number	 of	 ties	 they	 maintain	 but	 their	strategic	placement	within	that	network.	In	some	cases	networks	break	into	smaller	groups	 where	 a	 few	 key	 actors	 bridge	 them	 into	 a	 single	 system	 (referred	 to	 as	cliques	in	SNA).	Such	actors	might	be	CBO	members	or	district	officials	that	transfer	information	from	the	MERECP	administration	to	the	community.	At	the	macro-level,	the	percentage	of	all	geodesic	paths	that	 link	one	group	to	another	through	a	single	actor	 is	 quantified	using	 the	metric	 betweenness	 centrality	 (Hanneman	and	Riddle,	2005).	 A	 high	 betweenness	 centrality	 represents	 a	 clumpy	 network	 consisting	 of	structural	 holes	 with	 bridging	 characteristics	 (Prell,	 2012).	 In	 this	 scenario,	 the	network	 is	 not	 very	 resilient,	 depending	 on	 a	 few	 prominent	 actors	 to	 bridge	information	(Prell	et	al.,	2010).		
Understanding Power: Homophily and Actor Centrality 	After	 grasping	 the	 overall	 level	 of	 cohesion	 within	 the	 four	 networks,	 the	 role	 of	individuals	in	shaping	them	was	then	investigated	using	eigenvector	and	betweeness	centrality.	The	SNA	 theory	assumes	 that	 the	number	and	 type	of	 relational	 ties	you	maintain	 is	an	 indication	of	 the	power	you	occupy.	This	 is	based	on	 the	notion	 that	actors	 that	 interact	more	 often,	 or	with	 the	 right	 type	 of	 actors,	 are	more	 likely	 to	receive	 valuable	 information,	 wield	 influence	 and	 mobilise	 resources	 (Bodin	 and	Crona,	2009;	Weiss	et	al.,	2012).		The	most	intuitive	measure	of	this	is	the	number	of	ties	an	individual	actor	holds	(degree),	however,	the	type	of	ties	you	hold	are	equally	as	important.	For	example,	an	actor	may	have	a	few	ties,	but	these	ties	are	established	with	actors	who	are	well	connected	to	others,	i.e.	at	the	core	of	the	network	(Barnes-Mauthe	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 Known	 as	 eigenvector	 (Bonacich,	 1972),	 	 in	 this	 analysis	 it	 is	assumed	that	higher	scoring	actors	hold	greater	influence	within	their	network	(Prell,	2012).	 Subsequently	 the	 specific	 individuals	 who	 are	 bridging	 different	 groups,	including	 cross-scale	 links,	 were	 calculated.	 At	 the	micro-level	 this	 is	 the	 extent	 to	which	an	actor	falls	on	the	shortest	geodesic	path	length	between	two	others	who	are	not	directly	connected	(Freeman,	1979).		
	Finally,	 to	 test	 the	 theory	 that	 individuals	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 interact	 with	 others	similar	to	themselves	(McPherson,	Smith-Lovin	and	Cook,	2001),	an	ANOVA	density	model	 of	 variable	 homophily	 is	 used	 to	 assess	 whether	 CBO	 membership	 affected	
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participation	levels.	Building	on	the	density	statistic	this	model	tests	the	probability	that	 within-group	 ties	 (bonding)	 density	 differ	 from	 between-group	 tie	 (bridging)	density	(Berman,	Quinn	and	Paavola,	2014;	Hanneman	and	Riddle,	2005).			Combining	 this	 theory	 with	 the	 objective	 of	 exploring	 participation	 levels,	 the	aforementioned	SNA	statistics	were	used	to	test	the	following	hypotheses:	-		
H1:	CBO’s	whose	associational	networks	are	densely	connected,	decentralised	(i.e.	
few	 dominant	 actors)	 and	 comprised	 of	 supporting	 extension	 officers	 acquire	
higher	levels	of	community	participation.		
H2:	 The	 local	 elite	 (i.e.	 actors	 from	 higher	 socio-economic	 and	 political	 status)	
hold	 the	 most	 discretionary	 power	 in	 disseminating	 MERECP	 information,	
possessing	 the	 highest-ranking	 eigenvector	 centrality	 measures	 and	 in	 turn	
participation	levels.		
H3:	 Communities	 that	 exhibit	 lower	 levels	 of	 socio-economic	 and	 membership	
homophily	(i.e.	within	group	sharing)	acquire	higher	participation	levels.		
Results		
Network	Cohesion	and	Composition			Within	 all	 four	 sites,	MERECP	 information	 sharing	networks	 comprised	of	 different	actor	types,	relational	ties	and	levels	of	participation	(Table	17).	Network	1	had	the	largest	number	of	 respondents	and	most	diverse	actor	 typology,	yet	 lower	 levels	of	respondents	 accessing	 information	 and	 loans.	 Network	 2	 and	 3	 included	 a	 similar	number	of	actors,	yet	had	marked	differences	in	their	composition.	A	quarter	more	of	the	respondents	in	network	3	had	established	information	sharing	ties	in	comparison	to	 network	 2.	 The	 availability	 of	 a	 board	 and	 diverse	 set	 of	 network	 connections	enabled	nearly	all	of	the	actors	to	access	some	degree	of	MERECP	knowledge	(94%).	This	 was	 followed	 with	 higher	 participation	 levels	 and	 a	 greater	 likelihood	 of	receiving	a	loan	(32%),	especially	as	CBO	member	(80%).		
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	Network	4	was	 substantially	 smaller	 than	 all	 the	 other	 networks	with	 respondents	only	coming	from	one	village.		With	fewer	people	to	share	with,	and	a	greater	chance	of	 interviewing	 a	 participant,	 the	 percentage	 of	 loan-takers	 was	 the	 highest.	Nevertheless,	access	to	MERECP	information	was	the	lowest,	unexpectedly	so,	given	the	 likelihood	 that	 more	 actors	 will	 connect	 to	 a	 higher	 proportion	 of	 others	 in	 a	smaller	network.	Considering	the	size	and	structure	of	the	four	sampled	networks	were	very	different,	all	possessed	relatively	low	density	and	centralisation	measures	(Table	18).	This	was	due	 to	 the	 study	 design	 where	 snowball	 sampling	 was	 used	 to	 identify	 an	 ego-network	and	alters	were	not	asked	 if	 the	 relationship	was	reciprocated	 (lower	out-degree).	Comparatively,	network	1	was	the	most	centralised,	possessing	the	highest	in-degree	 (information	moving	 through	 fewer	 actors),	 yet	 exhibited	 features	of	 low	network	 cohesion.	 More	 than	 a	 quarter	 of	 the	 network	 received	 no	 information	surrounding	MERECP	(26.2%),	with	a	tendency	to	form	groups	(higher	betweenness	centrality).	 In	 contrast,	 network	 3	 was	 the	 most	 cohesive	 obtaining	 the	 highest	number	 of	 relational	 ties	with	 lower	betwenness	 centrality	 figures	 to	 network	2	 of	equal	size.	Nevertheless,	network	2	still	displayed	relatively	high	levels	of	structural	unity	achieving	the	second	highest	level	of	knowledge	dissemination.					
Table 17. Summary of network participation levels 
Network 
No of 
Respondents 
Respondents 
who were 
CBO 
Members (%) 
Respondents 
Participating 
(%) 
Respondents 
Accessing 
Information 
(%) 
CBO Members 
Participating 
(%) 
1 47 53 26 64 48 
2 35 51 26 69 50 
3 34 29 32 94 80 
4 16 56 38 63 67 
Note: CBO participation levels are calculated according to the number of CBO members 
interviewed, not quoted in focus group discussion 
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Table	18.	Summary	of	cohesion	measures	at	the	whole	network	scale	
	 1	
	(n=61)	
2	
(n	=	54)	
3	
(n=54)		
4	
(n=24)		
Number	of	ties		 87	 83	 95	 32	
Density	(d)	 0.02	 0.03	 0.03	 0.06	
In-degree	(%)	 33.17	 29.7	 29.7	 30.25	
Out-degree	(%)	 6.10	 7.00	 6.2	 16.64	
WholeNetwork	
Betweenness	(%)	 3.35	 2.91	 1.76	 6.61	
Isolated	Actors	 16	 10	 2	 6	
Note:	Statistics	run	on	data	with	isolated	nodes.		Of	the	ties	established,	nearly	a	quarter	(if	not	more)	were	based	on	the	general	terms	and	 conditions	 of	 the	 CRF	 (Fig.	 26).	 Across	 all	 four	 networks	 there	 was	 a	 good	understanding	 of	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 loan,	 or	 references	 to	 other	 on-farm	diversification	 efforts,	 as	 numerous	 information	 exchanges	 were	 built	 upon	knowledge	 surrounding	 market	 access,	 technology	 choice	 and	 other	 income	generating	activities.	For	 communities	 that	 invested	 in	mix-breed	cattle	and	biogas,	the	 reference	 to	 animal	 and	 land	 management	 knowledge	 was	 more	 substantial	(Network	 3	 &	 4).	 Overall,	 the	 percentage	 of	 information	 shared	 surrounding	MERECP’s	overarching	aims	and	objectives,	those	of	conservation	and	climate	change,	were	low.			Grouped	 according	 to	 management	 level,	 Table	 19	 provides	 a	 detailed	 list	 of	 the	actors	 involved	 in	MERECP	 information	 networks.	With	 no	 formal	 association	with	the	 programme,	 extension	 officers	 belonging	 to	 the	 National	 Agricultural	 Advisory	Services	 (NAADs)	 were	 common	 knowledge	 mediators	 throughout	 all	 networks.	Similar	government	or	private	led	agricultural	and	development	programmes	played	a	particularly	dominant	role	in	network	3,	whereas	actors	in	political	positions	were	mainly	void.	Brought	in	to	help	implement	and	monitor	the	programme,	district	staff	and	the	Uganda	Wildlife	Authority	assisted	MERECP	information	flows	throughout	all	of	the	networks.		
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Actor	Centrality			Amongst	 the	 different	 actors,	 trained	 CBO	members	 remained	 the	most	 prominent	brokers	in	disseminating	MERECP	knowledge.	Establishing	more	relational	ties	with	supporting	organisations,	they	sat	in	close	proximity	to	these	actors	within	network	configurations	 (Fig.	 27,	 28,	 29	 and	 30)	 and	 obtained	 higher	 betweeness	 centrality	values	 (Table	 20).	 Consequently,	 with	 greater	 access	 to	 vital	 knowledge	 these	members	 exercised	 the	 greatest	 control,	 occupying	 core	 positions	 and	 acquiring	higher	eigenvector	centrality	values	(as	indicated	by	larger	node	size).		Confirmed	in	each	 of	 the	 networks	 using	 a	 two-sampled	 t-test,	 actors	 with	 a	 high	 eigenvector	centrality	were	also	 significantly	more	 likely	 to	obtain	a	 loan	 (p	>0.01;	participants	shown	in	dark	purple	in	sociograms).				
Figure	26.	Composition	of	knowledge	exchanged	in	MERECP	information	ties		
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Figure	 27.	 Network	 one	 MERECP-information	 sociogram.	 The	 size	 of	 each	 node	 correlates	 with	 Eigenvector	centrality	 for	 each	 actor	 (larger	 nodes	 re@lecting	 higher	 centrality).	 Arrows	 indicate	 directional	 relation	 with	thickness	 representing	 the	 relative	 degree	 of	 information	 exchange.	 Nodes	 in	 dark	 purple	 are	 loan-takers.	 The	shape	of	the	node	indicates	the	type	of	actor	(refer	to	Table	19	for	more	information	about	actor	type).		
Small-holder	Farmer																															Local	Council	(village)																																																	Private	Developer		CBO	Member																																														Sub-County	Council/Government																											Religious	AfFiliation																																	NGO		Executive	CBO																																												District	Government																																																				National	Government				
Actor	Key			
Figure	28.	Network	two	MERECP-information	sociogram.	The	size	of	each	node	correlates	with	Eigenvector	centrality	for	each	actor	(larger	nodes	re@lecting	higher	centrality).	Arrows	indicate	directional	relation	with	thickness	representing	the	relative	degree	of	information	exchange.	Nodes	in	dark	purple	are	loan-takers.	The	shape	of	the	node	indicates	the	type	of	actor	(refer	to	Table	19	for	more	information	about	actor	type)	
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Table	19.	Type	of	actors/organisations	linked	to	MERECP	information	networks,	grouped	by	management	level	
	 	 Network		 	 	
Actor	Typology		 1		(16)	
2	
(13)	
3	
(15)	
4	
(12)	
Village	
Small-Scale	Farmer	Ordinary	CBO	Member	Executive	CBO	Member	 Small-Scale	Farmer	Ordinary	CBO	Member	Executive	CBO	Member	 Small-Scale	Farmer	Ordinary	CBO	Member	Executive	CBO	Member	 Small-Scale	Farmer	Ordinary	CBO	Member	Executive	CBO	Member	
Local	Council	
(Village	and	Parish)	
LC1	LC2	 LC1	LC2	 LC1	 LC1	
Sub-County	Council	
LC3	Sub-County	Chief		 LC3	Sub-County	Chief		 Agricultural	Extension	Officer		 LC3	NAADs	
District	
Government	
Community	Development	Officer	District	Natural	Resource	Officer	Environment	Officer	Forest	Officer	NAADs	
	NAADs	Environment	Officer		
Agricultural	Extension	Officer	District	Natural	Resource	Officer	Veterinary	Officer	KADLACC	KACODA	NAADs	Forest	Officer	
Natural	District	Resource	Officer	Agricultural	Officer		District	Internal	Security	Officer		Community	Development	Officer		
Private	
Developer/Business	
	 Bagishu	Co-operative	Union		 KAWACOM		 	
Faith-Based	
Organisation	
Reverend	 	 Reverend	 	
NGO	
Mount	Elgon	Regional	Eco-system	Conservation	Porgramme	(MERECP)		
Mt.	Elgon	Conservation	and	Development	Project	(MECDP)	Mount	Elgon	Regional	Eco-system	Conservation	Programme	(MERECP)	
Mount	Elgon	Regional	Eco-system	Conservation	Programme	(MERECP)	 Mount	Elgon	Regional	Eco-system	Conservation	Programme	(MERECP)	
National	
Government	
Member	of	Parliament	(LC5)	Uganda	Wildlife	Authority	(UWA)	 Uganda	Wildlife	Authority	(UWA)	 Uganda	Wildlife	Authority	(UWA)	 Uganda	Wildlife	Authority	(UWA)	
Note:	There	may	be	more	than	one	actor	listed	under	the	same	title,	some	of	which	work	at	different	governance	levels	
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Figure	 29.	 Network	 three	 MERECP-information	 sociogram.	 The	 size	 of	 each	 node	 correlates	 with	 Eigenvector	centrality	for	each	actor	(larger	nodes	re@lecting	higher	centrality).	Arrows	indicate	directional	relation	with	thickness	representing	the	relative	degree	of	information	exchange.	Nodes	in	dark	purple	are	loan-takers.	The	shape	of	the	node	indicates	the	type	of	actor	(refer	to	Table	19	for	more	information	about	actor	type)	
Figure	30.	Network	four	MERECP-information	sociogram.	The	size	of	each	node	correlates	with	Eigenvector	centrality	for	each	actor	(larger	nodes	reAlecting	higher	centrality).	Arrows	indicate	directional	relation	with	thickness	representing	the	relative	degree	of	information	exchange.	Nodes	in	dark	purple	are	loan-takers.	The	shape	of	the	node	indicates	the	type	of	actor	(refer	to	Table	19	for	more	information	about	actor	type)		
Small-holder	Farmer																															Local	Council	(village)																																																	Private	Developer		CBO	Member																																														Sub-County	Council/Government																											Religious	AfFiliation																																	NGO		Executive	CBO																																												District	Government																																																				National	Government				
Actor	Key			
133		
Local	politicians	also	 featured	 in	all	of	 the	networks,	especially	network	one,	where	they	 took	 on	 executive	 positions.	 Managing	 to	 uphold	 their	 pre-existing	 roles	 of	authority,	 these	politicians	created	one	of	the	most	centralised	networks,	where	the	majority	of	MERECP	information	was	channelled	through	them.		
Table	20.	The	top	three	betweenness	and	eigenvector	centrality	actors	and	their	relative	wealth	ranking	in	each	perspective	network.	
Rank	 Type	of	
Actor	
Relative	
Wealth	
Betweenness	
Centrality	
Type	of	Actor	 Relative	
Wealth	
Eigenvector	
	 	 	 Network	1	 	 	 	
1	 Sub-County	Chief/	Executive	Member	 Very	Rich	 3.44	
Sub-County	Chief/	Executive	Member	 Very	Rich	 65.29	
2	 Executive	Member	 Rich	 1.99	 Executive	Member	 Rich	 51.32	
3	 LC3/Executive	Member		 Rich	 1.74	 LC3/Executive	Member		 Very	Rich	 49.84	
	 	 	 Network	2	 	 	 	
1	 Sub-County	Council/	Executive	Member	
Rich	 3.00	 Sub-County	Council/	Executive	Member	 Rich	 62.68	
2	 Extension/	Farmer	 Very	Rich	 1.29	 Executive	Member	 Poor	 53.41	
3	 Executive	Member		 Poor	 1.14	 Executive	member		 Poor	 49.96	
	 	 	 Network	3	 	 	 	
1	 Executive	Member	 Rich	 1.82	 Executive	Member	 Rich	 60.31	
2	 Executive	Member	 Very	Rich	 0.77	 MERECP	Personal	 N/A	 44.67	
3	 Executive	Member	 Rich	 0.74	 Executive	Member	 Rich	 43.33	
	 	 	 Network	4	 	 	 	
1	 Executive	Member	 Rich	 6.62	 Executive	Member	 Rich	 74.21	
2	 Executive	Member	 Poor	 0.30	 Executive	Member	 Poor	 48.18	
3	 -	 -	 -	 Executive	Member	 Rich	 43.31	
Note:	Normalised	betweenness	and	eigenvector	centrality	values	reported.		Sample	Size	
too	small	to	run	statistical	test	on	wealth	and	centrality		Broken	 down	 according	 to	 membership,	 the	 ANOVA	 model	 of	 homophily	 further	reveals	that	within	network	1	there	were	no	relational	ties	established	amongst	non-members	 and	 comparatively	 lower	 amount	 between	 members	 (Table	 21).	 In	comparison,	 network	 3	 had	 the	 highest	 proportion	 of	 non-member	 information	
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acquisition,	in	what	was	overall	a	fairly	dense	network	and	one	exclusively	governed	by	 smallholder	 farmers.	 Most	 notable	 were	 the	 relationships	 between	 community	members	and	umbrella	organisations/extension	officers.	 It	was	the	only	network	 in	which	 a	 MERECP	 representative	 was	 directly	 ranked	 amongst	 the	 top	 three	 most	influential	 actors	and	one	 in	which	external	personal	 founded	strong	 relational	 ties	both	with	members	 and	 non-members.	 This	 network	 confirms	 hypothesis	 1	 and	 3	that	 infers	 that	 dense	 networks,	 with	 between	 groups	 sharing	 resulting	 in	 more	participation.		
	Following	 a	 snowball	 sampling	 design,	 relatively	 few	 actors	 belonging	 to	 the	 ‘very	poor’	 wealth	 catogery	 featured	 in	 MERECP	 information	 networks.	 Exposing	 either	their	low	densities	within	communities	or	their	lack	of	access	to	the	programme,	not	a	single	beneficery	came	from	this	wealth	class	(Fig	31	&	32).	In	absolute	terms,	of	the	interviewed	 respondents	 roughly	42%	of	participants	 came	 from	 ‘poor’	households	and	45%	 from	 ‘rich.’	However,	 as	 a	 proportion	 of	 the	 total	 number	 of	 respondents	sampled	 in	 each	 perspective	 wealth	 class,	 richer	 actors	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 have	gained	 acces	 to	 a	 loan	 than	 the	 poor	 (Fig	 31).	 	 None	 of	 the	 sampled	 population	 in	network	four	belonged	to	the	very	rich	category,	hence	not	accessing	any	loans.	Of	the	members	 interviewed	 in	 network	 3,	 the	 ‘very	 rich’	 and	 ‘rich’	 also	 showed	 a	 high	
Table	21.	Differences	in	group	tie	density	according	to	non-members,	members	and	external	organisations		
Network	
	 Non-
Member
s	
Members	 External	Organisations	
Adj	R-
Square	 P-Value	
1	 Non-members	 0	 6.8	 3.8	 0.34	 <0.02	
	 Members	 0.9	 8.2	 9.4	
2	
Non-
Members	 2.9	 2.6	 1.3	 0.060	 <0.00	
Members	 1.3	 14.1	 11.7	
3	
Non-
Members	 2.1	 5.4	 5.9	 0.052	 <0.00	
Members	 0.30	 9.0	 17.3	 	 	
4	
Non-
Members	 0	 11.1	 0	 0.141	 <0.00	
Members	 0	 13.9	 31.7	
Note	:Organisation–Organisation	relational	ties	were	not	identified	in	the	network	
design	used	in	this	study.	
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likelihood	 of	 recieivng	 a	 loan.	 A	 similar	 pattern	 emerged	 in	 network	 1,	 with	more	favouritism	 towards	 richer	 farmers.	 Lastly,	 when	 comparing	 the	 percentage	 of	participants	 coming	 from	 each	 wealth	 ranking	 to	 the	 corresponding	 number	 of	households	belonging	to	that	wealth	catogery,	it	becomes	even	more	evident	that	the	‘rich’	and	‘very	rich’	are	in	a	much	better	position	to	acces	a	loan	than	the	poor	(Fig	32).	Supporting	hypothesis	two,	the	elite	are	dominating	CRF.	Nevertheless,	since	the	majority	 of	 households	 are	 considered	 ‘poor,’	 relatively	 speaking,	 this	wealth	 class	have	gained	from	the	MERECP	programme.																		
Figure	31.	The	percentage	of	 	respondents	that	received	MERECP	CRF	loans	as	a	proportion	of	 the	 total	number	of	 respondents	 interviewed	within	 their	relative	wealth	class	in	each	of	the	networks.	
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		At	the	end	of	each	interview	respondents	were	asked	for	their	opinions	about	benefit-sharing	mechanisms	(Fig	33)	and	for	management	recommendations	that	would	help	their	implementation	and	use	(Fig	34).		A	majority	agreed	that	distributing	finances	to	the	community	 level	was	the	best	(59.	8%)	and	cash	payments	were	prefered	(65.5	%).	It	was	acknowledge	that	the	terms	and	conditions	of	the	CRF	were	complex	and	would	 benefit	 from	 recieivng	 technical	 training	 and	 increased	 minitoring	 and	evaluation	 (Fig	 34).	 Left	 freely	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 questions,	 community	 members,	however,	 did	 not	 vocalise	 dissatisifaction	 about	 goverance	 and	 participation	dynamics.					
Figure	32.	Mean	percentage	of	sampled	respondents	that	received	MERECP	CRF	loans	in	comparison	with	mean	respondent	that	received	loans	in	the	wider	population	according	to	relative	wealth	ranking	
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Figure	33.	Household	perceptions	on	future	bene2it-sharing	mechanisms		
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Figure	34.	Collated	MERECP	CRF	management	recommendations	as	a	percentage	from	household	interviews	
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Discussion		 		Like	the	findings	of	this	study,	the	literature	is	full	of	diverse	accounts	of	how	social	networks	 influence	 development	 outcomes.	 Apart	 from	 confirming	 how	 variable	socio-ecological	 systems	 can	 be	 at	 the	 fine-scale,	 the	 outcomes	 uncovered	 here	reiterate	 that	 there	 are	 no	 idealised	 network	 structures	 that	 result	 in	 ‘good	governance’	 (Alexander,	 Armitage	 and	 Charles,	 2015;	 Crowe,	 2007)	 but	 perhaps	consistent	features	within	the	Sub-Saharan	context	can	yield	more	desirable	effects.		The	first	aspect	of	which	is	that	knowledge	dissemination	is	central	in	achieving	more	successful	forms	of	decentralisation	(Khatun	et	al.,	2015)	and	in	keeping	with	earlier	research	 (including	 the	 tested	hypotheses)	 that	 a	 combination	of	 bonding,	 bridging	(between	group)	 and	 cross-scale	 links	 facilitate	 fluent	 information	 flows	 (Cooper	&	Wheeler	 2015;	 Crowe	 2007;	 Baynes	 et	 al.	 2015;	 Jeha	 et	 al.	 Chapter	 3;	 Pretty	 et	 al	2011).	 Under	 this	 structure,	 intra-community	 ties	 (particularly	 amongst	 non-members)	 represent	 strong	 social	 relationships	 as	 network	 2	 and	 3	 show,	 can	transcribe	 into	 the	broader	acquisition	of	knowledge.	Cross-scale	 ties	 then	have	the	ability	to	strengthen	these	interactions	(Baynes	et	al.,	2015;	Olsson	and	Folke,	2001),	providing	a	safety	net	of	information	sharing	when	CBO	members	fail	to	do	so.	
Empowerment?	Or	Another	Token	of	Participation?			Following	 years	 of	 contradictory	 management	 regimes,	 some	 promoting	encroachment	 of	 the	 park	 whilst	 others	 used	 coercive	 means	 to	 prevent	 it,	 the	sentiments	from	Mt.	Elgon	re-emphasise	that	communicating	a	clear	and	convincing	conservation	storyline	is	fundamental	in	bringing	about	change	(Folke,	Hahn,	Olsson	and	Norberg,	2005).	In	the	face	of	distrust	towards	the	Ugandan	government,	who	by	and	large	are	still	seen	as	corrupt,	violent	and	trying	to	steal	land,	reconciliation	with	local	communities	remains	sensitive	and	one	that	should	be	treated	with	care.	Indeed,	one	of	the	marked	differences	between	network	3,	and	those	with	much	poorer	levels	of	 knowledge	 dissemination,	 was	 the	 relationships	 established	 between	 external	organisations	and	smallholder	farmers.	Not	only	were	these	assembled	at	all	levels	of	network,	 signifying	 a	 strong	 level	 of	 community	 outreach,	 there	 were	 numerous	different	 agri-ecological	 and	 government	 personnel	 relaying	 coherent	 messages	 of	conservation.	Bearing	testament	to	over	twenty	years	of	continuous	sensitisation,	in	
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some	cases	with	 the	 same	people,	positive	 co-management	 regimes	have	 started	 to	emerge.	Indicated	by	the	high	quality	of	forest	cover	bordering	this	networks	villages,	negotiated	compromises	from	these	longstanding	partnerships	has	seen	community	3	(and	their	neighbours)	sign	and	adhere	to	the	most	resource	agreements	with	UWA	(Nakakaawa	et	al.,	2015).		Coupled	with	a	stronger	MERECP	presence	(as	reflected	through	their	high	centrality	ranking),	akin	to	the	communities	that	were	better	 facilitated	by	the	project	staff	 in	the	 Socio-Bosque	 Program,	 Ecuador	 (Krause,	 Collen	 and	 Nicholas,	 2013),	 directly	sourcing	 information	 from	 an	 NGO	 lead	 to	 more	 transparent,	 better	 quality	information	 exchanges	 that	 enhanced	 the	 innovation	 and	 adaptability	 of	 the	 group.	Confirming	 hypothesis	 1	 and	 3,	 this	 point	 is	 illustrated	 in	 network	 3	 through	 a)	 a	better	understanding	and	consequent	use	of	the	CRF	and	b)	the	adoption	of	a	broader	range	 of	 conservation	 technologies.	 In	 this	 instance,	 useful	 MERECP	 collaborations	included	 repeated	 field-visits,	 a	 biogas	 demonstration	 and	 executive	 members	participating	in	a	higher	number	of	meetings	and	trainings.		Exhibited	through	the	high	number	of	within	and	between	group	ties,	the	foundation	of	 this	 collective	 action	 was	 the	 strong	 level	 of	 inter-community	 co-operation.	Community	3	showed	a	greater	ability	to	work	across	different	sects	in	what	appears	to	be	a	more	inclusive	and	deliberative	approach	in	implementing	their	CRF.	In	two-way	 progression,	 the	 long-term	 partnerships	 with	 external	 organisations	 provided	the	 environment	 for	 these	 elements	 of	 community	 cohesion	 to	 develop,	 yet	simultaneously	 acted	 as	 an	 arena	 to	 rebuild	 levels	 of	 trust	 with	 higher	 order	management.	 Together	 these	 dimensions	 have	 improved	 the	willingness	 to	 engage	and	 initiative	 taken	 by	 farmers,	 one	 of	 the	 most	 central	 factors	 in	 driving	participation	 (Méndez-López	et	 al.,	 2014).	An	example	 that	 typifies	 the	groups	 self-motivation	is	when	the	CBO	members,	using	CRF	cash	and	a	forest	avoidance	reward,	actively	approached	HIEFER	International	to	support	further	bio-gas	installations.		For	most	of	the	other	communities	studied,	conflicting	messages	from	uncooperative	politicians,	 on-going	 disputes	 over	 park	 boundaries	 and	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 district	government	in	providing	adequate	support	has	halted	this	level	of	progress.	With	the	opportunity	 to	 sit	 in	 on	 a	 workshop	 held	 by	 a	 different	 NGO,	 the	 reality	 of	 the	
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tokenistic	 participation	 came	 to	 light.	 A	 communication	 barrier	 during	 the	 session	meant	that	community	voices	were	lost	and	limited	to	a	one-way	flow	of	information.	When	 the	 community	 were	 asked	 who	 would	 volunteer	 to	 plant	 trees	 no	 one	accepted.	Instead	they	stressed	that	they	were	limited	by	land,	even	requiring	more	from	the	park	to	survive.	Having	been	promised	incentives	throughout,	in	addition	to	the	small	allowances	given	to	attend	meetings,	a	member	then	immediately	inquired	about	 compensation.	 The	 LC3	 and	 environment	 officer	 who	 were	 facilitating	 the	translations	 then	 refused	 to	 relay	 the	 communities	 concerns	 back	 to	 the	 NGO,	proceeding	with	participatory	mapping	exercises	that	failed	to	engage	the	majority	of	attendees.	 Whilst	 aiming	 for	 a	 more	 consultative	 process,	 the	 whole	 interaction	remained	 instrumental	 with	 communities	 being	 told	 to	 develop	 action	 plans	 and	implement	eco-agri	technologies	with	no	real	desire	to	do	so.		With	this	experience,	the	fact	that	community	1	had	the	second	biggest	network	(both	in	 terms	 of	 number	 of	 ties	 and	 actors),	 yet	 the	most	 centralised	 network,	 suggests	that	the	extensive	MERECP	knowledge	dissemination	is	a	product	of	these	big	group	style	 meetings	 as	 oppose	 to	 proactive	 group	 proceedings.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 true	willingness	or	a	course	of	action	where	citizen	control	can	take	place-which	requires	a	growing	level	of	inclusion,	consciousness,	solidarity	and	good	leadership	-	authentic	participation	is	unlikely	to	follow.	As	network	3	case	study	proves,	the	motivations	of	stakeholders	are	not	only	founded	on	the	just	distribution	of	benefits	but	a	feeling	of	empowerment	 over	 the	 decisions	 that	 affect	 their	 lives.	 Void	 of	 this	 level	 of	participation,	 financial	 gains	 start	 to	 crowd	 out	 intrinsic	motivations	 (Atela,	 Quinn,	Minang	and	Duguma,	2015).	Undeniably,	compensating	poorer	communities	for	their	time	and	effort	 is	crucial	 in	giving	them	the	flexibility	to	adapt	(Baynes	et	al.,	2015)	however,	 the	 lack	 of	 information	 exchanges	 centred	 on	 the	 principles	 of	 climate	change	and	conservation	reminds	us	these	core	values	are	being	lost.		Having	invited	district	staff	to	several	regional	meetings,	requested	their	input	on	the	selection	of	CBOs,	then	provided	them	with	the	financial	support	to	carry	out	detailed	monitoring	 and	 evaluation	 tasks,	 MERECP	 did	 invest	 in	 building	 inclusive	relationships	at	 this	 level.	The	problem	is	whether	 they	did	so	 in	 the	most	effective	capacity.	 The	 aforementioned	 findings	 have	 already	 validated	 the	 need	 to	 include	government	 institutions	 in	 the	 operations	 of	 NGOs,	 not	 least	 because	 they	 need	 to	
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recognise	and	support	the	programmes	agenda	(Atela	et	al.,	2015),	reinforce	external	accountability	 (Agrawal	 and	 Goyal,	 2001;	 Labonne	 and	 Chase,	 2009)	 and	 add	legitimacy	to	the	process	(Mbeche	and	Dorward,	2014).	The	fact	 is	that	districts	are	underfunded	 by	 central	 government.	 Staff	 still	 require	 vehicles	 to	 reach	 remote	villages,	 better	 equipment	 to	 document	 their	 work	 and	 more	 human	 resources	 to	meet	their	objectives	(Namara,	2015).		
“As	an	office	we	are	having	a	problem	of	not	being	able	 to	move,	 so	we	are	not	
really	 capable	 of	 doing	 the	 routine	 monitoring	 that	 we	 are	 supposed	 to	 do.”	
Environment	Officer,	Network	2,	November	2013.	More	often	than	not,	instead	of	investing	in	these	aspects	of	development,	NGO’s	host	expensive	workshops	where	 personnel	 are	 presented	with	 responsibilities	 and	 left	little	 decision-making	 power.	 Much	 like	 the	 grassroots	 level,	 district	 level	management	 need	 to	 be	 won	 over	 by	 the	 intentions	 of	 the	 project,	 building	longstanding	partnerships	with	NGO’s	they	are	working	for.		
Piecing	Together	Participation	Dynamics				So	far	constructing	MERECP	information	networks	has	given	us	some	useful	insights	into	 governance	 structures,	 however,	 by	 no	 means	 provided	 us	 with	 concrete	evidence	 in	 understanding	 participation	 dynamics.	 In	 practise,	 the	 management	 of	finance	 remains	 a	 sensitive	 topic	 in	 Uganda	 and	 one	 that	 is	 hindering	 the	development	of	micro-credit	programmes	 throughout	 the	country	(FAO,	2005).	The	account	from	Mt.	Elgon	appears	no	different.	Contrary	to	the	information	supplied	by	executive	members,	in	every	community,	at	least	one	interviewee	claimed	that	loans	were	 no	 longer	 being	 offered	 or	 in	 fact	were	 never	made	 available.	 Instead	 it	 was	implied	 that	 these	 funds	were	shared	amongst	group	members	or	hijacked	by	 local	politicians.		
	“I	understand	that	they	go	on	writing	names	close	to	500,	yet	in	reality	there	are	
below	11	 in	 the	group	and	 they	keep	 showing	 that	 these	are	 the	people	we	are	
with.	 It	 is	 not	 good.’’	 	 Household	 interviewee	 twenty-four,	 network	 3,	 October	
2013.	
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“They	were	17	members,	combined	with	the	ladies	this	totalled	to	22,	of	these	only	
10	 people	 benefited	 from	 the	 19.6	 millions.”	 Household	 interviewee	 sixteen,	
network	3,	October	2013.			Being	 documented	 with	 the	 case	 of	 NAADs	 in	 Kigando	 (Berman	 et	 al	 2014),	 after	years	 of	 civil	 unrest	 in	 Uganda,	 it	 is	 not	 uncommon	 to	 see	 such	mistrust	 amongst	anyone	 beyond	 close	 family	 connections	 (Auren	 and	 Krassowska,	 2004).	 Although	relational	 ties	 were	 not	 mapped	 between	 participants	 (a	 future	 improvement),	evidence	 of	 such	 nepotism	 did	 surface	 during	 the	 snowball	 sampling.	 The	 most	prominent	form	of	which	was	the	sharing	of	 loans	with	the	wives	of	dominant	male	members.	In	 conjunction	 with	 these	 observations,	 in	 network	 3,	 household	 figures	 point	towards	 high	 participation	 in	 what	 is	 a	 closed	 group.	 So	 as	 MERECP	 information	spread	 extensively,	 access	 to	 credit	 did	 not,	 advocating	 more	 of	 core-periphery	structure	 in	 the	 management	 of	 finances	 where	 richer	 landowners	 dominate.	Certainly	the	bonding	ties,	consensus	and	collective	action	displayed	in	this	network	are	more	 characteristic	of	 centralised	networks	 (García-Amado	et	 al.,	 2012).	As	 too	are	 the	 levels	 of	 exclusion	 (Ernstson,	 Sörlin	 and	 Elmqvist,	 2008)	 and	 rivalries	 that	erupted.	Interviews	revealed	that	after	two	members	failed	to	reinvest,	the	remaining	associates	dismissed	them	from	the	group	and	the	remainder	are	now	seeking	 legal	assistance	 to	 retrieve	 their	 assets.	 Typically,	 in	 groups	 that	 possess	 such	 a	 strong	social	 identity,	 i.e.	 one	 in	which	everyone	 shares	 a	minimum	set	of	 common	values	and	trustworthiness	(van	Staveren	and	Knorringa,	2007),	a	level	of	favouritism	can	a)	lead	to	certain	members	enjoying	more	benefits	at	the	expense	of	the	community	and	b)	 	when	broken	can	result	 in	this	type	of	disagreement.	Under	these	circumstances	the	 improvement	 in	well-being	of	a	 few	individuals	has	had	harmful	effect	on	social	cohesion.	 Often	 forgotten	 in	 the	 scope	 of	 policy	 designs,	 detrimental	 impacts	 from	interventions	 can	 occur	 and	 as	 an	 evaluation	 of	 136	 projects	 found,	 social	 and	economic	 win-wins	 are	 not	 common	 in	 community-based	 conservation	 (Brooks,	2016).	 Nevertheless,	 akin	 to	 the	 conclusions	 in	 the	 Sierra	 Morena	 case	 study	 in	Mexico,	 the	 inequalities	 and	 disputes	 witnessed	 amongst	 this	 group	 have	 not	hampered	positive	natural	resource-management	(García-Amado	et	al.,	2012).		
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In	addition	to	the	bias	in	the	distribution	of	funds,	executive	members	were	not	shy	in	revealing	 that	 loan	 defaulters	 were	 limiting	 the	 access	 of	 funds.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	downward	accountability,	weak	prosecution	bodies	and	loan-takers	being	close	ties,	handling	repayments	was	named	as	one	of	the	most	challenging	aspects	of	dealing	the	CRF,	 especially	 when	 communities	 are	 accustomed	 to	 hand-outs	 and	 those	 with	authority	are	giving	conflicting	messages.		
	“They	told	us	to	use	court	of	law	and	police	when	they	saw	a	list	of	defaulters	that	
had	 signed	 agreements	 but	 we	 feel	 some	 shame	 to	 use	 police	 to	 attack	 our	
members.”	Interview	twenty	two,	Network	1,	November	2013.		Fundamentally,	 the	 experience	 of	 financial	 decentralisation	 is	 novel	 to	 most	grassroots	organisations	 (Dewan,	Buisson	and	Mukherji,	2014).	 In	projects	haste	 to	distribute	 funds,	 mainly	 to	 avoid	 past	 experiences	 of	 misappropriation,	 neither	executives	 nor	 district	 personnel	 were	 adequately	 prepared	 for	 their	 upkeep.	Understandably,	asking	government	officials	 to	 resolve	 internal	disputes	when	 they	do	 not	 hold	 power	 or	 trust	 in	 this	 situation	 would	 be	 difficult	 and	 explains	 their	reluctance	 to	 do	 so.	 Of	 the	 studied	 groups,	 the	 only	 executive	 to	 take	 firm	 action	against	defaulters	was	in	networks	3,	who	as	mentioned	above,	are	trying	to	take	loan	defaulters	 to	 court.	 Having	 the	 confidence	 to	 carry	 out	 such	 actions	 is	 a	 form	 of	empowerment	 necessary	 (Mbeche	 and	Dorward,	 2014),	 but	 not	 seen	by	 any	 of	 the	other	 groups.	 In	 this	 situation,	 developing	 the	 legal	 status	 and	 rights	 in	 the	constitutions	 under	 which	 executives	 function	 may	 increase	 their	 effectiveness	 in	managing	and	controlling	funds	(Armitage,	2005).	Like	in	Nepal,	(Gentle,	Acharya	and	Dahal,	2007)	accompanying	 this	with	public	hearings,	 audit	 sessions	and	 the	public	display	 of	 information	 may	 increase	 the	 transparency	 of	 the	 groups,	 making	 the	recovery	 of	 lost	 money	 easier	 (Chinangwa,	 Sinclair,	 Pullin	 and	 Hockley,	 2015).	Regardless	of	their	choices,	network	3	were	the	most	open	group,	making	the	biggest	effort	 to	 provide	 and	 share	 knowledge	 (Fig	 35)	 that	 has	 translated	 into	 expansive	information	 flows	 and	 tighter	 control	 of	 finances.	 Finally,	 insisting	 on	 a	 unified	bookkeeping	methodology,	and	providing	CBO’s	with	the	training	manuals,	resource	books	 and	 other	 materials	 to	 do	 so,	 may	 have	 led	 to	 a	 more	 standardised	administration	system.	
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Understanding	the	Small	Print:	How	do	the	Terms	and	Conditions	Affect	
Participation			In	 hindsight,	 the	 concept	 of	 using	micro-finance	 as	 a	 benefit-sharing	 scheme	 is	 not	necessarily	a	poor	one.	Communities	require	cash	flows	to	give	them	the	opportunity	to	 invest	 in	 income	 generating	 activities	 and	 diversify	 their	 livelihood	 strategies	accordingly	–	effects	that	have	been	more	accurately	documented	in	the	International	Crane	 Foundation	 Trickle	 Up	 Programme	 in	 the	 Caohai	 Nature	 Reserve	 China	(Herrold-Menzies,	2006).	Some	of	its	limitations,	however,	are	in	its	design	that	fails	to	 account	 for	 local	 realities.	 In	 Uganda	 strong	 hierarchical	 governance	 structures	typically	 impede	 full	 and	effective	participation.	Regardless	of	 their	 involvement,	 in	their	 fear	 of	 losing	 power	 and	 patronage	 benefits	 (Dutterer	 and	 Margerum,	 2015;	Mbeche	and	Dorward,	2014;	Pasiecznik,	Herman,	Campbell	and	MacQueen,	2015;	Van	Dam,	 2011),	 the	 political	 elite	 believe	 they	 should	 be	 compensated	 by	 external	interventions	 often	 leaving	 smallholder	 farmers	 with	 insignificant	 funds/inputs	 to	make	 meaningful	 changes.	 To	 avoid	 this	 common	 monopolisation,	 MERECP	
Figure	 35.	An	 example	 of	 a	 more	 transparent	 CBO,	 who	 openly	 displays	 their	aims,	objectives,	<inances	and	future	goals	in	a	public	area.			
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intentionally	channelled	funds	directly	to	CBOs.	Nonetheless,	amongst	their	efforts	to	resist	institutional	change,	the	political	elite	either	dominated	their	group	or	created	conflict.	 In	one	of	 the	case	studies	examined	 the	executive	members	were	 forced	 to	give	 a	 large	 sum	 of	 their	 CRF	 to	 their	 LC3	 and	 in	 another	 the	 Community	Development	 Officer	 refused	 to	 continue	 working	 in	 the	 area.	 With	 the	 ability	 to	override	 community	 preferences,	 similar	 to	 the	 community-driven	 development	projects	 in	 Indonesia	 (Fritzen,	 2007),	 in	 network	 1,	 the	 governance	 by	 political	leaders	 lead	the	most	 inequitable	distribution	of	both	knowledge	and	credit	despite	having	the	ability	to	attract	the	most	funding	from	environmental	NGO’s.	Considering	these	 insights,	 the	 findings	 presented	 here	mirror	 those	 found	 in	Mbarara,	 Uganda	where	wrangles	over	power	is	wearing	down	issues	of	trust,	exacerbating	community	divisions	and	discouraging	participation	(Cooper	and	Wheeler,	2015).			In	 many	 ways,	 by	 using	 executive	 CBO	 members	 to	 introduce	 and	 manage	 the	project’s	intentions,	MERECP	also	limited	participation	towards	the	end	of	the	project	(Atela	et	al.,	2015;	Mekuria,	2015).	Comparable	with	many	other	smallholder	farmer	groups	across	the	globe,	executives	typically	comprised	better-off	members	of	society	who	 owned	 more	 land,	 had	 a	 higher	 level	 of	 education	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 were	involved	in	other	leadership	positions	(Dewan,	Buisson	and	Mukherji,	2014).	Taking	into	consideration	skill-sets	required	 in	running	a	CRF,	 there	 is	no	doubt	 that	 these	members	are	more	capable	of	implementing	the	scheme.	Just	keeping	up	with	project	training	 that	 was	 conducted	 in	 English	 using	 elaborate	 language	 such	 as	‘accountability’	and	 ‘interest-rate,’	would	be	problematic	 for	most	 illiterate	 farmers.	Under	 this	 type	 of	 application,	 it	 is	 inevitable	 that	 power	 asymmetries	 will	 be	amplified	rather	than	evened	out.		Realistically,	 no	 network	 can	 be	 free	 from	 dominant	 leaders,	 yet	 in	 the	 absence	 of	prior	stakeholder	consultations,	as	promoted	 through	the	 ‘Free,	Prior	and	 Informed	Consent	(FPIC)’’	principle	in	international	agreements	and	safeguards	(Mahanty	and	McDermott,	2013),	 there	was	no	guarantee	 that	 the	CBO’s	selected	by	MERECP	and	local	governments	were	a)	the	ones	desired	by	the	community	as	a	whole	or	b)	those	who	 would	 promote	 participation	 (Krause,	 Collen	 and	 Nicholas,	 2013).	 Just	comparing	 and	 contrasting	 the	 findings	 from	 four	 of	 the	 studied	 CBO’s	 shows	 that	working	 with	 leaders	 who	 are	 willing	 to	 share	 rather	 than	 obstruct	 resource	 and	
146		
decision-making	 arenas	 is	 the	 key	 to	 breaking	 equity	 barriers	 (Namara,	 2015).	Communities	 did	 not	 rank	 participation	 or	 governance	 as	 a	 major	 hindrance	 to	project	development	but	 they	did	 recognise	 the	need	 to	monitor	and	evaluate	 their	actions.	The	attitude	observed	from	some	marginalised	farmers	is	that	leaders	should	be	key	participants,	holding	disproportionate	power	in	planning,	rule	formulating	and	decision-making.	Observed	 in	 other	 Sub-Sarahan	 contexts	 (Chinangwa	et	 al.,	 2015),	hierarchical	structures	are	therefore	grounded	and	valued	by	communities.		Parallel	to	other	PES	schemes	across	the	globe,	the	inability	of	smallholder	farmers	to	understand	the	terms	and	conditions	or	meet	 their	eligibility	requirements	has	 to	a	certain	 extent	 limited	 the	 success	 of	 the	 CRF	 (Fisher,	 2011;	 Kosoy,	 Corbera	 and	Brown,	2008).	As	advised	during	the	MERECP	training,	most	CBO’s	incorporated	asset	backing	 as	 a	 prerequisite	 to	 accessing	 a	 loan.	 Theoretically	 speaking,	 smallholders	would,	therefore,	need	to	provide	evidence	of	their	ownership	of	assets	equal	to	the	sum	of	their	desired	loan	thereby	making	it	almost	impossible	for	landless	and	poor	to	contract.	The	results	from	this	study	verify	these	restrictions	but	from	an	efficiency	standpoint	 (when	willing),	 the	 farmers	 participating	 from	 the	 ‘rich’	 and	 ‘very	 rich’	wealth	category	made	the	most	ecological	gains.	Since	the	amalgamation	of	Poverty	and	Environment	Network	(PEN)	data	also	show	that	poorer	households	are	not	the	main	drivers	of	deforestation,	targeting	the	poor	could	boil	down	to	ethics	rather	than	the	goal	of	reducing	carbon	losses.		On	occasions	some	participants	vocalised	the	difficulty	 in	repaying	loans	came	from	poor	 investments,	 the	 most	 cited	 problem	 being	 the	 failure	 of	 crops	 due	 to	unexpected	 weather	 events	 such	 as	 drought	 or	 heavy	 rainfall.	 Under	 the	 short	repayment	 timeframes	 (often	 set	 between	 three	 to	 twelve	 months),	 selecting	 an	appropriate	enterprise	can	be	tricky.	Some	returns	can	take	many	years,	for	example	tree	 planting	 exercises.	 These	 longer	 term	gains	 involve	 risk	 farmers	 cannot	 afford	both	in	terms	repayment	or	the	opportunity	costs	involved	in	doing	so	(Fisher,	2012).	When	non-participants	were	asked	what	limited	their	participation,	the	fear	of	taking	out	 a	 loan	 was	 often	 cited.	 In	 a	 landscape	 where	 poorer	 households	 are	 directly	dependant	on	natural	resources,	as	shown	in	the	previous	chapters,	large	insecurities	lie	 in	 changing	 livelihood	 strategies	 making	 them	 less	 reluctant	 to	 participate	(Lapeyre,	 Hartanto	 and	 Pirard,	 2015).	 Ultimately,	 even	 with	 the	 flexibility	 and	
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financial	 resources	 to	 choose	 the	most	 fitting	 technologies,	 the	majority	 of	 farmers	are	 obviously	 lacking	 the	 confidence,	 agricultural	 innovation	 and	 market	 linkages	required	in	creating	income	generating	enterprises	(Lamb	et	al.,	2015).		
Conclusion			In	 conclusion,	 this	 chapter	 has	 reviewed	 both	 the	 individualistic	 and	 community	interactions	that	have	moulded	CRF	participation	across	Mt.	Elgon,	Uganda.	Through	information	 networks,	 this	 analysis	 has	 identified	 that	 power	 symmetries	 are	restricting	 resource	 flows,	 as	 are	 capabilities	 of	 smallholders	 in	 accessing	 them.	Importantly,	the	narratives	uncovered	here	highlight	that	an	improvement	to	one	of	these	dimensions	does	not	necessarily	lend	itself	to	the	other.	In	the	absence	of	prior	stakeholder	consultation,	bypassing	hierarchal	governance	structures	and	financially	empowering	 a	 few	 individuals	 has	 created	 conflict	 and	 further	 animosity	 towards	conservation	interventions.	Aiming	to	work	with	democratically	elected	leaders,	who	have	intrinsic	supportive	values,	abilities	to	share	power	and	a	vision	to	propel	their	fellow	 members	 is	 central	 to	 dispersal	 of	 knowledge,	 decision-making	 and	 access	credit	(Krause,	Collen	and	Nicholas,	2013).		Following	 hostile	 involvements	 with	 the	 government,	 some	 of	 which	 are	 ongoing,	establishing	 trust	 is	 at	 the	 epicentre	 of	 motivating	 participation	 (Pasiecznik	 et	 al.,	2015).	 There	 are	 no	 shortcuts	 in	 rebuilding	meaningful	 relationships	 or	 in	 fact	 the	capacity	of	smallholder	 farmers	 in	adapting	to	decentralised	control	and	alternative	livelihoods.	 	 It	 requires	 resources	 and	 time	 that	 if	 used	 appropriately	NGO	budgets	could	 finance.	 The	 findings	 are,	 therefore,	 in	 line	 with	 the	 global	 analysis	 of	 160	terrestrial	 and	 marine	 Protected	 Areas,	 in	 that	 the	 best	 outcomes	 for	 both	conservation	 and	 equity	 are	 founded	 upon	 productive	 co-management	 regimes	(Oldekop,	Holmes,	Harris	and	Evans,	2015).	Achieving	a	fine	balance	of	autonomy,	yet	transferring	 the	 appropriate	 legal	 and	 correct	 technical	 knowledge	 (Dolisca	 et	 al.,	2006)	 is	 what	 is	 required	 to	 achieve	 these	 results.	 In	 hindsight,	 a	 CRF	 is	 not	necessarily	 a	 poor	 benefit-sharing	 scheme.	 Development	 practitioners	 just	 need	 to	devote	more	effort	into	ensuring	that	sufficient	and	the	effective	facilitation	is	given	so	these	schemes	can	become	self-governing.		
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Are	Community	Revolving	Funds	a	Sustainable	and	Equitable	
Method	of	Slicing	Conservation	Capital?	Insights	from	Mt.	Elgon	
Uganda.	
Major	Findings				Communities	neighbouring	the	single	protected	area	of	Mt.	Elgon	are	heterogeneous	(Lamb	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 They	 differ	 in	 their	 socio-economic	 conditions,	 governance	structures,	 livelihood	 strategies,	 levels	 of	 community	 cohesion	 and	 experiences	 of	conservation	interventions.	All	of	which	have	affected	the	capabilities	and	desires	of	local	 actors	 in	 participating	 and	 adapting	 to	 the	 alternative	 livelihood	 strategies	introduced	through	Integrated	Conservation	and	Development	Projects.		From	 an	 environmental	 viewpoint,	 the	 self-reported	 evaluation	 conducted	 here	indicates	that,	despite	twenty-five	years	of	intervention,	on-farm	habitat	degradation	surrounding	 the	national	park	has	persisted.	Exploration	of	 social	networks	reveals	that	similar	to	the	Sloping	Land	Conservation	Program	in	China	(He	and	Sikor,	2015),	the	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 surrounding	 sustainable	 agricultural	 production	 systems	 is	limiting	 their	 development,	 as	 too	 are	 the	 unsuitability	 of	 introduced	 technologies	that	fail	to	have	regard	to	the	cultural,	socio-economic	and	gender	variations	amongst	target	 populations	 (Lamb	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 In	 the	 context	 of	 extreme	 poverty,	 it	 is	 not	uncommon	 for	 communities	 to	 prioritise	 the	 development	 of	 non-cash	 needs,	 i.e	health,	 education	 and	 housing	 The	 diversity	 of	 mapped	 livelihood	 activities	 today	(particularly	 napier	 grass	 and	 zero-grazing)	 represents	 the	 fruitful	 changes	intervention	 projects	 have	 created.	 In	 communities	 where	 positive	 environmental	outcomes	 arose	 (both	 on-farm	 and	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 N.P.),	 trustworthiness	amongst	neighbours	and	partnerships	with	supporting	personnel	were	distinguishing	features.		In	 reality,	 past	 experiences	of	 colonial	 rule	 (Soini,	 2007)	 and	 coercive	 conservation	tactics	(Norgrove	and	Hulme,	2006)	continue	to	supress	the	appetite	to	engage	with	such	programmes.	This	 is	 reinforced	by	 the	 continual	 use	of	 top	down	approaches,	persistent	 political	 interference	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 tangible	 benefits	 materialising.	Overall,	 the	 introduction	 of	 incentive-based	 initiatives	 has	 not	 legitimised	
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decentralisation	over	the	parks	natural	resources	nor	has	it	worked	towards	settling	on-going	 boundary	 disputes	 (Petursson	 and	 Vedeld,	 2017).	 Comparable	 to	 the	scenario	 in	 the	Bukit-Bulit	 Raya	National	 Park	 in	Melawi	District	West	Kalimantan,	Indonesia	 (Myers,	 Ravikumar	 and	 Larson,	 2015),	 livelihood	 incentives	 alone	 have	failed	 to	 win	 over	 community	 consent	 over	 the	 park’s	 existence,	 where	 some	residents	 are	 still	 fighting	 for	 their	 claims	 to	 land.	 A	 review	 of	 the	 International	Forestry	Resources	and	Institutional	datasets	by	Pelletier,	Gélinas	&	Skutsch	(2016)	found	 rulemaking	 autonomy,	 local	 enforcement	 rules,	 well-defined	 property	 rights	and	 the	 design	 of	 effective	 institutional	 arrangements	 were	 fundamental	characteristics	 for	 sound	 community-based	 natural	 resource	 management.	 In	 the	present	study,	like	the	REDD+	process	in	Peru,	pouring	resources	into	creating	these	enabling	 conditions	may	be	a	necessary	precondition	despite	 their	high	 transaction	costs	(Dunlop	and	Corbera,	2016).		Tracking	the	MERECP	cash-revolving	fund	as	an	example,	the	analysis	in	chapter	five	highlights	how	different	dimensions	of	elite	capture	are	 further	restricting	resource	sharing	and	hindering	the	elements	of	procedural	equity	that	give	rural	 farmers	the	confidence	 to	 diversify	 their	 livelihoods	 accordingly.	 For	 the	 most	 part,	implementation	 of	 Vietnam’s	 payment	 for	 Forest	 Environmental	 Services	 program	(PFES)	 (Wong	 et	 al.,	 2016)	 and	 Zambia’s	 Administrative	 Management	 Design	 for	Game	 Management	 Areas	 (Gibson	 and	 Marks,	 1995)	 followed	 the	 same	 pattern,	where	 village	 heads	 who	 were	 given	 a	 large	 responsibility	 in	 running	 the	 scheme	made	 most	 of	 decisions	 on	 how	 to	 use	 and	 distribute	 revenues,	 favouring	 family	members.	Mainly	documented	through	unequal	forest	access	(Agarwal,	2001;	Thoms,	2008),	widening	disparities	between	 the	rich	and	 the	poor	due	 to	 the	devolution	of	power	has	been	documented	 in	 other	 forms	of	 decentralised	management	 (Luintel,	2016).	With	regards	to	the	forest	funds	in	Nepal,	like	this	study,	the	‘very	poor’	were	excluded	 both	 from	 decision-making	 process	 and	 from	 accessing	 credit	 (Pokharel,	2008).		In	 the	Mt.	Elgon	context,	 this	unequal	 sharing	of	money	has	gone	as	 far	as	 creating	disputes,	 further	 tarnishing	 conservation	 values	 rather	 than	 improving	 them.	Typically	amongst	leaders	and	local	governors	who	were	not	compensated	(a	form	of	resisting	 redistribution	 of	 power),	 without	 stressing	 the	 need	 for	 improved	
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participation	 in	the	programme,	communities	still	 favoured	the	distribution	method	employed	under	the	CRF	(i.e	one	that	targets	CBO’s	and	provides	cash	inputs).	Whilst	some	cases	of	resentment	were	reported,	 for	the	most	part	 it	would	seem	that	 local	conceptions	 of	 fairness	 that	 show	 respect	 for	 hierarchical	 governance	 systems	(referred	 to	 a	 ‘Kiganda’)	 are	 mismatched	 with	 external	 ones	 (Martin	 et	 al.,	 2014).	Known	 as	 achievement/status/power	 economic	 fairness	 principle	 (Le	 et	 al.,	 2016),	benefit-sharing	mechanisms	here	need	to	overcome	misappropriation	of	resources	by	sufficiently	 compensating	 the	 dominant	 elite	 so	 that	 they	 will	 continue	 to	 transfer	resources	to	the	most	marginalised,	albeit	in	a	smaller	capacity.	Acknowledging	these	local	 informal	 structures	 will	 help	 design	 an	 operational	 based	 system	 (Moeliono,	Pham,	Le	and	Brockhaus,	2016),	particularly	one	that	prioritises	trustworthy	leaders	(Diedrich	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 For	 instance,	 in	 Ghana,	 of	 the	 55%	 of	 rent	 paid	 by	 mining	companies,	20%	goes	to	local	communities,	20%	to	traditional	authorities	and	10%	in	administrative	fees	(Ministry	of	Finance	and	Economic	Planning,	2010).		Not	 forgetting	 that	wealthier	 individuals	dominated	MERECP	 information	 flows,	 the	snowball	 sampling	 methodology	 employed	 in	 this	 study	 is	 biased	 towards	 their	views.	Whilst	this	reflects	the	reality	of	how	benefit-sharing	is	unfolding	in	practice,	if	greater	 equality	 is	 the	 aim,	 further	 research	 into	 how	 the	 poor	 perceive	 notions	 of	fairness	is	required.	From	their	sites	in	Guinea-Bissau,	Mali	and	Senegal,	a	review	of	the	Kyoto	Think	Global,	Act	Local	carbon	project	found	that	offering	smallholders	as	little	as	10%	of	their	financial	returns	would	motivate	participation	(Skutsch	and	Ba,	2010),	 because	 it	 is	 the	 perception	 that	 they	 have	 received	 a	 just	 reward	 that	influences	 their	 behavior	 (Bennett,	 2016;	 Sikor	 and	 Hoàng,	 2016).	 Studies	 from	Rwanada	(Martin	et	al.,	2014)	and	Vietnam	(Le	et	al.,	2016)	have	highlighted	that	at	this	horizontal	 level,	 egalitarian	options	were	viewed	as	most	 the	 legitimate.	Again,	drawing	 from	 the	 PFES	 scheme,	 a	 combination	 of	 different	 payment	 distribution	models	can	be	 introduced	to	 fulfill	 these	societal	differences	of	 fairness	(Yang	et	al.,	2015).	 To	 ensure	 that	 marginalised	 people	 are	 represented	 in	 the	 policy	 goal,	distribution	models	under	the	REDD+	pilot	scheme	in	Nepal	may	be	applicable.	Here,	pre-financing	 the	 poor	 to	 ensure	 that	 they	 are	 in	 the	 same	 position	 as	 the	 rich	 to	participate	 (rights-based	 approach)	 then	 providing	 further	 incentives	 that	 rewards	
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this	participation	(merit-based),	can	be	 included	(Nawir,	Paudel,	Wong	and	Luttrell,	2015).		Given	the	paucity	of	documented	evidence	of	agreements	found,	it	was	very	difficult	to	 gauge	 exactly	 who	 had	 benefited	 from	 the	 CRF	 inputs,	 by	 how	much,	 and	what	investments	were	made.	With	a	fair	number	of	residents	unwilling	to	be	interviewed	and	 those	 reluctantly	 agreeing	 feeling	 awkward	 or	 requiring	 lots	 of	 probing	 to	answer	questions,	 verifying	 transactions	was	difficult.	 Coupled	with	 inconsistencies	in	 facts	and	 lack	of	monitoring,	 there	was	no	guarantee	 that	what	was	cited	during	field	visits	has	materialised	in	real	life.	For	example,	during	a	focus	group	discussion	CBO	members	specified	that	they	received	35.6	million	Ugandan	shillings,	19.6	from	the	CRF	and	an	additional	16	million	as	forest	avoidance	fund.	With	respect	to	loans,	They	stated	that	these	had	been	used	in	the	construction	of	an	office,	a	coffee	pulping	machine,	beehives	and	other	livelihood	activities.	This	included	the	installation	of	48	biogas	units	 costing	2.2	million	 shillings	 each,	 some	of	which	HIEFER	 International	co-funded	 to	 the	 tune	 of	 0.8	 million	 of	 the	 cost.	 If	 all	 of	 the	 48	 units	 had	 been	subsidised,	 a	 deficit	 of	 67.2	 million	 would	 still	 remain	 (equivalent	 to	 more	 than	30,000	US	dollars	 at	 the	 time).	Whilst	 one	member	mentioned	he	had	 financed	 the	additional	costs	himself,	contributing	1.1	million	(approximately	what	farmers	make	in	a	whole	year),	of	the	sampled	households	in	the	area	only	8	(23	%)	actually	quoted	having	biogas	units.	 In	this	more	confidential	environment,	some	interviewees	even	claimed	 that	 a	 large	 sum	 of	money	went	missing	 and	 only	 a	 small	 proportion	was	used	as	loans.		Comparable	 to	 Le	 et	 al.’s	 (2016)	 assessment,	 the	 number	 of	 unrelated	 actors	 and	descriptions	 of	 similar	 interventions	 mentioned	 during	 discussions	 reveals	 that	 a	majority	 of	 smallholders	 were	 unable	 to	 differentiate	 MERECP	 from	 other	programmes.	 As	 numerous	 environmental	 organisations	 target	 the	 same	 CBO’s,	certain	 individuals	are	receiving	constant	consultation	and	 training.	Not	only	 is	 this	creating	 fatigue	 (witnessed	 by	 the	 difficulty	 in	 mobilising	 participants	 for	 this	research),	 attendance	 is	 becoming	 increasingly	 motivated	 by	 compensation	 or	 the	incentives	on	offer.	Reimbursing	time	that	could	have	been	used	to	produce	income	is	essential,	 particularly	 for	 poorer	 households	 where	 the	 opportunity	 costs	 of	participating	 are	 higher	 (Adhikari,	 Kingi	 and	 Ganesh,	 2014),	 however	 over	 time	
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groups	are	becoming	over-reliant	on	development	agencies,	mobilising	with	the	pure	objective	of	 	receiving	inputs,	a	phenomenon	also	documented	in	the	Philippines	by	Peras	et	al.	(2016).	On	reflection,	one	does	need	to	question	what	type	of	interactions	are	 occurring	 that	 has	 lead	 to	 such	 disengagement	 with	 the	 true	 purpose	 of	interventions.	 It	 is	 still	 the	 case	 	 that	 devolving	 financial	 ownership	 and	 control	 to	grassroots	level	is	ideal,	because	it	gives	rural	farmers	the	flexibility	to	invest	in	the	strategies	that	are	most	suited	to	their	needs,	but	to	take	full	ownership	does	requires	a	 strong	 level	 of	 technical,	 organisational	 and	 managerial	 skills	 that	 smallholder	farmers	seem	to	lack,	hence	their	failure	to	comply	with	the	term	and	conditions.		Transferring	 these	 resources	 efficiently	 under	 complex	 project	 designs	 is	 essential	and	 as	 case-studies	 in	 Indonesia	 (Myers,	 Ravikumar	 and	 Larson,	 2015),	 Vietnam	(Wong	et	al.	In	Prep)	and	with	the	CBO’s	that	had	strong	external	ties	highlight,	local	level	governance	institutions	play	a	crucial	role	in	horizontal	success	(Schreckenberg	and	Luttrell,	2009).	This	is	not	just	in	terms	of	supporting	local	communities	but	also	in	colouring	their	perceptions	of	equity,	motivating	behaviour	change,	creating	local	goals	 and	 installing	 a	 level	 of	 downward	 accountability	 (Fujisaki,	 Hyakumura,	Scheyvens	and	Cadman,	2016;	Loft,	Gebara	and	Wong,	2016;	Luintel,	2016).	Yet	 the	weak	 capacities	 of	 local	 districts	 (inadequate	 transportation,	 personal	 etc.)	 limited	their	ability	to	provide	this	support	to	very	scattered	groups,	particularly	in	the	much	needed	monitoring	 and	 evaluation.	 In	 some	 respects	 the	 fact	 that	MERECP	 did	 not	channel	 CRF	 funds	 through	 these	 intermediaries	 (though	 some	 small	 funds	 were	separately	 allocated),	 left	 them	 demotivated.	 Often	 underpaid,	 district	 officials	 also	need	financial	motivation	so	that	the	need	to	focus	on	other	money-making	activities,	especially	those	that	are	detrimental	to	conservation	objectives,	is	reduced.	Akin	to	a	merit-based	 system	 at	 the	 horizontal	 sharing	 level,	 rewarding	 districts	 that	 meet	specific	 targets	 (adequate	 planning,	 x	 number	 of	 field	 visits,	 written	 reports)	 may	motivate	 further	 involvement.	 Within	 this	 perspective,	 it	 should	 also	 be	acknowledged	that	local	institutions	are	not	a	single	entity	but	a	network	of	different	agencies	with	varied	objectives	and	areas	of	expertise	(Fujisaki	et	al.,	2016).	Learning	from	the	Kecamatan	Development	Project	in	Indonesia	(Hite,	2015)	and	pilot	REDD+	schemes	 in	 Vietnam	 and	 Indonesia	 (Dunlop	 and	 Corbera,	 2016),	 including	subnational	 capacity	 building,	 strengthening	 of	 social	 capital	 and	 giving	 adequate	
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operational	 support	 to	 as	 many	 of	 these	 organisations	 would	 help	 them	 provide	sound	 	 community	 support.	More	 co-operation	 between	 these	 organisations	would	also	avoid	targeting	the	same	CBO’s,	leading	to	clearer	measurement	of	their	impact	across	a	wider	number	of	individuals.	To	speed	up	this	process,	trustworthy	private	contractors	could	be	brought	in	to	develop	these	relationships.		
Who	should	be	targeted?			The	observations	made	on	Mt.	Elgon	highlight	 that	 it	 is	not	necessarily	 the	benefits	communities	receive	that	motivates	their	behaviour	but	their	inclusion	in	the	process	that	 is	 fairing	 well	 for	 conservation.	 Perceptions	 of	 justice	 are,	 therefore,	 not	universal	and	vary	depending	on	the	eye	of	the	beholder	(Corbera,	2015).	Given	the	billions	 of	 dollars	 that	 are	 required	 in	 rebalancing	 habitat	 degradation	 to	 build	effective	and	equitably	managed	Protected	Areas,	crucial	decisions	on	where	finances	should	be	channelled	need	to	be	made.	Below,	the	thesis	concludes	with	a	discussion	of	 the	general	 trade-offs	 that	may	be	 involved	 in	different	 incentive	mechanisms	 to	the	CRF.	For	 projects	 that	 are	 based	 on	 actual	 provision,	 i.e	 the	 number	 of	 trees	 planted	absorbs	 x	 metric	 tonnes	 of	 carbon	 which	 is	 sold	 at	 x	 value,	 tend	 to	 be	 the	 most	straightforward	 benefit-sharing	 mechanisms	 to	 implement	 as	 they	 mimic	 existing	market	 structures.	 With	 this	 design,	 wealthier	 landowners	 who	 have	 the	 space,	productive	 land	and	capabilities	to	engage	in	tree-planting	activities	are	more	likely	to	participate	(Kosoy,	Corbera	and	Brown,	2008;	Mahanty,	Suich	and	Tacconi,	2013).	As	 the	 recent	 amalgamation	 of	 Poverty	 and	 Environment	 Network	 (PEN)	 data	suggests,	 poorer,	 isolated	 households	 are	 not	 responsible	 for	 the	 highest	deforestation	 rates	 (Foss,	 2014),	 therefore,	 targeting	 richer	 landowners	 would	undoubtedly	meet	additional	criteria.	This	approach,	however,	could	not	claim	to	be	‘pro-poor’,	 nor	 a	 fair	 one	 to	 those	 who	 have	 historically	 engaged	 in	 conservation	efforts	 (Gebara,	 2013).	 	 Schreckenberg	 &	 Luttrell	 (2009)	 argue	 that	 the	 key	 to	providing	 rural	 people	 with	 a	 stream	 of	 sustainable	 and	 equitability	 benefits	 is	 to	adopt	poverty	reduction	as	a	stated	objective.		Not	forgetting	social	safeguards	presented	in	policies	such	as	REDD+,	(criterion	12),	which	 calls	 for	 ‘equitable,	 non-discriminatory,	 and	 transparent	 benefit-sharing	 and	
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distribution	 among	 relevant	 stakeholders	 with	 special	 attention	 to	 the	 most	vulnerable	 and	 marginalised	 groups,’	 an	 ‘individual	 needs’	 principle	 that	 favours	disadvantaged	 groups	may	 be	 a	more	 rational	 approach	 (McDermott,	Mahanty	 and	Schreckenberg,	 2013).	 Theorists	 such	 as	 John	 Rawls	 and	 Karl	 Marx	 justify	 such	distribution	 by	 arguing	 that	 societies	 are	 not	 created	 equal	 and	 that	 consequently	benefits	 should	 be	 channelled	 to	 disadvantaged	 groups	 (McDermott,	 Mahanty	 and	Schreckenberg,	 2013).	 Differentiating	 distribution	 methods	 according	 to	 socio-economic	status	and	gender	may	yield	the	most	effective	results.	This	could	be	in	the	form	 of	 capacity	 building	 or	 finding	 suitable	 incentives	 to	 meet	 specific	 livelihood	strategies.	 	 At	 least	 the	 initial	 findings	 from	 REDD+	 pilot	 schemes	 in	 Nepal	 and	Indonesia	 verify	 these	 assumptions,	 demonstrating	 that	 right-based	 approaches	generate	 more	 tangible	 and	 intangible	 benefits	 than	 performance-	 or	 input-based	alone	(Wong	et	al.,	2016).		For	 the	 case	of	protected	areas,	 like	 the	MERECP	cash-revolving	 fund,	 stakeholders	that	 incur	 the	 largest	 costs	 may	 be	 compensated.	 As	 seen	 in	 this	 study,	 given	 the	number	of	households	that	typically	occur	in	these	areas,	finding	sufficient	funds	and	alternative	 livelihood	 activities	 to	 compensate	 each	 community	 is	 extremely	challenging	 and	 expensive	 (Pinto	 and	McDermott,	 2013).	 If	 small	 revenue	 streams	were	divided	equally,	the	high	transaction	costs	and	ineffectiveness	of	small	amounts	of	compensation	are	unlikely	to	motivate	environmental	stewardship	(Wong	et	al.	In	Prep).	In	terms	of	short-term	efficiency	it	may	be	practical	to	target	those	who	have	a	history	 of	 high	 deforestation	 rates,	 although	 in	 the	 long	 run	 it	 could	 be	 counter-productive.	 Introducing	monetary	 incentives	 does	 not	 necessarily	 strengthen	 social	and	ethical	motives	to	conserve	and	can	even	go	as	far	as	eroding	forest	services	into	a	 single	 exchange	 value	 of	 receiving	 carbon	 credits,	 a	 phenomenon	 Kosoy	 and	Corbera	(2010)	refer	to	as	‘commodity	fetishism.’		
Conclusion			Adding	to	the	small	but	growing	body	of	literature,	this	much-needed	(Corbera,	2015)	practice-ordinated	 research	 has	 provided	 detailed	 insights	 into	 how	 three	dimensions	 of	 equity	 -contextual,	 procedural	 and	 distributional	 -	 affect	 local	participation	 and	 subsequently	 the	 outcomes	 of	 ICDP’s	 projects	 across	 Mt.	 Elgon.	
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With	 the	 unified	 policy	 aim	 of	 diversifying	 livelihood	 strategies	 away	 from	 the	protected	park,	it	explored	how	differing	operational	conditions	and	design	principles	can	shape	the	capabilities	and	willingness	of	rural	farmers	in	developing	sustainable	alternatives.		The	 story	 presented	 here	 reminds	 us	 that	 conservation	 is	 political.	 Political	 in	 that	people’s	livelihoods	are	involved,	money	is	at	stake	and	that	stakeholder	perceptions	of	 legitimacy	 and	 fairness	 come	 into	 play	 (Calvet-Mir	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 In	 hindsight,	 it	seems	 almost	 impossible	 to	 design	 a	 benefit-sharing	 scheme	 that	 does	 not	 create	some	clear	winners	and	losers	(Sommerville	et	al.,	2010).	The	decision	practitioners	opt	for	is	clearly	a	political	one	based	on	what	specific	goals	that	project	is	seeking	to	achieve,	 i.e	 to	a)	maximise	equity,	b)	 improve	equity	or	c)	do	no	harm	(McDermott,	Mahanty	 and	 Schreckenberg,	 2013).	 Despite	 being	 costly	 and	 time	 consuming,	 on-going	stakeholder	consultation	where	participants	have	the	freedom	of	choice	on	how	they	 manage	 their	 land	 is	 a	 key	 aspect	 of	 achieving	 justifiable,	 fair	 and	 equitable	benefit	sharing	mechanisms.													
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Appendix	I:	Guidelines	For	Household	Interviews		
A)	Selecting	Research	Assistants	and	Enumerators		
 Both	 the	 SNA	 and	 participatory	 mapping	 exercises	 required	 enumerators	 to	 have	some	level	of	expertise,	especially	as	they	need	to	actively	engage	with	participants,	asking	and/or	probing	responses	given	 the	context.	Equally	 the	research	would	not	be	possible	without	assistants	fluent	in	the	locally	specific	languages	found	across	Mt.	Elgon.	 For	 this	 reason,	 I	 sought	 a	 research	 assistant	 that	 had	 completed	 a	 degree	(particularly	in	social	sciences)	but	was	also	from	the	Mt.	Elgon	region.	In	particular	I	looked	for	the	following	skills:-		-Eagar	to	work	-Trustworthy	-Shows	good	communication	skills	-Someone	who	can	commit	to	the	whole	fieldwork	time	frame.			Coupled	 with	 extensive	 training	 before	 and	 during	 data	 collection;	 I	 was	 able	 to	obtain	 a	 balance	 between	 an	 affordable,	 culturally	 sensitive	 and	 capable	 research	assistant	 (although	this	did	not	go	without	 its	 fair	share	of	problems).	To	help	with	my	 selection	 and	 to	 determine	 payment	method	 (salary	 and	 bonus)	Rhoda	Nyaribi	(Mbale	 District	 Environment	 Officer)	 and	 Richard	 Gafabusa	 (Mbale	 office	 IUCN)	helped	arrange	the	interviews	and	provided	advice.				For	 the	 semi-structured	 interviews,	 the	 idea	 was	 to	 get	 the	 recoded	 interviews	translated	 and	 transcribed	 by	 an	 external	 party.	 Not	 only	 does	 this	 give	 additional	verification,	it	meant	both	my	enumerators	and	I	can	concentrate	on	conducting	the	interviews,	 rather	 than	 taking	 exhaustive	 notes.	 	 Unfortunately	 finding	 people	 to	transcribe	 the	 interviews	 was	 more	 challenging	 than	 I	 had	 initially	 anticipated.	Numerous	different	people	were	involved	(recruited	from	NGO’s,	the	local	university	
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and	 the	 church),	 the	 quality	 was	 poor	 and	 eventually	 due	 to	 time	 limitations	 a	number	of	interviews	had	to	be	directly	coded	for	the	analysis.		
B)	Meeting	Government	Officials	and	Community	Based	
Organisations			Steps	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 fieldwork	 period	 were	 taken	 to	 officially	 introduce	myself	 to	 all	 the	 relevant	 government	 officials,	 organisations	 and	 CBO’s.	 	 Clear	explanations	of	my	research	and	 its	 intentions	were	given.	Emphasis	was	placed	on	the	 long-term	benefits	communities	can	gain	by	engaging	in	the	research,	especially	with	regards	to	improving	the	management	of	CRF’s.	This	is	of	course	in	an	unofficial	capacity	 and	 I	 can	 only	make	 recommendations	 for	 the	 future	 rather	 than	 directly	affecting	 the	 programme	 myself.	 	 I	 clarified	 that	 my	 position	 was	 as	 a	 student	researcher	 and	 I	 cannot	 assist	 with	 compensation	 for	 loss	 of	 access	 to	 natural	resources	within	 the	 forest,	prosecute	 illegal	activities	or	 the	 failure	 to	 repay	 loans.	This	was	 reinforced	with	 the	 promise	 of	 returning	 to	 any	 villages	 involved	 in	 data	collection	 to	 discuss	 issues	 raised	 in	 the	 research	 and	 potential	 suggestions	 to	improve	forest	management	set-ups.	Contact	details	were	left	for	those	who	wanted	further	information.		Initial	meetings	in	this	capacity	not	only	served	as	an	introduction	forum	but	to	gain	detailed	information	on	the	real-life	implementation	of	CRF’s.	This	helped	develop	my	methods	 further	 as	 well	 as	 answer	 my	 research	 objectives.	 Questions	 that	 were	brought	up	during	such	meetings:		
• Main	ethic/religious	groups	and	 the	presence	of	ethnic/religion-based	 forms	of	segregation	or	conflict	
• Current	 population	 level	 and	 trends	 (migration	 issues	 or	 increasing	 in	mortality	rates)	
• Number	and	type	of	migrants	(permanent,	seasonal,	men	or	woman)		
• Poverty	levels		
• Main	livelihood	strategies	in	the	community	and	dependence	on	programmes	such	as	MERCEP	
• Current	tenure	and	decision-making	power	over	different	land	use	types	
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• Main	changes	in	land	use	and	the	provision	of	CRF’s	
• Internal	and	external	drivers	of	land-use	change		This	opportunity	was	also	used	to	identify	the	four	villages	I	chose	to	do	my	fieldwork	in.		Decisions	were	based	on	the	willingness	of	communities	to	participate,	how	many	members	have	been	taking	out	loans,	whether	repayments	have	been	made,	the	types	of	 activities	 communities	 have	 been	 engaging	 in,	 the	 distance	 to	 the	 national	 park,	whether	 people	 feel	 there	 really	 had	 been	 forest	 avoidance	 due	 to	 the	 project	 and	logistics	such	as	getting	to	and	from	the	village.	
C)	Well-Being	Ranking			Following	 Schreckenburg	 et	 al	 (2012),	 participatory	 well-being	 ranking	 activities	were	 conducted	 in	 each	 of	 the	 four	 selected	 study	 sites	 during	 their	 village	introduction.	A	focus	group	comprising	of	men	and	woman	that	live	in	different	areas	of	 the	 village	 and	 have	 different	 occupations	 were	 brought	 together	 in	 a	 spacious	area.	This	included	CBO	members,	participants	and	non-participants	of	the	MERECP	Programme.	 I	 introduced	 the	 overall	 research	 aims,	 highlighting	 that	 I	 am	 not	interested	in	where	households	rank	and	that	I	have	no	intention/ability	to	change	it.	Following	an	introduction	of	the	aims	of	the	focus	group	consultation,	the	group	were	asked	 to	 discuss	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘well-being’	 and	 ‘livelihood.’	 The	 dialogues	 were	centred	on	material	 ranking	 of	well-being	 i.e	 livestock	 and	non-material	 ranking	 of	well-being	i.e	education.	Using	drawings	and	symbols,	the	most	commonly	mentioned	material	and	non-material	indicators	were	listed	on	flipchart/board	or	on	the	ground.	On	the	basis	of	the	listed	indictors,	the	participants	were	then	be	asked	to	define	and	name	 four	well-being	categories;	 focusing	on	 the	productive	and	 income	generating	activities	 associated	 with	 each.	 Following	 this	 exercise	 participants	 were	 asked	 to	have	 an	 in	 depth	 discussion	 about	 what	 they	 have	 just	 created,	 making	 any	 final	adjustments	 if	 they	wished	 to.	With	 the	 results	 of	 the	 focus	 group,	 four	well-being	cards	with	the	key	indictors	listed	on	them	was	created.		
Categorising	Households	With	 the	 initial	 intention	 of	 stratifying	 each	 household	 into	 wealth	 category,	 the	diversity	of	attendants	coming	from	several	different	villages	made	this	challenging.	
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Instead,	 the	 most	 straightforward	 and	 robust	 indicators	 from	 the	 participatory	wealth	 ranking	 activities	 (Table	A.2),	 coupled	with	 indicators	 from	a	 large	national	household	survey	report	(Ministry	of	Finance	2001),	were	incorporated	into	the	SNA	interviews.	 Based	 on	 the	 information	 given	 during	 the	 household	 interviews	 and	following	 the	 descriptions	 during	 the	 focus	 group	 discussions	 (Table	 A.1),	 each	household	was	ranked	into	a	wealth	category	with	study	site	having	its	own	relative	degree	of	wealth.		
	
Table	A.	2:	Top	eight	indicators	used	to	measure	wealth.		
Asset	 Indicator	Human	Capital	 No.	Of	Children	Education		
Natural/	Agriculture	Capital	 No.	Goats	No.	Cows	No.	Sheep	No.	Pigs	Average	Landholding	(Acres)	Income	 No.	of	kg	sugar/month,	No.	of	bars	of	soap/month	In	addition,	an	on-site	assessment	of	housing	material	helped	categorise	respondents.						
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Table	A.1:	Results	of	Participatory	Well-being	Exercises	
CBO	1	
Indicators	 Very	rich	1%	 Rich	5%	 (Active)	Poor	75%	 Very	poor	19%	
Education	
-Private	-Degree	and	higher	level	-Boarding	-Most	go	to	school	
-Private-	no	boarding,	maybe	within	the	sub	county	-Some	diploma,	some	degree	 -	Government	schools	-Some	are	sponsored	-Senior	4.	Average	level	reached	
-Government	-Stop	at	primary	level	-Not	all	children	attend	school-cannot	afford	uniform	
Health	
-Private	hospital	-Can	travel	further	-Access	to	good	medicine-	abroad	
-Cheaper	private	hospitals	closer	to	their	homes	-Afford	treatment	for	small	diseases.	
-Health	centres	provided	by	the	district	-Most	die	of	cough	malaria	etc.	
-Health	centres	within	the	sub	county	-Use	herbs	from	the	forest	-Cannot	afford	medicine.	
Assets	
-Car	-Boda	boda	-Many	wives	-TV,	mobile	-Generator,	solar	
-Boda	boda	-Bicycles	-Phone(	mobile)	-Radio	
-Radio	(small)	-Phone	-Mattress	 -Mat	-1	wife	-Lots	of	children	
Land	 -5plots,	2acres+	 -3plots,	1	½	acres	 -1-2plots,	¼	-	½	acres	 -No	land	-Maybe	small	plots	
House	 -Permanent	house,	glass	windows,	doors-	iron	roof	 -Semi-permanent,	iron	sheet,	wooden	doors	 -Mud	house,	iron	sheets	 -Mud	with	banana	thatched,	no	doors	
Livestock	
-Cows	(6+)	-Pigs	(10+)	-Goats	(5+)	-Sheep	(2+)	
-Cows	(2)	-Pigs	(2)	-Goats	(1)	-Poultry	(20+	 -Cow	(1)	 -Two	hens	
CBO	2	
Indicators	 Very	rich	1%	 Rich	10%	 Not	very	poor	80%	 Very	poor	9%	
Crops	
-Coffee,	bananas,	plantation,	onions,	agro	forestry,	tree	diversity,	beans,	wood	lots.	 -Some	beans,	some	matooke,		some	wood	lots,	(trees),	maize	and	beans.	 -Bananas,	yams,	cassava,	beans.	 -Beans,	not	much	growth	or	land.	
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Land	 -3-5	acres	 -1.5-	2acres	 -1.5-	1acre	 -0.5	acre	
Food	
security	
-Rice,	chicken,	beef,	bananas	mature,	chapatti	(makes)	 -Immature	bananas	sometimes	eat	meat.	 -Yams,	beans,	pumpkins,	greens,	bananas.	 -Chapatti	(buy),	greens,	not	much	meat.	
Education	
level	
-Higher	education,	send	children	to	schools	like	private	schools	 -Send	children	up	to	public	secondary	schools.	 -Send	children	to	public	primary	 -No	education,	works	instead.	
Housing	
-Permanent	and	cemented	houses,	glass	windows,	bars	and	gate	 -Iron,	galvanized	sheets	for	roof,	semi-permanent	houses.	 -Mud,	cow	dung,	different	size	than	very	poor,	slightly	bigger.	 -Cow	dung,	thatch	roof	or	banana	fibres	for	roof,	mud	
Assets	 -Constant	supply	of	paraffin,	beddings,	radios,	TVs	 -1	bed,	half	bar	of	soap,	½	kilo	salt.	 -Make	own	beds	from	stakes	and	mattress,	some	soap.	 -No	bed,	no	soap,	mats,	buys	soap	for	200/=shs,	borrows	salt,	steal	items,	no	radio	
CBO	THREE	
Indicators	 Very	rich	5%	 Rich	15%	 Poor	60%	 Very	poor	20%	
Education	 -Private	school,	is	educated	to	university	level	 -Can	afford	university	education	 -Goes	to	free	public	schools	-Typically	ends	at	primary	level	 -Children	do	not	attend	school	
Land	
-Has	up	to	10	acres	of	land	-Hires	people	to	work	on	his	land		 -Owns	5-6	Acres	of	land	 -Owns	one	acre	of	land	-Casual	worker	for	the	rich	 -0-1/4	acre	of	land	Casual	worker	for	the	very	rich	
Health	 -Government	hospitals,	he	can	buy	medicine	 	 	 	
Livestock	
-30	Cows,	-10	goats	-10	pigs	 -6-7	heads	of	cattle	-5	goats	-4-5	pigs	 -1	cow	-2	goats	-3	pigs	 -None	
Assets	
-Buys	up	to	15	kgs	of	sugar	per	month	-Uses	10	bars	of	soap	per	month	-Owns	a	cars	
-Can	use	a	pressure	lamp	and	solar	energy	for	power	-Can	buy	up	to	10	kg	of	sugar	per	month	-Owns	a	motorcycle	
-Uses	paraffin	for	light	-Buys	3	kg	of	sugar	per	month	-Buys	1	bar	of	soap	-Bicycle	
-Uses	firewood	to	cook	-Buys	a	piece	of	soap	per	month	-Used	½	kilo	of	sugar	per	month	
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-Uses	electricity,	solar	and	biogas	 	
House	 -Permanent	house	 -Lives	in	semi-permanent	house	 -Lives	in	a	mud	hut	with	grass	thatched	house	 -Mud	hut	with	grass	thatched	house		
Food	 -Has	a	balanced	diet,	takes	food	everyday	 -Has	a	balanced	diet	twice	a	week	 -Mainly	eats	vegetables	 -Eats	food	once	a	day	
CBO	FOUR	
Indicators	 Very	rich	5%	 Rich	15%	 Poor	60%	 Very	poor	20%	
Education	 -Private	and	public	s4	 -Public	schools	senior	1-2	 -Public	schools,	drop	outs	in	-primary	5-	senior	3	 -No	education	
Land	 -1-2acres	 -1-2	acres	 -Small	plots	like	¼	 -No	land	
Health	 -Government	hospitals,	he	can	buy	medicine	 -Government	hospitals	 -Government	hospitals	 -Government	hospital	
Livestock	 -2	cows	-2	goats	 -1	cow	-1	goat	 -Chicken	-1	goat	 -No	livestock	
Assets	
-Phone	-Radio	-Pulping	machine	 -Phone	-Radio	 -Two	cell	radio	-Mattress	 -Mat	-Sauce	pan	
House	 -Semi-permanent	and	iron	-sheet	 -Semi-	permanent	with	iron	sheet	 -Banana	fibre	thatched	house	 -No	house	(room	with	another	family)	
	166	
D)	Ethical	Considerations			A	 number	 of	 ethical	 considerations	 were	 undertaken	 during	 the	 research	 period.	Firstly,	to	address	the	risk	of	disclosure,	all	data	was	stored	securely	and	anonymised	in	presentation.	During	interviews,	special	care	was	taken	not	to	directly	link	or	name	specific	individuals.	This	point	was	emphasised	to	both	my	participants	and	research	assistants	throughout	data	collection.		For	seeking	 informed	consent,	a	 full	explanation	of	 the	purpose	of	 the	research	and	what	I	will	do	with	the	information	was	given.	At	this	point	they	had	the	option	to	opt	out.	Due	to	literacy	and	sensitivities	over	using	signatures,	verbal	consent	was	sought.		A	final	consideration	about	rewarding	respondents	was	taken.	Due	to	the	presence	of	poverty	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 people	 gave	 up	 valuable	 time	 to	 participate,	 after	 a	discussion	of	gift	possibilities	with	Michael	Mbogga	(Makerere	University)	and	Rhoda	Nyaribi	(Mbale	District	Environment	Officer)	sugar,	salt	and	soap	was	given	to	each	household.		
E)	Consent	Form		Before	 each	household	 interview	 translated	 versions	 of	 the	 following	 consent	 form	were	given:	-	
What	is	the	purpose	of	this	research?	
This research is designed to share and learn how conservation interventions have been 
impacting communities living across Mt. Elgon. Data collection is primarily focused on 
capturing social-economic and land-use changes occurring in your area.  	
I am not a funder, therefore, I have no ability to provide finances or change the way the 
project is run. I am however, hoping to collectively present your feedback to the relevant 
organisations.  
 
This research is being undertaken by Lena Jeha and will be written up in a Doctoral 
dissertation and submitted within the Environment Department, University of York, U.K. I	have	research	clearance	from	Uganda	Commission	for	Science	and	Technology	and	Uganda	
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Wildlife	 Authority.	 The results will be fed back to these organisations and may be 
published in an academic publication (journal or book form).			
The research is funded through a three plus one doctoral studentship of the UK 
Economics and Social Research Council (ESRC). You will have access to the final thesis (in 
.pdf format) when it is available. Please indicate if you would wish to be sent a copy by 
providing an e-mail address.	
What	is	involved?		
Your participation in this research will include an in-depth interview with the 
discussion focused on social relations, information exchange and decision-making. 
You will be asked to list the people you interact with on-farm practices.  
 
You will have a choice regarding whether the interview will be recorded. Your 
participation in this research is entirely voluntary and you may decide to 
withdraw from the research process at any point before publication of the results. 
If you wish to do this, your interview transcript and recording (if applicable) will 
be destroyed.  
 
Your responses will be treated in complete confidence and will be made 
anonymous in the final report (see below). Transcripts of your interview will be 
stored securely and will only be accessible to a small research team. You will also 
receive a transcription of your interview.	 I	am	an	independent	researcher,	 therefore,	 I	will	never	divulge	any	personal	 information	you	give	me	with	anyone	else,	especially	UWA,	MERCEP	or	local	government.	
Note	on	anonymity	
	
Part of my research will ask you to list the names of those who have given you 
important information on farming practices. Consequently, these people will also 
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be asked to part take in the study. At that point your name will not be disclosed to 
the contacted participant. Furthermore, as they may refuse to participate, none of 
the names	 you	 give	 will	 be	 mentioned	 in	 any	 of	 the	 final	 publications.	 	 Instead	categories	 such	 as	 an	 organizations	 name,	 executive	 CBO	 members,	 ordinary	 CBO	members	and	non-participants	will	be	given.	Please	consider	this	issue	before	giving	me	consent	and	ask	me	any	questions	you	might	have.	Your participation is central 
to this research and I am very grateful for your assistance.			
F)	Semi-structured	interview	for	household	Interviews			
Basic	Household	Questions	Sub	County	__________		Parish	&	Village	______________________________	GPS	Waypoint	Number	______________________________	Dictaphone	Recording	Number	______________________________		
1. Name	of	respondent	(s)	________________________		
2. Age	of	respondent	(s)	______________________________	
3. Respondent	head	of	household	(Yes/No)?	
4. Are	you	involved	in	any	community	activities	or	in	any	leadership	positions?		
5. Marital	Status	______________________________	
6. Educational	Background	(Primary/Secondary/Tertiary	and	Literacy)______________________________	
7. Number	of	Children	and	their	highest	level	of	education	______________________________	
8. Number	of	goats/pigs/cows/sheep______________________________	
9. How	many	bars	of	soap	do	you	buy	each	month?	_____________________________	
10. How	many	kg	of	sugar	do	you	buy	each	month?	_____________________________	
11. Ethnicity	______________________________	
12. Approximately	how	much	land	do	you	own?		
From	the	aforementioned	information	place	a	HH	into	a	wealth	category	that	is	
the	most	fitting	to	the	characteristics	listed	during	the	study	sites	participatory	
well-being	ranking.		
Questions	on	Structure	of	Famer	Networks	
13. What	type	of	activities	do	you	engage	with	on	your	farm?			Horticulture		Bee-keeping	Tree	planting-	fruits,	indigenous,	exotic		Cows-Dairy,	Biogas		Coffee	
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14. Can	you	list	five	people	whom	you	seek	advice	for	on-farm	practices?		
15. What	type	of	information	did	you	discuss?		
	Western	Scientific		Indigenous	Knowledge			
16. How	often	do	you	engage	with	these	people?		
17. Did	this	knowledge	alter	your	farm	practises	in	any	way?	
18. Do	any	other	NGO’s	work	in	the	area	that	you	have	not	mentioned?		
Questions	on	MERECP	Networks	
19. Have	you	ever	heard	of	the	CRF	MERECP	programme?	If	no,	go	to	question	34.	
20. Can	you	list	the	name	of	five	key	people	that	gave	you	useful	information	surrounding	MERECP	CRF?		
	
															Farmers	Association																		MERECP																		UWA																		District	Forest	Officer																		District	Environmental	Officer																		Members	from	another	CBO’s,	please	list	their	name	(s)	
												Members	from	within	your	village,	please	list	their	name	(s)																Members	from	another	village,	please	list	their	name(s)																		Other,	please	specify			
21. What	type	of	information	did	they	give	you?		
	Micro-finance		Planting	Land-use	planning	Conservation			
Questions	Surrounding	MERECP	CBO	Management	
22. Are	you	member	of	the	MERECP	CBO?	(Yes/No)	If	ordinary	member	or	non-member	go	to	question	30.		
23. What	tasks/	work	does	your	job	in	the	CBO	involve?	
	Facilitating	meetings	or	getting	people	together	Finances	Voicing	personal	or	community	opinions		Communications	e.g	writing	down	minutes	of	meetings	Providing	direction	and	leadership	Being	accountable	to	stakeholders	e.g	sharing	information	with	non-members,	providing	training	etc											Dealing	with	compliance	issues	e.g	repayment	of	loans		
24. How	and	why	did	you	decide	to	be	an	executive	member	of	the	CBO?	
25. How	long	have	you	been	in	this	position?		
26. Have	you	learnt	any	new	skills	from	taking	on	this	role?		
27. Where	did	you	learn	these	skills?		
28. What	do	you	feel	you	would	need	to	enhance	you	performance?		
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Questions	on	MERECP	Loans	and	Benefits	
29. Have	you	ever	taken	out	a	CRF	loan	from	MERECP?	(Yes/No).	If	no	go	to	question	32.			
30. Why	did	you	take	out	the	loan?	
31. Are	you	able	to	repay	your	loan	(Yes/No)?	
32. If	not,	why	not?	
33. Would	you	consider	taking	out	CRF	loan	(again	if	repaid)?	(Explain	CRF	if	they	have	not	heard	of	MERECP).		
34. What	would	you	invest	the	money	in	and	why?	
35. Do	you	feel	the	introduction	of	MERECP	CRF	funding	has:		a) Affected/altered	you	well-being	in	a	negative	or	positive	way.	(Refer	back	to	well-being	cards	to	identify	key	areas	to	discuss	i.e.	income,	food,	jobs	land	etc.)	b) Changed	the	quality/availability	of	natural	resources.	If	not,	why	not?		c) Are	these	changes	solely	attributed	to	the	MERECP	intervention	or	other	factors	too?	Please	explain.				
36. Do	 you	 believe	 that	 CRF	 is	 an	 effective	 way	 of	 distributing	 finance	 for	 forest	conservation?	If	not,		a) What	do	you	feel	is	the	best	way	to	distribute	the	funds?		b) How	can	the	programme	engage	better	with	poorer	households?		c) What	 measures	 need	 to	 be	 put	 in	 place	 and	 challenges	 overcome	 to	 make	 the	programme	 for	 efficient?	 Do	 you	 have	 any	 suggestions	 how	 these	 can	 be	achieved?		
	 	
Other	topics	that	should	be	discussed	if	not	brought	up	by	participants:-	
-Interest	Rate	
-Repayment	time	frame	
-Accessibility	to	loan	i.e.	getting	a	guarantor	–	Is	it	is	easy	to	find	someone	to	lend	you	
money	in	the	village	when	you	need	it?										
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G)	Semi-structured	guidelines	for	management	officials			
Questions	for		Management	Offical	
	
1. Name	of	respondent	(s)	
2. Name	of	organisation	
3. Role	in	organisation	
4. Can	you	tell	how	you	became	involved	with	the	MERECP	programme?		
5. Have	you	ever	provided	stakeholders	involved	with	the	MERECP	programme	
advice	on	on-farm	practises?		
6. Which	particular	communities	did	you	engage	with?	Can	you	list	any	one	in	
particular?	
7. If	so	what	information	did	you	give?	
8. Have	you	ever	engaged	with	stakeholders	surrounding	the	MERECP	
Programme?	
9. Which	particular	communities	did	you	engage	with?		
10. In	what	capacity	have	you	worked	with	them?		
11. What	specific	information/training/capacity	did	you	share	with	them?		
12. How	often	have	you	interacted	with	these	communities?		
13. Do	you	feel	like	there	is	sufficient	information/training	for	community	
members	to	implement	the	project	effectively?	
14. If	not	what	improvements	can	be	made?	
15. Do	you	feel	the	programme	is	meeting	the	project	objectives?	How	about	the	
broader	REDD+	ones?			
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Appendix	II	Guidelines	to	Participatory	Rural	Appraisal	
A)	Facilitators	Guide		
Introduction	This	manual	is	designed	to	steer	facilitators	through	the	Participatory	Rural	Appraisal	(PRA)	 process	 I	 aim	 to	 undertake	 in	 Mt.	 Elgon	 Uganda,	 2014.	 	 It	 will	 outline	 the	purpose	 of	 each	 exercise,	 the	 questions	 that	 will	 be	 presented	 to	 participants,	 the	types	of	activities	we	would	like	the	participants	to	perform	and	some	general	notes	on	how	the	facilitator	should	be	running	each	exercise.		The	overall	objective	of	 the	PRA	 is	 to	evaluate	 the	 long-term	effectiveness	of	policy	interventions,	such	as	Forest	Restoration	efforts	and	Conservation	and	Development	Initiatives,	 in	 altering	 land-use	 practices	 in	 favour	 of	 environmental	 sustainability	(Dalle	et	al.	2006;	Semwal	et	al.	2004).		Whilst	an	extensive	review	of	forest	loss	and	recovery	over	the	past	four	decades	has	been	 assessed	 through	 remote	 sensing	 data	 (Sassen	 et	 al.	 2013),	 this	 research	 is	focused	on	capturing	a	more	detailed	understanding	of	the	social	processes	that	have	driven	 land-use	 and	 consequently	 conservation	 outcomes	 	 in	 the	 area	 (Dalle	 et	 al.	2006).		The	data-collection	process	will	include	six	main	steps:										
Step	1	 • Mobolising	Participants		
Step	2	 • Collecting	Secondary/Background	Data	
Step	3		 • Group	Introduction	• Gaining	Consent		
Step	4	 • Land-use	and	Conservation	Intervention	Discusssion	
Step	5	 • Participatory	Mapping	
Step	6		 • Trend	Analysis		• Management	and	Governance	Review	Discussion	
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Mobilising	Participants			Participants	 will	 be	 recruited	 through	 existing	 connections	 with	 local	 council	 and	executive	members	of	the	CBO	within	each	field	site.	A	maximum	of	10	people	from	differing	gender,	social,	economic	and	cultural	groups	will	be	included.	 	Two	groups	separating	 participants	 and	 non-participants	 will	 be	 created	 for	 each	 study	 site.	Special	care	will	be	taken	to	ensure	there	is	a	gender	balance	within	the	groups	and	that	specific	questions	are	aimed	specifically	at	engaging	them.	
Project	Description	for	Participants			“My	name	is	Lena	Jeha	and	I	am	from	the	University	of	York	in	England.		My	assistants	and	I	would	like	you	to	work	with	us	on	some	research	looking	at	how	conservation	interventions	over	the	past	few	years	have	been	impacting	the	communities	you	live	in.		We	 need	 you	 to	 help	 us	 understand	 who	 has	 been	 working	 in	 your	 area,	 what	information	or	resources	 they	have	given	you	and	 if	 or	 how	 this	has	changed	your	livelihood.	 	 More	 specifically	 we	 want	 to	 understand	 whether	 these	 interventions	have	 altered	 your	 resource	 use	 both	 on	 your	 farm	 and	 from	 the	 National	 Park,	 or	whether	other	factors	such	as	governance,	markets	or	your	values	have	driven	these	actions.		We	also	want	to	grasp	how	you	feel	about	such	interventions	in	your	areas	and	what	can	be	done	to	improve	them.		Please	try	and	be	as	open	and	truthful	as	possible.	Without	an	accurate	reflection	of	the	success	and	challenges	from	the	introduced	interventions,	the	implementation	of	such	projects	 cannot	be	 improved.	Bearing	 in	mind	 I	 am	an	 impartial,	 independent	researcher,	I	have	no	ability	to	change	the	way	these	programs	run	or	their	funding.	I	can	however,	guarantee	that	no	private/personal	information	will	be	disclosed.	This	process	is	about	sharing	information	and	learning	from	one	another.	The	activities	are	fun	to	undertake	and	not	too	time	consuming.	We	will	start	with	a	group	meeting	 –	 followed	by	 some	participatory	mapping.	 Snacks	 and	 soda	will	 be	
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supplied;	 however,	 no	 allowances	 will	 be	 given.	 Please	 feel	 free	 to	 ask	 as	 many	questions	as	you	would	 like	 throughout	 the	activities.	Equally	you	have	 the	right	 to	stop	the	discussion	at	any	time	without	giving	any	reason.	Is	that	okay?	The	 information	 you	 supply	 will	 be	 analysed	 by	 myself	 –	 and	 will	 collectively	feedback	 to	 the	 relevant	 organisations	 either	 through	 a	 progress	 report	 or	 a	published	 article.	 Again,	 no	 personal	 information	 will	 be	 disclosed;	 instead	 I	 will	highlight	key	emerging	themes	 identified	by	the	participant.	We	will	not	share	your	personal	details	or	personal	views	with	anyone	else	during	this	process.	Is	this	okay?	If	you	wish	to	take	part	in	the	activity	please	write	your	name	and	sign	next	to	it.		If	you	agree,	we	would	like	to	take	some	photos.	We	might	use	these	in	presentations	or	publications	about	 this	project.	 Is	 this	okay?	Do	you	have	any	 further	questions?	Can	we	start	the	discussion	now?	
Principles	and	Guidelines		Taken	 from	Schreckenburg	 et	 al	 (2012),	 the	 following	 key	 principles	will	 underpin	this	PRA	:-	
Mutual	Learning	During	 this	 PRA,	 an	 open	 methodology	 that	 encourages	 “natural	 conversation”	between	 both	 my	 research	 team	 and	 the	 participants	 will	 be	 introduced.	 The	emphasis	 will	 be	 placed	 on	 building	 rapport	 and	 a	 good	 relationship	 with	 the	community	by	showing	respect,	answering	questions,	and	generally	showing	interest	and	willingness	 to	 learn	 from	 residents	 (who	 are	 the	 local	 knowledge	 experts).	 In	addition,	 PRA	 exercises	 are	 expected	 to	 generate	 a	 space	 for	 debate	 and	 reflection	about	residents’	understanding	of	local	problems,	reasoning	behind	actions,	as	well	as	expectations.	Rather	than	a	one-way	flow	of	information,	this	PRA	aims	to	generate	a	collective	 learning	 process	 in	 which	 outsiders	 and	 insiders	 learn	 together	 through	those	exchanges.		
Passing	the	Stick			It	 is	 paramount	 that	 my	 PRA	 team	 let	 residents	 take	 the	 initiative.	 Although	 this	manual	 presents	 the	 set	 of	 topics	 and	 questions	 that	 will	 be	 discussed,	 the	
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instructions	 provided	 will	 not	 be	 taken	 as	 a	 clearly	 structured	 framework	 to	 be	imposed.	 Instead,	 facilitators	will	 guide	 the	 key	 topics	 of	 interest	 for	 the	 research,	allowing	participants	to	freely	contribute	to	the	agenda	of	discussion,	introducing	any	additional	pieces	of	 information	 that	 they	 consider	 relevant.	 Similarly,	 visual	 group	exercises	(i.e.,	drawings	and	diagrams)	will	be	oriented	by	the	PRA	team	but	done	by	participants.	The	symbols,	selection	or	ranking	criteria	as	well	as	the	key	topics	to	be	analysed	will	be	defined	and	represented	by	residents	in	their	own	terms.		
Participation		PRA	 exercises	will	 be	 conducted	 in	 a	manner	 that	 all	 participants—irrespective	 of	their	 age,	 sex,	 education,	 or	 cultural	 background—can	 take	 part.	 Although	 some	exercises	 demand	 a	 specific	 profile	 of	 participants	 (e.g.,	 women	 only	 groups),	 my	facilitators	 will	 be	 sensitive	 to	 any	 social,	 cultural,	 or	 economic	 differences	 within	those	groups.	Participants	of	different	socioeconomic	and	cultural	backgrounds	will	be	 given	 equal	 opportunity	 to	 contribute	 in	 terms	 of	 information	 and	 opinion.	 All	efforts	will	 be	made	 to	 avoid	 any	 potential	 bias	 in	 detriment	 of	 vulnerable	 groups	such	 as	 women,	 the	 elderly,	 very	 poor	 neighbours	 or	 ethnic/religious	 minorities,	amongst	others.	Likewise,	diagrams	and	tables	will	be	designed	in	a	manner	that	all	participants	will	be	able	to	contribute.	Symbols	and	other	visual	aids	should	be	used	so	as	to	allow	illiterate	people	to	participate	(if	they	are	present).	
Collecting	Useful	Secondary	Data		Given	 the	group	dynamic,	 I	will	use	 this	opportunity	 to	ask	whether	any	additional	information	 about	 the	 study	 site	 exists.	 	 I	 am	 particularly	 interested	 in	 accessing	documents	that	are	not	available	online.	The	types	of	data	that	will	be	useful	for	my	study	include:	-	
• Maps	
• Climatic	Information	
• Forest	Inventories		
• Reports		
• Dissertations		
• Census	information-derived	at	sub-county	level	
• Journal/Newspaper	reports		
• Community	Documentation		
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Introduction	and	Background		
Task	1:	To	identify	the	socio-economic	characteristics	of	the	study	site		
Introduction	to	task:	We	are	interested	in	finding	out	some	background	information	about	the	area	you	live	in.	In	particular	we	would	like	to	know:	
• Age/History	of	policy	interventions	in	this	area	(participants	come	from	more	than	one	village).		
• The	distance	to	the	nearest	road		
• Whether	most	people	have	access	to	formal	credit		
• Population	 stats	 at	 the	 Parish	 level-	 information	 derived	 from	 sub-county	office.		
Facilitators	Notes		
	All	the	information	discussed	during	this	exercise	will	be	transcribed	onto	a	flip	chart.			One	 facilitator	will	be	 taking	notes	 throughout	 the	discussion	 in	separate	notebook.	They	will	be	paying	attention	to	details	and	recording	any	information	missed	out	by	the	facilitator	running	the	task	(most	likely	me).			I	 have	 already	 captured	 some	 of	 this	 basic	 information	 during	 the	 focus	 group	discussions	and	well-being	ranking	exercises	so	this	discussion	should	be	kept	brief.		Participants	might	get	carried	away	with	village	history.		
Materials:	 Snacks	 (Chapatti,	 samosas	 etc.)	 drinks	 (soda/water),	 flipchart,	 camera,	colour	pens,	note-book.		
Allow	10	minutes	for	this	exercise		
Task	2:	To	identify	local	resource-use	in	the	study-site		
	
Purpose:	 To	 determine	 how	participants	 are	 using	 land	 and	why	 they	 are	making	these	choices.		
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Introduction	to	task:	We	would	like	to	know	more	about	how	and	why	you	use	land	in	your	area.	We	are	interested	in	knowing	
• What	 day-to-day	 livelihood	 activities	 do	 you	 engage	 with	 on	 your	 land	 e.g.	home	 garden,	 food	 crops,	 fallow	 land,	 cash	 crop	 plantation,	 taboo	 or	 sacred	patches	of	forest,	wetlands,	diverse	types	of	farmland,	etc?	
• Can	you	think	and	agree	on	a	symbol	that	represent	these	activities	e.g	cow	for	Zero-grazing,	bee	for	apiary	etc		
• What	type	of	harvest	outputs	do	you	get	from	your	farms?	How	much	do	you	typically	sell?	How	much	for?		
• What	 type	of	 trees	have	you	planted	 in	your	gardens?	When	do	you	harvest	them?	Is	it	enough	to	meet	your	needs?		
• Do	you	use	the	NP?	How?		
• What	type	of	benefits	do	you	receive	from	these	activities?	
• Are	there	any	other	drivers	of	deforestation	in	the	area?		
Facilitators	Notes		
	All	the	information	discussed	during	this	exercise	will	be	transcribed	onto	a	flip	chart.			One	 facilitator	will	be	 taking	notes	 throughout	 the	discussion	 in	separate	notebook.	They	will	be	paying	attention	to	details	and	recording	any	information	missed	out	by	the	facilitator	running	the	task	(most	likely	me).		
Materials:	 Snacks	 (Chapatti,	 samosas	 etc.)	 drinks	 (soda/water),	 flipchart,	 camera,	colour	pens,	note-book.		
Allow	30	minutes	for	this	exercise		
Task	3:	To	identify	exactly	which	environmental	organisations	have	been	working	in	the	area	and	what	support	they	have	given	local	communities-both	via	inputs,	policy	changes	and	training.			
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Purpose:	 To	 determine	 which	 environmental	 interventions	 have	 taken	 place	 and	what	 methods	 have	 been	 used	 to	 do	 so	 (distribution	 of	 benefits).	 I	 have	 already	captured	 some	 of	 this	 information	 during	 the	 focus	 group	 discussions	 and	 semi-structured	interviews.	The	idea	of	this	exercise	is	to	set	the	context	for	the	mapping	exercise	and	capture	any	missing	information.			
Introduction	 to	 task:	We	 would	 like	 to	 know	 what	 environmental	 organisations	have	been	working	in	your	area	and	what	support	they	have	been	giving	you.	Can	you	tell	us:		
• Who	the	main	organisations-	both	 local	and	external-	who	have	been	helping	you	 with	 natural	 resource	 management.	 Can	 you	 start	 with	 the	 first	organisation	you	can	think	of	then	progress	to	the	most	recent	so	we	create	a	timeline	of	interventions?	
• How	have	they	been	working	with	you?	Did	you	receive	any	training	or	inputs?	Did	 they	 introduce	 any	 technologies	 such	 as	 elephant	 grass,	 biogas	 units,	apiary/	 contours/trenches	 etc.	 Again	 can	 we	 create	 a	 symbol	 for	 each	technology/input.	 Did	 they	 help	 you	 design	 village	 plans	 or	 put	 any	 other	management	regimes	in	place	like	resource	use	agreements	with	UWA?	
Facilitators	Notes		
	During	the	first	mapping	exercise	we	will	let	participants	come	up	with	the	symbols	and	 corresponding	 colours.	 After	 that	 we	 will	 use	 the	 same	 symbols	 and	 colours	unless	they	want	to	add	additional	ones.		It	is	important	that	a	legend	for	each	of	the	map	is	created.	
	All	the	information	discussed	during	this	exercise	will	be	transcribed	onto	a	flip	chart.			One	 facilitator	will	be	 taking	notes	 throughout	 the	discussion	 in	separate	notebook.	They	will	be	paying	attention	to	details	and	recording	any	information	missed	out	by	the	facilitator	running	the	task	(most	likely	me).			
Allow	20	minutes	for	this	exercise		
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Participatory	Mapping		
Task	4	To	map	the	changes	caused	by	conservation	interventions	across	Mt.	Elgon.		
Purpose:	To	understand	how	conservation	initiatives	have	impacted:		a)	On-farm	practises	b)	Resource	use	of	the	NP	
Introduction	to	task:	We	would	now	like	you	to	map	the	specific	changes	you	have	made	in	your	area	from	the	knowledge	or	inputs	given	to	you	by	the	environmental	organizations	that	have	or	are	working	in	your	area.			
Facilitator	Notes			Looking	at	 inputs	 and	 changes	 caused	by	 the	 intervention	may	 result	 in	 a	different	symbols	being	used	for	the	participatory	mapping.	During	the	first	mapping	exercise	we	will	 let	participants	come	up	with	the	symbols	and	corresponding	colours.	After	that	we	will	 use	 the	 same	 symbols	 and	 colours	 unless	 they	want	 to	 add	 additional	ones.		It	is	important	that	a	legend	for	each	of	the	map	is	created.		Again,	one	facilitator	will	be	listening	and	noting	down	what	participants	are	saying,	while	the	other	will	be	engaging	with	participants,	helping	them	to	draw,	answering	any	questions	and	translating	everything.	Control	points	and	orientation	of	the	map	will	also	need	to	take	place	during	this	exercise.			Note	 this	 exercise	 is	 not	 about	 general	 land-use	 change	 but	 about	 capturing	 the	specific	 changes	 in	 inputs/land-use	 introduced	 by	 the	 project	 such	 as	 tree	plantations,	biogas	units	etc		
Materials:	 Snacks	 (Chapatti,	 samosas	 etc.)	 drinks	 (soda/water),	 flipchart,	 camera,	colour	pens,	note-book,	base-maps	and	acetate.			
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Allow	30	Minutes	for	this	exercise		
	
Output		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Task	6	To	map	future	changes	villagers	would	like	to	see	in	their	local	environment	in	ten	years’	time.		
Purpose:	 To	 identify	 ‘user	 inspired’	 and	 ‘user-useful’	 management	 approaches	 for	future	conservation	interventions.			
Introduction	 to	 task:	We	are	 interested	 in	understanding	how	and	where	you	 feel	natural	 resource	management	 can	 be	 improved	 in	 your	 area.	 Can	 you	 draw	on	 the	map	what	type	of	activities	you	would	like	to	see	in	your	village	and	where?		
Facilitator	Notes		At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 exercise	 participants	 will	 be	 reminded	 that	 we	 do	 not	 have	 the	ability	 to	 implement	 such	 changes.	 Instead	 this	 process	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 an	opportunity	to	reflect	on	the	changes	people	could	make	to	improve	their	landscape,	acknowledging	what	exactly	needs	to	be	done	to	achieve	it.			
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Again,	 during	 this	 exercise	 one	 facilitator	 will	 be	 listening	 and	 noting	 down	 what	participants	are	saying.	We	will	continue	to	ensure	only	one	person	is	writing	on	the	map	at	each	point	in	time.			A	picture	of	the	final	map	will	be	taken	at	the	end	of	the	activity.		
Materials:	 Snacks	 (Chapatti,	 samosas	 etc.)	 drinks	 (soda/water),	 flipchart,	 camera,	colour	pens,	note-book,	base-maps	and	acetate.		
Allow	30	minutes	for	this	exercise	
Trend	Analysis	and	Management	Discussions		
Task	7:	To	complete	an	analysis	of	perceived	changes	in	benefits	and	dis-benefits.		
Purpose:	To	quantify	(socially)	the	changes	policy	interventions	have	had	on	natural	resources	and	livelihood	in	the	area.		
Introduction	to	task:	We	would	now	like	you	to	reflect	on	the	mapping	processes	by	looking	how	your	changes	in	livelihood	activities	have	affected	or	will	affect	natural	resources	and	livelihood	in	your	area.		Let	us	begin	by	identifying	what	are	the	major	aspects	 of	 your	 livelihood	 and	 natural	 resources	 that	 have	 changed	 e.g,	 crops,	landholding,	soil	fertility,	water	availability,	household	income,	walking	distances	and	healthcare.		We	would	now	like	to	know:		a)	What	these	were	like	10	years	ago	b)	What	they	are	like	today	c)	What	you	would	like	them	to	look	like	in	ten	years		
Facilitator	Notes	
	As	the	discussion	takes	place,	a	matrix	will	be	drawn	on	the	flipchart	for	participants	to	fill	in.	Similar	to	creating	the	symbols,	we	will	let	the	first	group	determine	the	criteria	then	add	additional	ones	if	specified	by	other	villages.			
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Facilitators	will	continue	to	take	notes,	help	with	translations	and	ensure	everyone	is	engaging	with	the	activity.		
Materials:	 Snacks	 (Chapatti,	 samosas	 etc.)	 drinks	 (soda/water),	 flipchart,	 camera,	colour	pens	and	note-book.	
Allow	45	minutes	for	this	exercise		
Output			 Landholdings	 Soil	Fertility	 Crops	Cultivated	 Forest	Cover	
25	years	ago	 	 	 	 	
Present		 	 	 	 	
Future		 	 	 	 		
Task	8	To	identify	the	main	governance	issues	surrounding	resource-use			
Purpose:	 To	 understand	 what	 governance	 structures	 are	 in	 place	 and	 how	conservation	 interventions	 have	 impacted	 or	 been	 impacted	 by	 these	 dynamics	 on	the	ground.		
Introduction	 to	 task:	 	We	would	 like	 to	 finish	 of	 this	 appraisal	 by	 understanding	how	natural	resources	are	managed	in	your	area.	We	would	like	to	know:		
• Have	the	conservation	interventions	in	your	area	been	effective?	
• If	 so	 why?	 Were	 there	 some	 inputs/management	 techniques	 you	 liked	 or	disliked?	
• Do	you	understand	why	such	programs	have	been	introduced	in	your	area?	Do	you	believe	they	are	good?	
• How	do	you	think	such	programs	can	be	improved?	
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• Is	 everyone	 in	 the	 community	 is	 engaging	 with	 how	 conservation	interventions	 are	 being	 run?	 How	 often	 do	 you	 meet	 as	 a	 group?	 Does	everyone	attend?	If	not	why	not?	What	can	be	done	to	improve	this?		
• Do	you	trust	the	partners	you	are	working	with-from	local	government	to	the	NGO’s	 running	 the	 program?	 How	 transparent	 are	 these	organizations/committees?		
• Is	 there	 any	 form	 of	 political	 interference	 with	 these	 projects?	 What	 about	local	elites?	Do	they	influence	how	the	organisations	operate?	If	so	how?		
• What	can	be	done	to	improve	governance	surrounding	resource-use?			
Facilitator	Notes	
	Facilitators	will	continue	to	take	notes,	help	with	translations	and	ensure	everyone	is	engaging	with	the	activity.		
Materials:	 Snacks	 (Chapatti,	 samosas	 etc.)	 drinks	 (soda/water),	 flipchart,	 camera,	colour	pens	and	note-book.	
Allow	30	minutes	for	this	exercise	
Time	Management	and	Housekeeping			Allowing	a	few	minutes	between	each	task,	the	total	time	required	to	complete	all	the	exercises	 is	 approximately	 four	 hours.	 Considering	 the	 difficulties	 in	 engaging	participants	for	long	periods	of	time,	each	group	will	be	asked	to	attend	for	half	a	day	on	two	separate	days.		A	timetable	can	be	found	in	Table	A.		Six	maps	should	be	created	for	each	field-site,	giving	a	total	of	30	maps	for	the	whole	study	(including	trial).						
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Table	A	Day	One	 Day	Two	 Day	Three	
Arriving	to	Field	site,	collecting	secondary	data	and	organising	participants	for	the	next	day	
Members	Group		
9.30:	Arrival	time	for	members	
10.00:	Introduction	and	consent		
10.30:	Task	One		
10.50:	Task	Two		
11.	20:	Break-Provide	Soda	
and	Chapatti		
11.45:	Task	Three		
12.	20:	Task	Four		
13.00:	End	of	first	day	/Break	for	facilitators				
Non-Members	Group	
	
13.30:	Arrival	time	for	non-members	
14.00:	Introduction	and	consent		
14.30:	Task	One	
14.50:	Task	Two		
15.20:	Break	Provide	Soda	
and	Chapatti		
15.45:	Task	Three		
16.	20:	Task	Four		
17.00:	End	of	first	day.			Pack	up	and	ensuring	all	data	is	organised.		
Members	Group		
9.30:	Arrival	time	for	members	
10.00:	Recap	of	past	activates	
10.10:	Task	Five	
10:	45:	Task	Six		
11.15:	Break-	Provide	Soda	and	
Chapatti	
11.45:	Task	Seven		
12.30:	Task	Eight		
13.00:	End	of	PRA	for	members/Break	for	facilitators		
13.30:	Arrival	time	for	non-members			
Non-Members	Group		
	
14.00:	Recap	of	past	activities		
14.10:	Task	Five	
14.	45:	Task	Six	
15.15:	Break-Provide	Soda	and	
Chapatti		
15.45:	Task	Seven		
16.30:	Task	Eight		
17.00:	End	of	PRA	for	non-members.			Packing	up	and	ensuring	all	data	is	organised.			
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										B)	Trend	Analysis	Results								
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Acronyms		 ALP	 Alternative	Livelihood	Project	CO2	 Carbon	Dioxide	 	CRF	 Cash	Revolving	Fund	 	CIFOR	 Center	for	International	Forest	Research	CAPS	 Conservation	Agricultural	Production	Systems	CBD	 Convention	on	Biological	Diversity	HH	 Household	 	 	IGA	 Income	Generating	Activities	ICDP	 Integrated	Conservation	and	Development	Project	IUCN	 International	Union	for	the	Conservation	of	Nature	KADLACC	 Kapchorwa	District	Landscape	Chapter	LVBC	 Lake	Victoria	Basin	Commission	MECDP	 Mt.	Elgon	Conservation	and	Development	Project	MERECP	 Mt.	Elgon	Regional	Eco-System	Conservation	Project	NAADs	 National	Agricultural	Advisory	Services	NP	 National	Park	 	NGO	 Non-Government	Organisation	NUSAF	 Northern	Uganda	Social	Action	Fund	PGIS	 Participatory	GIS	 	PRA	 Participatory	Rural	Appraisal	PES	 Payment	for	Ecosystem	Services	PA	 Protected	Areas	 	REDD+	 Reduced	Emissions	from	Deforestation	and	Forest	Degradation	SNA	 Social	Network	Analysis	 	SPW	 Student	Partnerships	Worldwide	SL	 Sustainable	Livelihood	 	TACC	 Territorial	Approach	to	Climate	Change	UWA	 Uganda	Wildlife	Authority	UNEP	 United	Nations	Environment	Programme	WWF	 World	Wildlife	Fund	 	
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